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ABSTRACT

Over forty years since the Korean War, Americans
continue to face limited war as a fundamental challenge to
their security.

In order to help the public to deal more

effectively with the problem, this study seeks a pragmatic
understanding of limited war (i.e., one in which it is
possible to judge in retrospect the cumulative practical
results of previous limited wars).
two other objectives are sought:

In achieving that goal,

first, to model and

critically evaluate two types of knowledge used by
policymakers to wage limited wars; and, second, to detail
the development of such knowledge from its historical
origins in the Korean War.
The first model of knowledge dealt with is the
deductive theory of limited war.

In order to assess the

policymaking impact of the theory, the study addresses the
following questions.

What framework does the theory

provide for limited war strategy?

What variables are

identified by the theory to which policymakers must give
specific strategic content?

What logic does the theory

associate with the successful employment of limited war

vi
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strategy?

What strategic use did policymakers make of the

theory?
The second model of knowledge dealt with is derived
from Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger's 1984
speech to the National Press Club.

Reformulated to allow

for a comparison of five limited-war case studies, the
Weinberger criteria provide five open-ended questions.
What interests were used to justify the commitment of
troops to combat?

What were the political and military

objectives to be accomplished?

What were the main

decisions regarding and consequences of mobilization?

What

were the levels and timing of public support relative to
combat?

What combination of military and nonmilitary means

were used to achieve political objectives?

vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Since the Korean War, few ongoing national security
problems have proven more difficult to understand for
participants at all levels of the U.S. political system
than the problem of limited war.

In dealing with this

problem, this study has two concurrent goals:

(1) to model

and critically evaluate two models of knowledge (as defined
below) used by policymakers to wage limited wars, and (2)
to trace the development of such knowledge from its
historical origins in the Korean War.

Restating these

goals in the form of a research question:

To what extent

have past limited war efforts by the United States affected
its involvement in and conduct of subsequent limited
wars?1
^his study is subject to three caveats. First,
the lessons of history are generally ambiguous and open to
competing interpretations. Second, even in the presence of
broad agreement on appropriate lessons to be drawn from
particular historical cases, such lessons are open to
misapplication to contemporary cases. Third, in order to
increase objectivity and consistency in the treatment of
available cases, the results of this study are left open to
reassessment in view of alternative explanations and
additional information. These caveats reflect the work of
Alexander George, “Case Studies and Theory Development," in
Diplomacy. ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press,
1979), 43, 58.
1
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The primary difficulty in addressing this question is
the general lack of recent literature providing an aid in
judging limited war policies in contrast with the
phenomenon's continued development as a U.S. security
problem.2 Even allowing for recent experience in the
Persian Gulf War, it is debatable whether the United States
retains either the military capabilities to respond
effectively to threats or the political consensus needed to
persevere in war efforts.

The technologies, training,

types and uses of intelligence, and methods of operation
developed in the past for contingencies involving Soviet
and Warsaw Pact aggression have undergone trials by combat
against lesser adversaries.

However, such combat cannot

fully demonstrate the ability to control the use of armed
force.

There remains the constant problem that

disproportionate or indiscriminate force might be applied
merely to avoid the prolongation of conflicts threatening
domestic consensus.

There is also the more subtle problem

of being drawn gradually into costly, prolonged conflicts.
In either case, knowledge is effectively lacking.

2An important exception in this regard is
Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994). Placing limited war
theory in historical context, he provides strong empirical
evidence of a "complex learning process" (294) whereby "the
decisive use of force has become today's 'common wisdom'"
(311) in American foreign policy. This study complements
Gacek's work by directing more explicit attention to the
democratic processes needed for the accumulation and
articulation of empirical evidence in such learning.
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The task set for this study is to suggest and
establish the plausibility of the view that the development
of security policy regarding the controlled use of military
force can best be explained inductively, by the
accumulation of knowledge, through historical experience.
Assuming that theoretical knowledge can best be judged
after achieving some level of practical success, it appears
justified to proceed with an inductive demonstration of
such accumulation in limited war.

Two Models of Knowledge

The foregoing remarks are meant only to caution
against the limits of knowledge in relation to
policymaking.

As a matter of course, such caution is

appropriate in dealing with the period of limited war
theorization and debate that extended roughly from the end
of the Korean War through the early years of U.S.
involvement in the Vietnam War.

While the former war

provided an impetus for theoretical work during the period,
that work was deductive and proceeded primarily through
logical argumentation rather than empirical evidence.3
The resulting deductive model of limited war was not
subject to further development after the Vietnam War but

CO:

Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder,
Westview Press, 1979).
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did give rise to a host of derivative concepts (i.e.,
deterrence, signaling/bargaining, coercive diplomacy) which
have since undergone empirical examination by scholars.4
The deductive model of limited war corresponds to one
type of knowledge relevant to policymakers' selection and
implementation of strategies against adversaries, what
George characterizes as ’’abstract conceptual models of
strategies."5 Utilizing the characteristics attributed by
George to such models, this study poses the following
questions, in order to assess the policymaking impact of
the deductive theory of limited war:
1.

What "basic framework for understanding the
nature and general requirements for designing an
effective" limited war strategy was provided by
the theory?

2.

What were the "critical variable-components"
identified by the theory to which policymakers
had to give specific strategic content?

3.

What "general logic" did the theory associate
with the successful employment of limited war
strategy?

4Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence
in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1974).
DC:

Alexander L. George, Bridging the Gap (Washington,
United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993), 137.
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4.

What strategic use did policymakers make of the
theory?

(The answers to these questions provide the substantive
content of chapter 2).
Another type of policy-relevant knowledge referred to
by George is "generic knowledge" of those conditions
favoring successful strategic outcomes.

Such knowledge is

based on the "study of past experience that identifies the
uses and limitations" of strategies "and the conditions on
which" their "effective employment depends."

Moreover,

"generic knowledge is more useful" to policymakers "when it
takes the form of conditional generalizations" (i.e.,
generalizations that apply under specific conditions).6
Taking these two points into consideration, along
with the lack of recent scholarly attention to limited war,
this study relies primarily on an existing expression of
such knowledge in a speech by Secretary of Defense Caspar
W. Weinberger to the National Press Club on November 28,
1984.

The speech drew on previous U.S. war experiences

(particularly in Vietnam) to provide six criteria to guide
decisions regarding the use of military force.

Weinberger

held that policymakers should commit forces to combat only
after determining that:

(1) vital interests are at stake,

(2) sufficient forces are sent to achieve their objectives,
(3) political and military objectives are clearly defined,
6Ibid., xvii, 138.
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(4) objectives and means are subject to constant
reassessment, (5) prior congressional and popular support
are reasonably assured, and (6) combat forces are used as a
last resort.7

(The full text of the speech is given in

appendix 1).8
In order for this study to use the five criteria as
the basis for systematic comparisons yielding generic
knowledge about limited war, it is necessary to keep
certain admonitions in mind.

First, the criteria represent

prescriptive standards and must be converted into questions
capable of yielding verifiable answers (discussed more
fully below). Second, the criteria potentially attribute
"a greater degree of prescience and rationality" to
policymakers than can be justified, allowing of course for
the role of judgment in decisions.9 Third, the criteria

York:

7Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace (New
Warner Books, 1990), 433-45.

“Using the Weinberger criteria as standards of
comparison offers the chance to access their historical and
theoretical antecedents as well as to check the possible
effects of the criteria on subsequent U.S. limited war
involvements and conduct. More importantly, the criteria
focus attention on the issue of informing public consensus
through the translation of national interests into
objectives and means. The idea of utilizing the criteria
as comparative standards is based on Cecil V. Crabb, Jr.
Policy-Makers and Critics. 2d ed. (New York: Praeger,
1986), 265-71. The ideas expressed by Weinberger have
influenced decision makers in subsequent presidential
administrations, recently being reiterated under the
Clinton administration by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin,
The Bottom-Up Review: Forces of a New Era (Washington, DC:
U.S. Department of Defense, 1993).
9Crabb, Policy-Makers. 271.
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allow for reassessment of military efforts, given changing
circumstances, but stress the need for security objectives
to be pursued virtually irrespective of military costs.
Reformulated to allow for open-ended responses, the
criteria provide the following questions:
1.

What were the interests used to justify the
commitment of troops to combat?

2.

What were the political and military objectives
to be accomplished?

3.

What were the main decisions regarding and
consequences of mobilization for combat?

4.

What were the levels and timing of public support
relative to combat?

5.

What combination of military and nonmilitary
means were used to achieve political objectives?

Employing these questions as comparative standards
provides a chance to assess the degree to which the
Weinberger criteria identify "variables and conditions that
account for or explain the variance in the outcomes" of
past limited wars.10 More broadly, the questions should
contribute to a greater understanding of limited war as a
subject of expert inquiry affected by domestic politics.
In this light, the utility of deductive, conceptual models
becomes a matter of translating their insights into generic
knowledge through the mediums of communication and
10George, Bridging the Gap. 120.
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participation.

Developing the point more fully below, this

study seeks a pragmatic understanding of limited war.

In

this understanding, specific limited war situations become
subjects of reiteration in an ongoing public policy
inquiry.

Democratic political processes strengthen this

inquiry, providing a means of arriving at consensually
validated standards of military achievement and reassessing
standards in view of accumulating evidence.

Defining Limited War

Before it can begin to move towards an understanding
of limited war as a subject of ongoing inquiry, this study
must first answer a question.

What is limited war?

A key

problem in answering this question is that cases of such
war are highly context dependent.

An adequate definition

must permit comparisons without ignoring the variety of
factors that combine to produce individual limited war
outcomes. Moreover,
definitions of a complex phenomenon, . . . are often of
limited value; they should not be allowed to constrain
open-ended empirical analysis of the phenomenon but
should be used flexibly as starting points to
facilitate such analysis.11

CO:

“Alexander L. George, ed., Avoiding War (Boulder,
Westview Press, 1991), 8.
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As a formal matter, maintaining a definitional balance
between generality and specificity is necessary to the
induction of military experiences.
A useful starting point is provided by the U.S. Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who define limited war as ’’armed
conflict short of general war, exclusive of incidents,
involving the overt engagement of the military forces of
two or more nations."12 General war is "armed conflict
between major powers in which the total resources of the
belligerents are employed, and the national survival of a
major belligerent is in jeopardy."13 Incidents are "brief
clashes or other military disturbances generally of a
transitory nature and not involving protracted
hostilities. ”14
The JCS definitions contain three major variables.
These include the objectives (political and military),
means (types and amounts of resources mobilized), and scope
(location and duration of conflict as well as identities of
belligerents) of war.

Incorporating the three variables,

the following definition is offered of limited war from the
U.S. perspective:

The overt engagement of conventional

U.S. military forces in armed conflict against other
12U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington,
DC: GPO, 1989), 209.
13Ibid., 156-57.
“Ibid., 176.
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national military forces in which America's security
objectives are not linked to threats immediately involving
the physical survival of the nation, resources undergo less
than total mobilization, and troops are physically present
over some period of time.is
Certain operational features of U.S. defense policy
can be linked to this definition; however, they are not
applicable only to limited wars.

Military operations

generally include the following:

political control over

military forces; proportional objectives and means; selfimposed rules of engagement; and flexible responses based
on diverse means and a will to avoid the expansion of
war.16

lsThe terms of this definition reflect the range of
violence that occurs in limited wars. The definition
permits consideration of military activities that occur in
other forms of war (i.e., unconventional, nuclear) as they
affect limited war contexts. The meanings of the main
variables, as well as their relations to each other, remain
contextual. In other words, the variables reflect
"relationships that can be altered by deliberate acts of
policy." Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security
Studies," International Studies Quarterly 35 (1991): 212.
Generalizations, particularly of objectives, occur at
multiple levels of analysis and require explicit attention
to the identities and environments of actors. The research
goal is not only to establish coherent links between
military actions and their consequences but also to
distinguish which individuals and aggregations thereof
attempt to control these consequences.
“William V. O'Brien, The Conduct of Just and
Limited War (New York: Praeger, 1981), 222-23.
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Limited War Dynamics

Although by definition it focuses on limited wars
fought by conventional U.S. forces, this study recognizes
that such wars exist in conjunction with other forms of war
(as discussed below).

In other words, conventional forces

can be used in all forms of war.

Conceptual distinctions

must permit overlaps among the forms based on that
potential.
One form is unconventional war, also referred to as
low intensity conflict.17 Low intensity conflict is
political-military confrontation between contending
states or groups below conventional war and above the
routine, peaceful competition among states. It
frequently involves protracted struggles of competing
principles and ideologies . . . . It is waged by a
combination of means employing political, economic,
informational, and military instruments. Low intensity
conflicts are often localized, generally in the Third
World, but contain regional and global security
implications .18
Even applying the term unconventional, a partial list of
the conflict activities making up this form of war range in
violence from political and economic sanctions, through

17Michael Klare and Peter Kornbluh, Low Intensity
Warfare (New York: Pantheon, 1988); Sam C. Sarkesian, The
New Battlefield (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press 1986); D.
Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988).
18JCS, Department of Defense Dictionary. 212.
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peacekeeping, to support of or opposition to subversion,
sabotage, terrorism, coups, and insurgency.19
The other form is general war.

In both forms, the

potential use of nuclear weapons to supplement conventional
forces has provided an important motive for efforts to
limit wars.20 There is much support for the assumption,
the one shared by this study, that the use of nuclear
weapons other than in a deterrent capacity constitutes an
act of general war.21
The theoretical and contextual complications
introduced by nuclear weapons can be summarized around two
general issues.

First, when (if ever) should the United

States begin using nuclear weapons in actual combat?

19Richard H. Schultz, Jr., "Low-Intensity Conflict
and U.S. Policy, in Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern
Technology. ea. David J. Dean (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL:
Air University Press, 1986), 77. Specific types of
unconventional war activities are dealt with individually
as they affect limited war. Attention is paid to the
timing and significance of the activities relative to
conventional conflict.
York:

2°Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice (New
Harper & Bros, 1961), 75-94.

21Desmond Ball, Can Nuclear War Be Controlled?
Adelphi Paper, no. 169 (London: IISS, 1981); Desmond Ball
and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); Aaron L.
Friedberg, "A History of U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine'— 1945 to
1980," Journal of Strategic Studies 3 (1980): 37-71; Scott
D. Sagan, Moving Targets (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1989); Warner R. Schilling, "U.S.
Strategic Nuclear Concepts in the 1970s," International
Security 6 (1981): 49-79.
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Second, what means ought the United States keep in
readiness for all forms of war?22
This latter issue is of major significance to an
understanding of limited war and concerns military planning
as a relatively long-term process and a process subject to
the exigencies of any form of ongoing war.

Both long-term

and immediate plans involve efforts to anticipate
contingencies, with mobilization occurring at various
levels and stages in advance of and during wars.

The

purpose of mobilization is to assure the physical
availability of types and amounts of resources sufficient
to achieve objectives against the limiting factors (e.g.,
time, space, geography, and logistics) present in one or
more operational environments.

Admittedly, to the degree

that these factors "are calculable with some precision, the
military planning process, as it relates to the ponderables
of real or hypothetical situations, may result in carefully
prescribed and viable results."23
The conditionality of this statement is necessitated
by the dynamic nature of war.24 The relationships between
22Richard Smoke, War; Controlling Escalation
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 11-12.
23Elmer Plischke, Foreign Relations. Contributions
in Political Science, ed. Bernard K. Johnpoll, no. 213 (New
York: Greenwood Press, 1988), 216.
2“Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and
the Unpredictability of War," International Security 17
(1992-93). The author explains war as a nonlinear system,
the dynamics of which yield outputs disproportionate to
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objectives, means, and scope produce operational limits
relative to ongoing events.

It is possible to fight wars

of comparatively unlimited means and scope for limited
objectives, or vice versa.25 It becomes empirically
untenable to assume a “simple one-to-one correspondence
between extent of purpose and extent of method" in war.26
Unable to assume such correspondence between
objectives and means, the question of the means that should
be mobilized before and during any form of war is
complicated and ambiguous.

Military plans are made with

incomplete foreknowledge of the initial forms of war in
which U.S. forces will engage and the possibilities for
expanded engagement (i.e., in more than one war or form of
war at a time).

In order to cope with these uncertainties,

U.S. plans and actions tend to stress the flexibility of
conventional forces.
An indication of this stress is provided by the
mobilization of conventional forces for combat in
unconventional, limited, and general war.

Such

inputs and irreducible interactions among variables.
“According to Smoke, War. 14, U.S. forces fought
"comparatively unlimited wars" for what ended up being
limited objectives in Korea and Vietnam. Even though this
position can be contested in view of the broad objective of
containing Communist expansion, the examples suggest useful
counterpoints to U.S. operations in Grenada and Panama. It
can be argued that U.S. forces fought comparatively limited
wars for unlimited objectives (i.e., overthrowing hostile
governments) in the last two cases.
“Ibid.
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mobilization provides for operational continuity among all
three forms of war, enabling them to be arrayed along a
spectrum of conflict.

Rather than being an arbitrary

matter, correspondence between the forms of war and the
scale of conventional mobilization depends on the
willingness and ability to deliberately control the use of
force.

Given the relative uncertainties behind military

planning, the spectrum necessarily permits areas of overlap
between the forms.

In any particular context, these areas

are contingent on two factors:

first, the primary form(s)

of war for which conventional forces are mobilized and,
second, the degree to which that mobilization detracts from
the ability to support objectives in other environments.27
These factors can combine at some point to lead to the
supplementation of standing conventional forces with those
that are reconstituted or newly created,28 as shown in
figure 1.

27Relatively small conventional forces may be
required for limited war (i.e., Grenada and Panama), while
large forces may be required for unconventional war
activities during limited war (i.e., Vietnam). Moreover, a
variety of scenarios suggest possibilities for the onset of
nuclear warfare to reduce chances to carry out conventional
mobilization. Harvard Nuclear Study Group, "The Shattered
Crystal Ball: How Might a Nuclear War Begin?" in
International War, 2d ed., ed. Melvin Small and J. David
Singer (Chicago: Dorsey, 1989), 355-68.
28U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Miliary Net
Assessment (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense,
Office of the Secretary, 1992), 3-1 - 3-2.
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Standing Forces

'
■
t

Reconstituted
Forces

U.S. Based Forces

Scale of
U.S.
Mobilization

Forces in Combat
Forward Based
Forc8si

Nudear Forces

Unconventional War

'

i

Limited War

S General War

Spectrum of Conflict

Fig. 1. The spectrum of conflict and mobilization of U.S.
conventional forces for combat.
Source:

Adapted from JCS.29

Note: The source defines the spectrum according to the
geographic scope of war. U.S. based forces include reserve
components. No distinction is made between operational
deployments and the onset of combat.

29Ibid. , 3-1.
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At issue above is timing, which can be defined as the
initial engagement in a particular form of war and
subsequent opportunities to mobilize conventional forces in
order to preclude or carry out expanded engagement.
Subject to the timing of war, it is conceivable for plans
and preparations to offset constraints on available combat
resources, particularly when mobilization includes
reconstitution efforts.

In this sense, mobilization at all

levels can be graduated into stages reflecting the temporal
proximity of general war.

At a stage furthest from the

onset of general war, plans are general, and preparations
involve efforts to maintain programs for resource
allocation as well as methods to prepare and test
resources.

Examples of activities during this stage

include the following:

assuring that standby authorities,

legislation, and the Selective Service System are in place,
maintaining a pool of trained personnel, stocking certain
components, and continuing research and development.

At a

stage proximate to general wars, plans and preparations are
geared to manage more specific crises.

Actions can be

taken which were prevented earlier due to resource
constraints and the lack of more specific objectives.
Examples of activities during this stage include surging
production of certain weapons as well as purchasing
hardware requiring long production periods in anticipation
of further production increases.

During a national
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emergency or war, industrial and personnel mobilizations
are made in anticipation of further mobilization
approaching totality,30 as shown in figure 2.
Allowing for both physical and political constraints,
the availability of combat resources only partially
explains the varying limits of U.S. war efforts up to total
mobilization.

There might be situations in which U.S.

technical and numerical superiority over opponents makes
for apparently predictable military outcomes such that
initial mobilizations effectively preclude the need for
expanded war efforts to achieve objectives (e.g., Grenada).
Even in such situations, however, outcomes depend on the
tactical and strategic uses made of available resources.31
Whatever theoretical and practical significance is
attached to the superiority of U.S. resources as a
determinant of U.S. military success, resources attain
importance in general according to their effective use in

3°Ibid., 10-5.
31Tactics are the planning and execution of
individual engagements during a war. Strategy is the
coordination of engagements with one another in order to
achieve the objectives of a war. Strategy determines the
times when, locations where, and forces with which
engagements are fought, providing for tactical resources
and relying on tactical results. Carl Von Clausewitz, On
War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 128, 196.
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combat.33 Resources are necessary, but they are not
always sufficient to assure successful military outcomes.
This is not to argue that operational decisions
affecting the use of resources are more important to
military outcomes than resources themselves.

Such an

argument oversimplifies an issue requiring more rigorous
treatment, the variation of limits due to the interaction
of objectives and means.

Political conditions establish

initial relationships between objectives and means.
Political decisions influence military command and are
influenced in turn by the political consequences of
military decisions.

Generalizing operations to include the

highest levels of authority, the coincidence of political
and military objectives common to total mobilization is
also possible at various lower limits due to the ultimate
locus of strategic responsibility in government.

However

much of political discourse is accomplished through
military means, whatever modifications are exerted on

33Ibid., 95-97. Clausewitz (204-13) defines
effectiveness according to four issues: concentrating
forces in space, holding forces in reserve to achieve
successive results, using reserves for strategically
decisive operations, and maximizing combat-related action
(204-13). He holds that there are usually a variety of
ways by which a weaker power can try to offset the
conventional advantages of a stronger power. This is in
keeping with his overall stress on the utter importance to
military outcomes of moral factors, factors that "cannot be
classified or counted" (184). He allows that the readily
quantifiable physical factor of numerical superiority can
be decisive in those outcomes relative to all other factors
affecting them (194-97).
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policy by military decisions, the precise mix and measure
of resources devoted to war remains subject to the
strengths and weaknesses of political decisions.34 As has
more recently been observed, "gross military capabilities
provide only the ingredients from which planners must
develop usable options," options that political leaders can
and will use along with nonmilitary resources to achieve
limited objectives.35
The significant question above is the degree to which
knowledge of specific operational contexts helps actors in
the U.S. political system to achieve their objectives
through combat mobilizations, especially in contexts where
war efforts undergo expansion.36 The term for the dynamic

34Ibid., 81-89, 605-08.
3SGeorge, Avoiding War. 16. The differences
between "gross capabilities" and "usable options" are
elaborated in Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and
William E. Simons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), ch. 1.
360f the relationship between objectives and means,
Clausewitz, On War. 585-86, says that
To discover how much of our resources must be mobilized
for war, we must first examine our own political aim
and that of the enemy. We must gauge the strength and
situation of the opposing state. We must gauge the
character and abilities of its government and people
and do the same in regard to our own. Finally, we must
evaluate the political sympathies of other states and
the effect the war may have on them.
It is obvious that, however partial and transitory,
knowledge in war must include reference to the enemy.
Objectives and means relate to each other mainly through
their interaction with opposing counterparts.
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of war expansion is escalation.

Escalation is any action

that exceeds the current limits of a war as defined by its
more or less salient contextual features (i.e., objectives,
means, and scope).

Limits vary within and between wars

relative to the knowledge that actors have of the
consequences of their actions.

Actors have more or less

accurate knowledge that particular actions and opponents'
potential reactions will interact to produce contexts
promoting new actions that will exceed still other salient
limits.37
Locating the dynamics of war in political knowledge
has several implications, not the least of which is to
reinforce the need to recognize the mutual effects of
objectives and means.

Primacy accorded to objectives as

extensions of such knowledge is qualified by their
adaptation to means selected over the course of a war.
Given that wars at all levels of mobilization are political
acts, policymakers must initially determine the type of war
in which they are engaging, judging as well as possible at
the outset what means are needed to achieve their
:7Smoke, War. 34-35. Smoke (29) is concerned only
with those cases of escalation that demonstrate a
"potentially open-ended cyclical sequence" of events driven
by less accurate knowledge of consequences. This study
shares Smoke's concern but draws on cases of close-ended
escalation to explore the interactions of several
variables: the superiority of resources and knowledge
requirements, the salience of time constraints and the
significance of immediate consequences, and the
decisiveness of military outcomes and the quality of public
inputs into political decisions.
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objectives.33 This holds to whatever extent that observed
limits involve mobilization that protracts or ends combat.

Defining Pragmatism

Pragmatism is a methodology that seeks the meanings
of concepts in their consequences for human experiences and
actions and that provides consensual bases for truth(s) in
the agreed opinions of those participating in ongoing
inquiries.39 Various tenets are associated with this
definition.

These include the following:

adherence to

syncretism, skepticism of a priori belief systems, belief
in continuous interaction between the mental and physical
efforts of humans on one hand and problems presented by
environmental changes on the other, stress on the
importance of contextual understanding in problem solving,
stress on the need to constantly evaluate the relations
between ends and means, treatment of science as a
community-based endeavor between expert inquirers and
others in society, acceptance of the fallibility of
knowledge, belief in the possibility of human progress in
terms of improving scientific methods and applying them to
increasingly complex social problems, preference for

33Clausewitz, On War. 87-89.
39A.R. Lacey, A Dictionary of Philosophy (Boston:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), 168.
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evolutionary changes in human affairs, and adherence to
democratic forms of association as the most conducive of
progress.40
The above definition and list of tenets differ in
important respects from other uses of the concept of
pragmatism in studies of foreign policy and international
relations.

Perhaps most basically, there is a tendency for

the label "pragmatic" to be associated with students or
practitioners of realism.41 That label is apt in some
regards, but is does not account for pragmatism7s regard
for the concept of power as a means of achieving other ends
related to human welfare.42 In a related vein, there has
been a tendency for some scholars, working at the level of
individual decision makers, to disassociate pragmatic
behavior from its welfare orientation and to associate such
behavior with a lack of principles.43
4°Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., The American Approach to
Foreign Policy: A Pragmatic Perspective. The Credibility
of Institutions, Policies and Leadership, ed. Kenneth W.
Thompson, vol. 2 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,
1985), 9-11; Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Diplomacy and
the Pragmatic Tradition. Political Traditions in Foreign
Policy Series, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 83-86, 125-127.
41Greg Russell, Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics
of American Statecraft (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State
University Press, 1990).
42Crabb, American Diplomacy. 112, 227-28.
43Inis L. Claude, Jr., “The Tension Between
Principle and Pragmatism in International Relations,"
Review of International Studies 19 (1993): 215-26; John G.
Stoessinger, Crusaders and Pragmatists. 2d ed. (New York:
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In an approach to the study of collective learning in
government, Ernst Haas uses the label "pragmatic" to
connote a particular decision-making style among others
combining the goals of politicians with the scientific
knowledge used by experts in attaining those goals.

The

"pragmatic" style involves pursuit of a specific or
singular policy outcome over a long period of time with the
use of expert knowledge that is moving towards greater
consensus.44 Such knowledge is systematic in the sense
that it results in increasingly complex sets of public
policy problems that draw on past accumulations of
knowledge and begin to moderate competition among political
interests.

Still, politicians make selective use of such

knowledge based on ideological preconceptions.45
This study employs pragmatism in a way that differs
from those above in its treatment of interest-based
politics.

Power is not considered an end in itself.

This

W.W. Norton, 1985).
44Ernst B. Haas, "Collective Learning," in Learning
in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy, eds. George W. Breslauer
and Philip E. Tetlock (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991),
68-69. Haas (65) defines consensual knowledge as
"generally accepted understandings about cause-and-effect
linkages about any set of phenomena considered important by
society, provided only that the finality of the accepted
chain of causation is subject to continuous testing and
examination through adversary procedures." A fuller
elaboration of Haas' ideas on the relation of expert
knowledge and political decisions, particularly those
involving the development of international organizations,
is not attempted here.
45Ibid., 88-89.
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calls into question any assumption of an objective national
interest capable of guiding security policies apart from
the values expressed through domestic political activities.
Competition among interests is treated as a process
necessary to provide information of common social concerns
to scientific inquirers and politicians who make use of
their knowledge.

Although competition insures neither

responsiveness to social concerns nor policies informed by
cumulative knowledge, constant dissent and consent in
accordance with democratic ideals are required if policy
relevant knowledge is to accumulate from iterative
solutions to public problems.46

Limited War and Pragmatism

The relevance of pragmatism to the study of limited
war derives from several propositions.

First, the

phenomenon of limited war remains a central concern of U.S.
security policy but has not been developed by scholars as
have other concepts in the literature of security studies.
Second, in order to understand limited war, it is necessary
46John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New
York: Henry Holt, 1927), ch. 6. Democracy is defined here
as an ideal whose realization depends on social inquiry in
which "the persons for whom something is a problem must
themselves partake in the inquiry, must come to agreement
on goals and means, and must themselves test the proposed
solution in terms of its effects on their lives." Charles
Morris, The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (New
York: George Braziller, 1970), 161-62.
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to view the phenomenon and its associated literature in
historical context.

Third, in this context, limited war

exists as a subject of expert inquiry with consequences
accessible to members of U.S. society through democratic
political processes.
The pragmatic thrust of these three propositions is
in support of public opinion as an arbiter of decisions to
use limited military force.

Short of general war, what

constitutes an interest vital enough to prompt U.S.
military action usually “emerges only from an authentically
democratic aggregation of domestic preferences."47
This position ameliorates the conception of an
objective national interest accessible only to certain
experts or political leaders as well as the view of the
public as capable of judging only the ideological contents
of security policies.

The improved versions of these

policies offer empirical standards of success open to all
members of society.

These standards are attained when

abstract, nonoperational goals are translated into
specific, operational objectives and communicated to the
public along with means needed to achieve them.

Short of

unambiguous threats to national security, the main
47Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 168. Notable
efforts to relate security policy and democracy include
Robert Dahl, Controlling Nuclear weapons (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 1985) and Bruce Russett,
Controlling the Sword (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1990).
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standards for judging the success of policy actions are
those inherent in the rules governing democratic discourse
and participation.48 Do the limits observed in wars arise
from the efforts of political leaders to form and maintain
consensus around objectives and means?
Apart from normative grounds for doing so, there are
growing evidentiary grounds to suggest an affirmative
answer.

The public is generally moderate in its foreign

policy leanings as seen in its expressions of support for
U.S. presidents moderating their own actions towards the
Soviet Union.49 This is supported by Shapiro and Page,
who demonstrate that U.S. public opinion is highly stable
and rationally responds to both domestic and international
events.50 Moreover, public opinion is divisible into four
stable dimensions reflecting varying degrees of willingness
to utilize force (e.g., use force, cooperate rather than
use force, use force only in cooperation with other

48Nincic, Democracy. 166-67.
49Miroslav Nincic, "The United States, the Soviet
Union and the Politics of Opposites," World Politics 40
(1988): 452-75.
“Robert Y. Shapiro and Benjamin I. Page, "Foreign
Policy and the Rational Public," Journal of Conflict
Resolution 32 (1988): 211-47. This provides substantial
confirmation of earlier works which "established, for the
United States and several European countries, that
sustained change in basic attitudes resulted only from
repeated, dramatic events." Russett, Controlling the
Sword. 93.
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nations, avoid cooperation and force).51 A key finding is
that "a new 'post post-Vietnam' pattern has emerged in
which public support" for the limited use of force "varies
according to" its "principal policy objective."
Accordingly, the public can distinguish between the
objective of restraining aggressors (e.g., Saddam Hussein)
and of carrying on interference in other nations' political
systems (e.g., Panama), generally supporting the former
objective.52
The suggestion offered on the basis of the above
evidence is that the limits in war emerge largely from a
consensuaily arrived at balance of objectives and means
within a domestic context.

This is only to point out that

the domestic political context of limited war is at least
as important as its foreign context.

Allowing for the

knowledge that military leaders have of their opponents'
intentions, communication of objectives and means is placed
at a premium.

Including the public among those involved,

5101e Holsti and James N. Rosenau, "Domestic and
Foreign Policy Belief Systems Among American Leaders,"
Journal of Conflict Resolution 32 (1988): 248-94; Eugene R.
Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 1990).
52Bruce W. Jentleson, "The Pretty Prudent Public:
Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military
Force," International Studies Quarterly 36 (1992): 49-50.
Jentleson's work is highly suggestive, offering insights
into the potential links between changes in the U.S.
conduct of war and public opinion.
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the knowledge needed to wage limited war emerges from
specific contexts rather than abstract speculation.
The goal of this study can be restated by way of a
caveat.

Domestic consensus and pragmatism can never

accumulate absolutely certain knowledge in judging policy
objectives, not that such an attempt is a viable option.
Objectivity is retrospective, "the judgment that after
enough success and consistency in practice and prediction
[of policy outcomes], a theoretical application works as it
does because it gets things right."S3 Although this study
deals directly with the question of relating past U.S.
limited wars to subsequent involvements and modifications
of conduct, it does not seek to validate the prescriptive
standards established by the Weinberger criteria for
military actions.

The primary goal is to explore limited

war as a product of expert inquiry shaped by democratic
practice.
By way of a further caveat, democracy is not a
panacea for an effective understanding of problems like
limited war.

Particularly in relation to this problem,

consensus can be manipulated by political leaders (e.g.,
urges to rally around the flag). Although this problem
inhibits informed consensus, its effects are temporary and

S3C. G. Prado, The Limits of Pragmatism (Atlantic
Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1987), 159.
Pragmatism has to offer some method of ascertaining
progress.
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potentially a source of negative public support relative to
the duration of war.5*

Research Method

In order to explore the topic of limited war as a
subject of inquiry with consequences affecting the U.S.
public, this study employs what George characterizes as a
"systematic progression of . . . controlled comparisons,"
the method of structured-focused comparison.55 Based on
the definition of limited war offered earlier, five cases
(e.g., Korea, Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, and the Persian
Gulf) are available for comparison.
Each case is asked the same set of questions, in
order that limited war theory can be linked inductively to
its strategic applications.

These questions are a means of

making "contingent empirical generalizations— contingent
because they apply only under certain (specified)
conditions, and empirical because they are derived from
analyses of multiple historical cases."

Generalizations

are possible because the five cases are evaluated using the
same operational concepts.

The diverse contexts of the

cases are given a common, theoretical viewpoint enabling
accumulated findings to be applied towards subsequent
5*Russett, Controlling the Sword. 151.
ssGeorge, "Case Studies," 59.
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limited war problems and theorization.

Essentially, the

motive for adopting the method of structured-focused
comparison is to arrive at an understanding of limited war
that is "neither purely descriptive nor derived from more
general propositions about human" actions.56
Unlike early refinements of this inductive method57
and more recent applications,58 this study derives its
operational questions from a statement of policy rather
than previous scholarly research.59 This statement is, as

“Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational
Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," World
Politics 61 (1989): 147. According to Achen and Snidal,
the focused comparative method is poorly equipped to
produce systematic theoretical accumulations or to test
hypotheses given its modest requirements in selecting data.
Nevertheless, such requirements are complementary of
formal, deductive theory because they generate variables,
provide contingencies explainable by theory, and generate
antecedent knowledge for statistics.
57George "Case Studies"; George and Smoke,
Deterrence: Smoke, War.
“Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley and
Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.— Soviet Security Cooperation
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Paul K. Huth,
Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 1988); Jonathan Shimshoni,
Israel and Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1988).
59Those employing the method of structured-focused
comparison seek to provide theory that is policy relevant
and offers operational knowledge of potential use to
decision makers, Smoke, War. 305-315. The use of focused
comparison by this study reverses such an emphasis under
the assumption that operational standards already in use by
decision makers represent accumulated knowledge of
potential use to scholars. In either direction of
influence, knowledge should be regarded as impartial and
improvable rather than as doctrine.
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will be recalled, the Weinberger speech.

This choice

offers a good opportunity not only to relate the theory of
limited war to its practice but also to explore more
broadly the relation between scientific inquiry and public
opinion.
In answering these questions, this study makes use of
both primary and secondary resources.

Primary

documentation consists of a range of sources.

Official

statements of policy are found in numerous speech texts and
public papers.

The operational aspects of those statements

are laid out in various'directives, enactments, and
regulations.

The texts of agreements, mutual declarations,

resolutions, treaties, and other negotiations supplement
the treatment of policy objectives.
Public support is to be primarily documented from
Congressional voting records and public opinion polls.
main sources for this study's polling data, when not
available from secondary sources, are the Roper
Organization,60 with the addition of various other news
polls.
It bears note that this study is not intended as
primary historical research.

When needed, secondary

materials should aid the incorporation of competing
explanations into the body of the study.

Library:

60Public Opinion Online, Available:
Market, File: RPOLL.

Allowing for

Lexis/Nexis,
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successful challenges from later scholars or additional
cases, the responses provided to the questions above are
provisional.

Plan of the Study

In chapter 2, deductive limited war theory is
analyzed in historical context.

The stress is on the

policymaking influence of the theory.
the Korean War.

Chapter 3 deals with

Primary attention is paid to the relevance

of the war to the subsequent development of theory.
Chapter 4 deals with the Vietnam War.

Attention is

directed towards the application of limited war theory and
its effects on strategy as an instrument of negotiation.
Chapters 5 and 6 deal, respectively, with U.S.
interventions in Grenada and Panama.

These two chapters

offer important insights into limited warfare.

Attention

is drawn to the relation between decisive military action
and possibilities for informed public debate as well as to
the examples set by those two wars for the use of decisive
force.

Chapter 7 deals with the Persian Gulf War.

Emphasis is on the danger of drawing "too many" lessons
from a clear political and military success.

Chapter 8

draws out the theoretical implications of the case studies.
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CHAPTER 2
THE DEDUCTIVE THEORY OF LIMITED WAR

The deductive theory of limited war has not undergone
a great degree of development since the Vietnam War.
Viewed in its historical context, however, the theory
becomes part of a wide public policy debate.

Even though

marked by a general lack of recent scholarly attention, the
phenomenon with which the theory deals remains a vital
concern of U.S. security.1
At the beginning of an important early essay tracing
the theory's development, it is stated that the "need for a
capability and doctrine for fighting limited local wars was

1In a field of such policy relevance as security
studies, there are several reasons why limited war qua
limited war is not a source of scholarly debate. Walt,
Renaissance. 217-18, would remark that limited war theory
was part of the "golden age" in the field of security
studies but did not survive the Vietnam War to be part of a
later “renaissance," among whose "most important
developments . . . was greater reliance on history." Given
its logical development from the single case of the Korean
War and subsequent strategic application in Vietnam, one
might argue that the theory fell into disrepute among
scholars seeking a public forum for their research. More
likely is the position that the theory, although developing
as far as it could solely based on general principles, at
least survives in terms of its strategic applications,
Osgood, Limited War Revisited.
35
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accepted slowly and reluctantly by Americans.”2 Following
the application of such capabilities and doctrines in the
Vietnam War, another treatment holds that limited war
strategy "not only survived" that war "but continued to
expand in application and acceptance."3
The central theme in these observations is that of
policy-relevant theory and its subsequent application and
modification under conditions of public scrutiny.

This

chapter should contribute to an increased understanding of
security policy as an inquiry process involving the
democratic selection and evaluation of knowledge by
detailing the following:

(1) the historical background of

the deductive theory of limited war, (2) the basic
framework provided by the theory for "effective" strategy,
(3) the critical variables identified by the theory for
strategy, (4) the general logic identified by the theory
for strategy, (5) the strategic uses made by policymakers
of the theory, and (6) the exposure of the theory to
political consequences.

Norton H. Halperin, Limited War. Occasional Papers
in International Affairs, no. 3 (Cambridge, MA: Center for
International Affairs, Harvard University, 1962; reprint,
New York: AMS Press, 1973), 1.
30sgood, Limited War Revisited. 10. For a more
detailed treatment of limited war theory and its
literature, see Gacek, The Logic of Force.
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Historical Background

The deductive theory of limited war developed
primarily in response to two historical events; first, the
deliberate political restraint of military efforts during
the Korean War? and second, the subsequent enunciation of
the doctrine of massive nuclear retaliation.4 The
significance of the first event lies in the proximity of
World War II, with its outcome of total victory, to the
Korean War as well as in President Truman's removal of
Douglas MacArthur from command in the latter war.s The
significance of the second event lies in the fears
generated by the stark terms with which John Foster Dulles
originally put forth the doctrine of massive retaliation.6
It is an understatement to point out that these two
events affected the tone and content of public debate over
limited war.

In particular, this debate can be discerned

4The literature on limited war actually predates
the Korean War, extending back to the efforts of the
Clausewitzian student Basil H. Liddell Hart, "War Limited,"
Harper's Magazine. March 1946, 193-203; and Basil H.
Liddell Hart, Revolution in Warfare (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1947).
A national security report made to President Truman
before the Korean War, NSC-68, anticipated the nuclear and
conventional force needs for responding to general and
limited wars. Paul H. Nitze, "Limited War or Massive
Retaliation?" The Reporter. 5 September 1957, 40-42.
George and Smoke, Deterrence. 23-27.
‘Xouis J. Halle, The Cold War as History (New York;
Harper & Row, 1967), 276-82.
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in the relationship between the theory and its strategic
applications.

Basic Framework

The primary impetus for theorization concerning
limited war was the prospect of confronting localized
Communist aggression with massive nuclear retaliation.7
Not only were the deterrent effects of such retaliation
called into serious question,® but it was also argued that
the very existence of nuclear capabilities made it vital to
develop alternatives that could be more easily controlled
in actual use.9

7Halperin, Limited War. 2-3. The Truman
administration sought to reduce military expenditures in
order to provide more money for European recovery under the
Marshall Plan. Following the outbreak of the Korean War,
however, the administration stressed the buildup of
conventional forces to defend Europe. Wallace J. Thies,
When Governments Collide (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1980), 163-73. The Eisenhower
administration stressed nuclear capabilities both to reduce
the burden of defense spending on a prosperous U.S.
economy, Ronald Ritchie, NATO (Toronto, ON: Ryerson Press,
1956), 14, and to deter overt Communist aggression, John
Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982), 121-22.
“William W. Kaufmann, “The Requirements of
Deterrence," in Military Policy and National Security, ed.
William W. Kaufmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1956), 12-38.
9Bernard Brodie, "Unlimited Weapons and Limited
War," The Reporter (18 November 1954): 16-21; Bernard
Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1959).
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Could nuclear weapons form part of U.S. limited war
capabilities?10 One position on this issue was that
nuclear weapons should form part only of U.S. general war
capabilities, being restricted even then to strikes against
military targets.11 Moreover, the potential productivity
of the U.S. economy was seen as grounds for pursuing wars
of conventional attrition, allowing for the possibility of
using tactical nuclear weapons.12 With stress laid on the
distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons,
it was argued not only that the former weapons could be
used in limited warfare but also that such use was the only
alternative to general war.13 A more nuanced approach
stressed the need to develop conventional armaments without
foregoing the use of tactical nuclear weapons as well as to

10Halperin, Limited War (4) indicates that this
question was affected by the increasing U.S. stockpile of
material from which to produce tactical nuclear weapons.
Coupled with the French defeat in Indochina, the
possibility of larger numbers of tactical nuclear weapons
led to a large public debate over their use.
“Paul H. Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy,"
Foreign Affairs 34 (January 1956): 188-98.
12Henry A. Kissinger, "Military Policy and Defense
of the 'Grey Areas,/H Foreign Affairs 33 (April 1955): 41628.
“Anthony Buzzard, "Massive Retaliation and
Graduated Deterrence,” World Politics 8 (January 1956):
228-37; Denis Healey, "Tactical Nuclear Defense," New
Republic. 9 January 1956, 8-9.
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develop limitations through a differentiated view of
warfare at all levels.1*

Critical Variables

A key issue in the development of limitations was the
relationship between objectives and means.

An important

step in arousing theoretical debate over this issue was
taken by Osgood.

He argued that Americans, unlike the

Soviets, did not understand the political nature of warfare
as an instrument of diplomacy, an instrument to be combined
with other instruments (i.e., economic) in the furtherance
of U.S. interests.

Developing the Clausewitzian notion of

the primacy of politics, Osgood argued that war was only an
expression of political conflict at a higher level.

Given

the limitation of war by policy makers, military forces
were to be treated only as a means of negotiating with
enemies.

In order for the United States to possess a

successful limited war strategy, the author stressed the
need to reorient American attitudes from their traditional
adherence to complete military victory and military
autonomy from political influence towards greater

“Raymond Aron, The Century of Total War (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1955); Raymond Aron, "Can War in the Atomic
Age Be Limited? Confluence 5 (July 1956): 99-114; Raymond
Aron, On War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959).
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acceptance of limited military objectives decided on by
political leaders.15
Kissinger shared the above concern with establishing
the primacy of politics, but he also offered positive
suggestions for formulating a U.S. limited war strategy.
The strategy suggested was continued reliance on nuclear
weapons in limited war.

He linked the prospects for

adhering to limits upon the use of these weapons to the
maintenance of limited political objectives.15
Challenges emerged to the notion that limited
political objectives could prove themselves sufficient to
limit military efforts.

Rather than limited political

objectives, the destructive potential of nuclear weapons
and the corresponding desires among combatants to avoid
their use were identified as critical variables in limiting
wars.17 Relaxing the stress on the connection between
political objectives and chances for limiting the use of
nuclear weapons produced arguments to build up conventional
forces.18
15Robert E. Osgood, Limited War (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1957).
“Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons.
“Bernard Brodie, "More About Limited War," World
Politics 10 (October 1957): 112-122; William W. Kaufmann,
"The Crisis in Military Affairs," World Politics 10 (July
1958): 579-603.
“Kissinger, Necessity for Choice. Both Osgood and
Kissinger were apprehensive of the U.S. public's ability to
accept and understand limited war efforts. This view

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

Early theory had recognized such tangible factors as
geography and weapons as the most crucial sources of limits
in war.19 Taking up the question of such physical
variables, Schelling used them in his development of a
theory of bargaining between competing nations.

Limits

were seen as the mutually recognized product of combatants'
actions.

Apart from actions directly intended to achieve

objectives, military activities could also be conducted as
a process of bargaining.

Carried out as a part of

bargaining, military activities were linked by Schelling to
salient contextual factors (i.e., weaponry, geography)
recognized by all combatants.

Limits were seen to expand

relative to the strength of communicated intentions between
interacting opponents.

The threat of escalation to total

war became part of a bargaining strategy that could either
reduce or increase the level of conflict.20

typifies what Nincic, Democracy (ch. 1) calls the realist
thesis of "disruption from below" in relation to popular
pressures on foreign policy.
19William W. Kaufmann, "Limited Warfare," in
Military Policy and National Security, ed. William W.
Kaufmann (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1956), 102-36.
Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); Thomas C.
Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1966).
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General Logic

By the early 1960s, a general consensus had emerged
among theorists, political leaders, and military
strategists on the need for a doctrine and capabilities to
confront enemies short of recourse to total war.

Based on

logic and speculation, the consensus involved the “proper"
application of military force in actual contingencies
ranging from the least to most intense.

Accordingly, the

proper way to conduct war was seen as involving a
bargaining process through which opponents would apply
force incrementally to achieve negotiated settlements.21

Strategic Use22

As early as 1957, the Eisenhower administration had
come to state the utility of tactical nuclear weapons to
offset reliance on strategic weapons.

By 1960, the

administration was publicly acknowledging a need for
capabilities of responding to threats down to the lowest

210sgood, Limited War. 9-11.
22This study's treatment of public policy making as
an inquiry process would be strengthened if room existed to
explicitly detail all the areas of cross-fertilization
between the theory and practice of limited war (i.e., think
tanks, academics recruited into government). As it stands,
reliance is on the political, military, and technological
manifestations of theory.
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levels of intensity.23 Still, these pronouncements must
be viewed against Soviet advances affecting delivery of
strategic weapons (e.g., Sputnik and intercontinental
ballistic missiles).24 In line with these advances and
budget constraints, the administration cut spending on
conventional and tactical nuclear forces "in order to take
some halting steps towards protecting its strategic
forces.I,2S
The Kennedy administration inherited a strategic
situation in which prospects for limited war were largely
confined to declaratory emphasis.

The new administration

responded with the doctrine of flexible, controlled
response.

Rather than relying on threats of nuclear

retaliation, the new doctrine sought to enhance deterrence
and diplomatic bargaining power by providing civilian
leadership with a wide range of controllable military
options at all levels of conflict.26 Aside from the
administration's efforts to build up conventional forces in
Europe, the doctrine found its first application in the
need for strategies and capabilities to wage unconventional
23Robert E. Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 142-59).
“Robert M. Slusser, "The Berlin Crises of 1958-59
and 1961," in Force Without War, ed. Barry M. Blechman and
Stephen S. Kaplan (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1978), 392.
2SHalperin, Limited War. 8.
1

.

26George, Hall and Simons, Coercive Diplomacy, ch.
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war in Southeast Asia.

Just at the time when the limited

war debate had begun to focus upon certain issues (i.e.,
the relation between political objectives and military
means, the importance of winning or not winning), these
issues were submerged in the larger problem of dealing with
communist aggression in Vietnam.27

Political Consequences

The Vietnam War can be seen as a test of limited war
theory, in the restricted sense that the war called into
question the grounds for previous consensus.28 The
situation is evident in the variety of lessons derived by
scholars from the war.

Among the ’’political" lessons

associated with Vietnam, perhaps the most general is the
need to pay constant attention to the relationship between
political objectives and the means needed to achieve them.
Domestic expressions of interests should be considered as a
27Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1967), 7-8, 149-50, 413-39.
"Formally speaking, the inductive method would not
qualify as a method if it were viewed as "a way of
producing one specific result on one specific occasion"
rather than "a generic device capable of repetitive
application." Nicholas Rescher, Methodological Pragmatism
(New York: New York University Press, 1977), 5. It would
be a mistake to regard limited war theory as conclusively
invalidated by a single historical case. Similarly, it
would be wrcng to judge the soundness of a decision to go
to war merely on the basis of its success. John E.
Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday (New York: Basic Books,
1989), 229.
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primary source of objectives rather than merely a
constraint on military actions as derived from some
appraisal of external interests.29
Related to these political lessons, certain military
lessons can be derived from the Vietnam War.

Granting the

importance of domestic opinion as a source of political
objectives, there is the problem of maintaining public
support over the period of time needed to achieve
objectives.

If time becomes the most crucial concern,

there is an argument to be made for avoiding politically
imposed restrictions on military efforts (including
particularly gradual escalation).30
A more subtle understanding of the contexts within
which limited wars occur suggests other possible military
lessons.

In order to avoid overgeneralizing those lessons,

each case of limited war needs to be assessed according to
its own peculiarities.

This assessment should include not

"Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel P. Huntington, Ernest R.
May, Richard N. Neustadt and Thomas C. Schelling, ”Vietnam
Reappraised," International Security 6 (1981): 3-26.
Lessons cited here attain varying levels of consensus among
the authors.
3°Samuel P. Huntington, American Military Strategy.
Policy Papers in International Affairs (Berkeley: ITS,
1986). The author maintains such an argument, stressing
the need to rely on numerical and technological superiority
to overcome the inability of U.S. public opinion to sustain
war efforts. Commentary by Paul Seabury in the same volume
amends this argument to include the need to change American
attitudes. Both positions view democratically articulated
interests as a hinderance to the pursuit of security
policy.
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only the articulation of objectives but also the judgment
of the means to be used within particular contexts.

The

forces and technologies needed in particular situations may
or may not be generally adaptable to others.31 Perhaps
the most important lesson derived from contextual
understanding is, as Clausewitz understood, that political
objectives should constitute limits within which military
decisions are subject to execution.

Clear communication of

objectives by political leaders should facilitate
operational assessments necessary for execution and, more
significantly contribute to the moral bases of both
civilian and military decisions.32

31Hoffmann, "Vietnam Reappraised," 7-12.
32Stephen Peter Rosen, "Vietnam and the American
Theory of Limited War," International Security 7 (1982):
83-113. The term moral is here taken in the sense common
to Clausewitz, On War, and William James, "The Moral
Equivalent of War," in International War. 2d ed., ed.
Melvin Small and J. David Singer (Chicago: Dorsey Press,
1989, 328-36. Both use the term moral in connection with a
host of psychological characteristics (e.g., skill,
experience, courage) necessary for the organized pursuit of
objectives.
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CHAPTER 3

THE KOREAN WAR

The Korean War began on June 25, 1950 when North
Korean forces invaded South Korea.

With the experience of

World War II just five years behind them, few among the
U.S. public would have predicted that their political and
military leaders' response to the invasion would eventuate
in an ambiguous Mlimited" war.

Even fewer would have

predicted that an era had begun in which Korean-type
limited wars would be a norm of U.S. security policy rather
than total wars.
Several issues carried over from the Korean War into
the era of limited war.

The Korean War set the containment

policy (Truman Doctrine) on a global footing and
established the willingness of U.S. policy makers to
enforce the policy through direct military means.

With the

proliferation of nuclear weapons, such enforcement has
involved integrating the goals of achieving military
success and avoiding escalation to the point of regional or
global conflagration.1
1Current U.S. security policy focuses primarily on
the threat posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons
among regional actors. The assumption of strategic nuclear
48
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Public understanding and support of limited wars has
been a key issue in integrating these goals.

The question

has remained to what extent the U.S. public can
differentiate and express conditions favorable to U.S.
security beyond the simplified alternatives of "'victory'
and 'stalemate.’1,2 Complicating this question has been
the fact that U.S. involvement in Korea and subsequent
limited wars has been undertaken without formal
declarations of war by Congress.

Instead, authority to

wage limited war has generally been sought under provisions
of the Constitution dealing with presidential powers and of
international agreements (e.g., the United Nations
Charter).3

Historical Background

The Korean War was an outgrowth of strategic problems
dating from the end of World War II.

Among these, none

were more difficult than the development of contingencies
war as the main threat to American security has been
relaxed, making decisive conventional force a more viable
option in confronting aggressors. Aspin, The Bottom-Up
Review. 5-8; Gerald M. Steinberg, "Non-proliferation: Time
for Regional Approaches?" Orbis 38 (Summer 1994).
NY:

Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War (Garden City,
Doubleday, 1967), 144.

3Donald M. Snow and Dennis M. Drew, From Lexington
to Desert Storm (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 180.
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for the Allied defeat of Japan and disposition of Japanese
colonial holdings such as Korea.
The Korean contingency was worked out by a rapid
series of events in August 1945.

The United States bombed

Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 8, and Japan surrendered
on August 14.*

A hasty agreement divided the Korean

peninsula into separate U.S. and Soviet occupation zones
along the 38th Parallel.

As Commander of U.S. Army Forces,

Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur selected forces under
General John Hodge for the U.S. zone on the basis of their
availability.

The advance elements of Hodge's command

arrived in southern Korea on September 8, 1945, weeks
behind Soviet forces in the north.s
Administrative choices made under the U.S. occupation
to channel Korean nationalism promoted the continued
division of the peninsula.

General Hodge's immediate

decision to retain Japanese officials provoked such popular
opposition that President Truman issued an order leading to
increased administrative placement of Koreans in the
southern military government6 These placements were

‘George Vernadsky, A History of Russia. 6th rev.
ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, Yale
Paperbound, 1969), 452.
Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, ed.
Walter G. Hermes (Washington, DC: GPO, 1962), 3, 7.
6Lee Suk Bok, The Impact of U.S. Forces in Korea
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987),
7-10.
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accompanied by occupation moves to introduce electoral
politics in the south.

By October 1946, elections were

held for an interim legislature in which half the members
were elected and half appointed by General Hodge.

All

elected seats went to right-wing nationalist candidates who
opposed the occupation, and General Hodge appointed more
liberal members to balance the election results.7 By May
1947, Korean administrators in the military government were
formed as the South Korean Interim Government (SKIG).
Against a dominant nationalist coalition led by Syngman
Rhee in the SKIG, the U.S. occupation maintained both an
advisory role in and financial control over
administration.8
Administrative decisions by Soviet forces also
interacted with Korean nationalism, promoting the emergence
of a separate northern government.

Rather than relying on

military government per se, the Soviets retained a system
of people's committees which had been organized by Koreans
in the aftermath of the Japanese surrender but were
suppressed in the U.S. zone.

In early 1946, a national

Provisional People's Committee under the chairmanship of
the nationalist Kim II Sung came to power in the north.
7Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol.
I, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes. 19451947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981-90),
260-62.

II.

“David Rees, Korea (New York:

St. Martin's, 1964),
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All political participation was channeled through the
communist National Democratic Front.

Polling under this

single party led to the formation of a Korean People's
Assembly in February 1947 with control centralized under
Kim as chairman of a new national People's Committee.9
The emergence of separate governments coincided with
two failed attempts by U.S. and Soviet officials to agree
on plans to reunify and prepare Korea for independence
through a trusteeship.

By the end of 1945 and through the

spring of 1946, southern nationalists had become
sufficiently organized and vocal in their demands for rapid
independence to affect U.S. and Soviet discussions at a
Joint Commission.

When the commission convened on March

20, 1946, the Soviet delegation announced its desire to
exclude all political groups that opposed trusteeship from
consultation in an interim Korean government.

The

commission became blocked when U.S. delegates insisted that
all groups should be allowed to participate and exercise
freedom of speech.

By May 6, 1946, the Joint Commission

adjourned sine die, having failed to arrive at standards of
popular participation acceptable to both U.S. and Soviet

9Ibid., 11-12.
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interests.10 A second Joint Commission was convened in
1947 but dissolved over the same free speech issue.11
Once the second commission failed, the Truman
administration had a difficult choice.

With the

formulation of containment in March 1947, withdrawal from
the Korean peninsula seemed desirable to free up personnel
and resources for locations more clearly vital to U.S.
interests.

At the same time, premature withdrawal seemed

likely to send a political signal to the Soviets of a lack
of commitment or ability to protect those very interests.
A compromise was reached by the Truman administration when
in November 1947 the U.N. General Assembly passed a U.S.
resolution calling for Korea-wide elections to be held by
the end of March 1948.

Under U.N. observation, Koreans

were to elect a national assembly which would draw up a
constitution and set up an interim government.

Once that

government had come into existence, U.S. and Soviet

10Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States. 1945. vol. 6, The British Commonwealth, the
Far East (Washington, DC: GPO, 1969), 1152-54; Department
of State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1946.
vol. 8, The Far East (Washington, DC: GPO, 1971), 615-16,
652-54, 665-67.
“ Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War,
vol. 2, The Roaring of the Cataract. 1947-1950 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981-90), 68-69.
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occupation forces were to be withdrawn from the
peninsula.12
Because the Soviets refused to cooperate in the
reunification of Korea, separate governments came to power
on the peninsula.

In the south, elections were held under

U.S. observation, and Syngman Rhee later became president
of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948.

Kim II Sung

became premier of the northern Democratic People's Republic
of Korea on September 10, 1948.

On December 12, 1948, the

U.N. General Assembly recognized Rhee's government as the
only "freely" elected one; U.N. membership for either
republic was prevented by the respective opposition of U.S.
and Soviet blocks.

By the close of 1948, a pair of hostile

Korean governments "founded on opposed ideologies and
interests, and each claiming jurisdiction over the whole of
Korea, faced each other over the 38th Parallel."13
The hostility exhibited between north and south had
affected U.S. provisions for the south's security even
before the foundation of separate governments.

Given the

need to limit such hostility during the U.S. withdrawal,
the Truman administration decided to form an indigenous
southern constabulary force capable of maintaining internal

12Ibid., 65-67; Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States. 1947. vol. 6, The Far East
and Australasia (Washington, DC; GPO, 1974), 832-35, 849,
857-59.
13Rees, Korea. 13.
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security while only gradually assuming the burden of
external defense.

With the final withdrawal of U.S. forces

in June 1949, an embryonic South Korean army was left under
the training of U.S. military advisors whose mission was to
prepare defenses.
numbered 95,000.

By June 1950, the South Korean army
U.S. military assistance had limited the

arm's offensive capabilities by providing only light
artillery and armored cars.14
In the north, the Soviets had set up an army and a
constabulary, training and equipping both for combat roles.
In December 1948, the Soviets withdrew the last of their
forces except for an abundance of advisors.

Under these

advisors, North Korean forces were built up with
conscripts, veterans formerly attached to Chinese communist
forces, and personnel trained in the Soviet Union to
operate and maintain both combat aircraft and tanks.

With

military aid from the Soviet Union as well as through their
own production, the North Koreans were able to sustain a
period of border fighting and large-scale guerrilla
operations against the south between the spring of 1949 and
the winter of 1950.

Nonetheless, the South Korean army was

able to overcome these unconventional threats, leaving the
north few means of unifying the peninsula other than fullscale invasion.

By June 1950, the North Koreans had

assembled 135,000 troops equipped with tanks, heavy
14Sawyer, Military Advisors. 12-45, 106.
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artillery, and combat aircraft for just such an invasion.
Although U.S. aid prepared the South Korean army to cope
with lower-level threats, that army had been equipped only
sufficiently enough to resist a conventional assault for
fifteen days.ls
When the North Koreans invaded the south on June 25,
their primary goal was to reunify the peninsula in a fait
accompli.

This goal reflected a number of considerations.

First, although the Soviets did not initiate the invasion,
North Korean leader Kim II Sung's decision to escalate from
unconventional operations to a massive conventional assault
against the south could not have been made without prior
Soviet military assistance.16 Second, the United States
had limited military assistance to South Korea in part to
prevent Syngman Rhee from having sufficient offensive
capabilities to attempt the forceful reunification of Korea
under his own regime.17 Third, "the border incidents in
which both sides had been involved since the spring of
1949, and Rhee's own martial pronouncements" provided Kim
with evidence "of a long-term threat from South Korea,

15Ibid., 104-105; John Merrill, Korea (Newark, DE;
University of Delaware Press, 1989), 130-167.
16James F. Schnabel and Robert J. Watson, The
History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 3, The Korean
War (Washington, DC; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, 1978-79), 54-55;
Sawyer, Military Advisors. 105.
17Ibid., 100-101.
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which would be eliminated only by a preemptive strike
southward."18 Fourth, given U.S. efforts to disengage
from Korea as well as an unclear commitment to the south
(discussed more fully below), the North Koreans did not
count on the swiftness of the American response to
aggression.

U.S. Interests in Korea

As noted above, Korea's political and military
significance to the United States emerged as a subsidiary
consideration of ending the war against Japan.

In this

regard, U.S. interests in Korea were defined as part of
broader interests in establishing political conditions to
prevent another total war once Japan was defeated.

That

definition did not change with the advent of the Cold War
and the subsequent outbreak of the Koran War.
In a joint statement released on December 1, 1943
following their meeting at the Cairo Conference, President
Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stated their intentions
towards Japanese holdings.

Claiming no interest in

territorial expansion, the statement expressed the

“ Burton I. Kaufman, The Korean War (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1986), 33. Rhee had ordered
several incursions into the north with what military
capabilities he had available.
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determination "that in due course Korea shall become free
and independent."19
The timing of Korean freedom and independence proved
to be subsidiary to the maintenance of Allied cooperation
in defeating Japan.

At the Yalta Conference, President

Roosevelt sought options to avoid or minimize any U.S.
casualties necessitated by an invasion of Japan's home
islands and, subsequently, its holdings in Manchuria and
Korea.

Given these concerns, Roosevelt signed a top-secret

agreement with Joseph Stalin whereby the Soviets would
receive territorial concessions (e.g., Kurile Islands,
access to a Manchurian port) in return for engaging the
Japanese.

Although Roosevelt and Stalin discussed a Korean

trusteeship in private, the public protocol agreed to at
Yalta put off discussions of specific trusteeships at the
upcoming United Nations Conference.

Left unresolved were

the possible duration of a Korean trusteeship and the
commitment of Allied occupation forces during that
period.20

19Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran. 1943
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1961), 449.
20Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta. 1945
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1955), 766, 768-70; Edward R.
Settinius, Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians (Garden City,
NY: Doubleday, 1949), 93-98; Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States: The Conference at Berlin
fThe Potsdam Conference1. 1945 (Washington, DC: GPO,
1960), 1568.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

President Roosevelt was unable to resolve these
issues.

Several weeks after Yalta, the Soviets actively

began installing pro-Soviet governments in Eastern Europe.
Roosevelt died on April 12, 1945, before he could convince
Stalin that Soviet interests would be strengthened rather
than compromised by adherence to international agreements.
The President had not realized his ideal of a U.N.
organization capable of reconciling the interests of the
major powers and, thereby, guiding colonial populations
such as Korea's towards self-governance by means of a
generalized system of trusteeships.21
Under President Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman,
the issue of Korean trusteeship would remain unresolved as
the administration confronted the larger issue of Soviet
expansion.

At both the United Nations and Potsdam

Conferences, the administration attempted to deal with the
same twofold problem of defeating Japan and preventing the
Soviets from moving into the Pacific as they had in Eastern
Europe.

On July 16, 1945, news of the first successful

atomic bomb test presented administration officials at
Potsdam with evidence that Soviet engagement of Japanese
forces was less necessary than when the mob was a mere
probability.

That day, based on information of Soviet-

trained Korean forces, Secretary of War Henry Stimson
warned Truman that the Soviets might set up a puppet
21Settinius, Roosevelt. 93-94, ch. 16.
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government in Korea-

The Secretary urged the President to

press the issue of trusteeship with the Soviets and to
station U.S. forces in Korea as part of a trusteeship.22
Secretary Stimson's advice presaged the
administration's commitment of forces to Korea to prevent
the Soviets from occupying the entire peninsula following
the rapid collapse of Japanese resistance in August
1945.23 With the president's enunciation of the Truman
Doctrine in March 1947 (discussed more fully in chapter 7),
that commitment would present an increasing dilemma for the
administration as it attempted to free up the economic and
military resources to contain the Soviets in other areas
(i.e., Europe, the Middle East).
Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson sought to
extend the basic rationale of containment to Korea.

On

March 27, 1947, Acheson personally approved a report which
argued that Korea would only be a military liability during
a total war.

Nevertheless, the loss of U.S. credibility

resulting from a withdrawal of U.S. forces in Korea could
just as easily encourage Soviet aggression in areas more
clearly vital to U.S. security (e.g., Europe).

This issue

22Department of State, Foreign Relations: Potsdam
Conference. 631-34; Harry S- Truman, Memoirs. vol. 1, Year
of Decisions (Garden City, NY; Doubleday, 1955-56), 26465, 273-75; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active
Duty in Peace and War (New York; Harper & Brothers, 1948),
599-602, 637.
23Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktona. North to
the Yalu (Washington, DC: GPO, 1961), 2-3.
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would affect subsequent considerations of U.S. interests in
Korea.24
A report to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JSC
1769/1) on April 29, 1947 was much more stringent in its
treatment of U.S. commitments and security assistance.

The

report pointed out how assistance could be
counterproductive to U.S. security when given to
governments which sought only to suppress democratic
participation (such as Rhee's). Another basis given for
determining security assistance was the establishment of
the area of primary strategic importance to the United
States.

In the Pacific, the report set a boundary running

from Alaska through the Philippines to Australia.

Korea

was acknowledged as an area in need of assistance due to
the existing U.S. commitment.

Nevertheless, the report

argued that commitments to Korea could be discontinued
without inviting Soviet aggression against more vital areas
(i.e., Europe).

Because Korea was deemed incapable of

providing sufficient support to the United States in a
total war, only aid left over from more vital countries was
suggested for Korea by the report.25
By November 1947, George Kennan had come to
acknowledge the difficulties of applying containment in
24Cumings, Korean War, vol. 2, 46-48.
2SThomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds.,
Containment (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979),
71-72, 77-78.
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Korea.

In a planning paper drafted for Secretary of State

George Marshall, Kennan noted that the potential for
democratic government throughout Korea was non-existent.
Furthermore, such conditions favored communist political
success.

Combined with Korea's lack of strategic

significance in a total war, this factor left the United
States few options other than to attempt withdrawal, while
minimizing the loss of U.S. credibility.26
The decision to turn the political future of Korea
over to the U.N. represented just such an option.

As noted

earlier in dealing with the historical context of attempts
to reunify Korea, U.N. acceptance of U.S. proposals for
free elections throughout the peninsula provided the Truman
administration with a way to smoothly withdraw U.S. forces
and a collective security mechanism to confront the
Soviets.
Even though the U.S. position was bolstered by
adherence to U.N. authority, withdrawal from Korea was
still an issue requiring consideration of the costs to U.S.
credibility.

According to a National Security Council

paper (NSC 8) put out in April 1948, U.S. forces would be
withdrawn from the south by December 1948.

Granting

Korea's military drawbacks, NSC 8 stipulated that security
assistance to the south would forestall communist
dominance.

Considering both internal and external threats,

26Ibid., 95-96.
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U.S. forces had not been withdrawn by December 12, 1948,
when the U.N. General Assembly recognized South Korea's
government as the only freely elected one on the
peninsula.27
A revision of NSC 8, designated NSC 8/2, was put out
in March 1949.

NSC 8/2 provided for the final withdrawal

of U.S. forces in June 1949.

NSC 8/2 acknowledged that

Korea would not be a primary theater of operations in a
total war and provided for substantial security assistance
to South Korea.

NSC 8/2 went on to admit the possibility

of overt communist aggression against the south but
provided several reasons to expect that U.S. credibility
would remain unaffected.

South Korean constabulary forces

could deal with threats themselves.

U.S. troops would not

be in any wartime situations risking defeat or surrender at
the hands of numerically superior communist forces.

Prior

to the final withdrawal of U.S. forces, a public statement
would be made to signal that the United States had not
abandoned its commitment to South Korea.28
Between December 23 and 30, 1949, two National
Security Council papers (NSC 48/1 and NSC 48/2) were issued

27Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States. 1948. vol. 6, The Far East and Australasia
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1974), 1163-69, 1321-27, 1336-37.
28Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States. 1949. vol. 7, The Far East and Australasia.
Part 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), 969-78.
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regarding U.S. policy in Asia.

Among its provisions, NSC

48/1 restated the main objective of NSC 8/2:
to strengthen that Government [South Korea] to the
point where it can (1) successfully contain the threat
of expanding Communist influence and control arising
out of the existence in north Korea of an aggressive
Soviet-dominated regime, and (2) serve as a nucleus for
the eventual peaceful unification of the entire country
on a democratic basis.29
Although not included in the revised NSC 48/2, the second
part of the above objective presaged U.S. efforts under
U.N. authority to unify Korea by force.
NSC 48/2 pledged continued material and political
support to South Korea, providing for both unilateral and
multilateral efforts.

Among its general provisions for

Asia, NSC 48/2 held that the United States was aware of
Formosa's strategic significance but lacked the military
means to prevent the Chinese Communists from taking the
island from the Chinese Nationalists.

In a related sense,

NSC 48/2 stressed that U.S. security in Asia would be best
served by ambivalence in treating with the Chinese
Communists, avoiding moves that might prevent the
exploitation of any Sino-Soviet rifts.

With an ambiguous

situation in China and Formosa, NSC 48/2 urged the
improvement of the overall U.S. situation vis-a-vis Japan,
the Ryukus, and the Philippines.30

29Etzold and Gaddis, Containment. 256.
3°Ibid., 272-75.
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These three groups of islands formed the bottom
portion of a U.S. defensive perimeter anchored in the north
Pacific by the Aleutian islands.

The perimeter was first

announced by Secretary of State Acheson on January 12, 1950
in a speech to the National Press Club.

Accordingly, the

perimeter represented the primary U.S. interests in the
Pacific, or at least the interests for which Acheson felt
the United States could bear the primary responsibility to
defend.

Outside the area of primary interests were South

Korea and Formosa.

Secretary Acheson stated that

So far as the military security of other areas in the
Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person
can guarantee these areas against military attack . . .
Should such an attack occur— one hesitates to say where
such an armed attack could come from— the initial
reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it
and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized
world under the Charter of the United Nations which so
far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people
who are determined to protect their independence
against outside aggression (emphasis mine).31
This was an accurate statement of the subsequent military
responses following the North Korean invasion.
The invasion's implications extended beyond the
Korean peninsula.

According to John Foster Dulles, *'to sit

by while Korea is overrun" would produce a "disastrous
chain of events leading most probably to world war."32

31Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1969), 357.
32Schnabel and Watson, Joint Chiefs. 67.
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This though was elaborated by President Truman, who felt
that
if the communists were permitted to force their way
into the Republic of Korea without opposition from the
free world, no small nation would have the courage to
resist threats and aggression by stronger communist
neighbors.33
In this context, the president linked U.S. interests with
the United Nations in opposing the invasion.

Ultimately,

it was the possibility of a world war that led the Truman
and Eisenhower administrations to choose to limit the war
to the peninsula and seek a negotiated settlement through
the United Nations.

U.S. Objectives in Korea

In the immediate aftermath of the North Korean
invasion, the Truman administration took steps to convene
an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council.

When

the council met on June 25, 1950, it passed an American
sponsored resolution calling for "the immediate cessation
of hostilities."

The resolution called for "the

authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their
armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel” and for all
members "to render every assistance to the United nations

33Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. vol. 2, Years of Trial
and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955-56), 332-33.
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in tiie execution of" the resolution "and to refrain from
giving assistance to the north Korean authorities-"34
Once the North Koreans failed to comply with that
resolution, the Security Council passed another on June 27.
The new resolution recommended that U.N. members "furnish
such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore
international peace and security in the area."35
These resolutions reflected the Truman
administrations' efforts to establish political and
military objectives under crisis conditions.

In a second

meeting with his top diplomatic and military leaders on
June 26, the president decided to use air and naval forces
to attack North Korean forces below the 38th parallel.
This decision was extended to the use of ground troops on
June 30 (both decisions are discussed more fully below).
Between those dates, on June 27, the president made a
national statement regarding objectives in Korea.

In a

speech dealing predominantly with the military quarantine
of Formosa (Taiwan), he noted that "I have ordered United
States air and sea forces to give the Korean government

34Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States. 1950. vol. 7, Korea (Washington, DC: GPO,
1976), 712-13.
3SIbid., 713. The Soviets were boycotting the
Security Council over its refusal to admit China as a
member and were thus unable to veto the resolutions passed
on June 25 and 27. Schnabel and Watson, Joint Chiefs. 76.
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troops cover and support."36 For the time being, U.S.
objectives remained primarily to restore the territorial
and political sovereignty of South Korea.37
Between July and September 1950, the battle for South
Korea varied between the North's farthest advance to the
Pusan Perimeter and the destruction of northern forces as
an effective fighting force.

Utilizing air strikes,

amphibious landings, naval blockades, and infantry
assaults, U.N. and South Korean forces routed the North
Korean army and had achieved the original U.N. and American
objectives by September 1950.38
The route of the North Koreans beginning in midSeptember reflected a significant expansion of objectives
from the restoration of South Korea.

According to a

National Security Council report (NSC 81/1) signed by
President Truman on September 11, "the political objective
of the United Nations in Korea is to bring about the
complete independence and unity of Korea."39 NSC 81/1
went on to qualify that objective with two other

36President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register. National Archives and Records Service, 1965),
Harry Truman, 1950, 492.
37Acheson, President at the Creation. 405.
38Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow (Washington, DC:
GPO, 1990), 10-17.
39Department of State, Foreign Relations. 1950:
Korea. 713.
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objectives:

avoiding general war with the Soviet Union and

China and building U.N. support for the imposition of a
political settlement on North Korea.40
By September 26, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had
drafted orders for U.N. Commander General Douglas
MacArthur.

The orders stated that his military objective

is the destruction of the North Korean armed forces.
In attaining this objective you [MacArthur] are
authorized to conduct military operations, . . . north
of the 38th parallel in Korea, provided that at the
time of such operation [sic] there has been no entry
into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist
forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat
to counter our operations militarily in North Korea.
Under no circumstances, however, will your forces cross
the Manchurian or USSR borders of Korea and, as a
matter of policy, no non-Korean ground forces will be
used in the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet
Union or in the area long the Manchurian border.41
In the event of Soviet intervention, MacArthur was ordered
to "assure the defense," take no action "to aggravate the
situation," and "report to Washington."

Regarding Chinese

intervention, MacArthur was ordered to continue "action as
long as action by your forces offers a reasonable chance of
successful resistance."42 The issues would remain how far
to advance beyond the 38th parallel without crossing
specified boundaries and what forms or extent of action to
take against the Chinese once they intervened in the war.

4°Ibid., 713-16.
41Ibid., 781.
42Ibid.
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On October 7, 1950, forces commanded by MacArthur
crossed the 38th parallel, having been authorized by U.N.
Resolution 376 to take "all appropriate steps . . . to
ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea."43 By
mid-October, with no apparent signs of Chinese
intervention, MacArthur had violated his orders and sent
non-Korean troops to within thirty-five miles of Manchuria.
Without contradictory orders from Washington, he ordered
his forces towards the Yalu River on October 24.44
As of late November 1950, it had become apparent that
massive numbers of Chinese Communist "volunteers" had
entered North Korea from Manchuria (approximately 210,000).
U.N. forces were forced to retreat south, back across the
38th parallel.

In January 1951, U.N. forces were able to

regroup, counterattack, and force the combined Chinese and
North Korean armies back into North Korea.

Rather than

pursuing those armies, however, U.N. forces were required
to remain south of the parallel.

The war stalemated there

for over the next two years.45
China's entry into the war presented the Truman
administration with the problem of managing relations with
U.N. allies as well as neutral members (e.g., India).
particular, the administration had to confront growing
43Ibid., 904.
44Schnabel and Watson, Joint Chiefs. 274-76.
45Mossman, Ebb and Flow, ch. 3, ch. 26, ch. 27.
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demands for crease-fire arrangements while preventing
measures leading to a compromise which might encourage
further Chinese aggression.

"Many in Washington were

afraid that a cease-fire . . . would give the Chinese time
to build up their forces for another thrust southward.1,46
Reflecting these concerns, the administration had
moved by March 20, 1951, to open cease-fire negotiations
with the Chinese.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff informed

General MacArthur "that, with [the] clearing of [the] bulk
of South Korea of aggressors, [the] United Nations [is] now
prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea."47
In response to this, MacArthur released a public statement
in which he noted that China
must now be painfully aware that a decision of the
United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to
contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion
of our military operations to . . . [Chinese] coastal
and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of
imminent military collapse . . . .48
Having previously been refused in his requests to carry out
such an expansion,49 MacArthur persisted in his

46Kaufman, Korean War, 115.
47Schnabel and Watson, Joint Chiefs. 525.
48Truman, Memoirs. vol. 2, 440-41.
49On January 9, 1951, the Joint Chiefs informed
MacArthur that he could not blockade China, carry out naval
and air attacks against China, or obtain reinforcements
from Taiwan. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States. 1951. vol. 7, Korea (Washington, DC: GPO,
1983), 41-42.
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contradiction of administration authority until relieved by
Truman on April 11, 1951.50
Although not directly connected, MacArthur's relief
coincided with a change in objectives from that of seeking
a military solution in Korea to seeking a political one.
As the president told a national audience upon relieving
the general, "in the simplest terms, what we are doing is
. . . trying to prevent a third world war."51 This
objective was reiterated in a national security report (NSC
48/5) signed by Truman on May 17, 1951.

NSC 48/5 held that

the main U.S. objective had become "a political, not
military, solution which would [eventually] provide for a
united, independent, and democratic Korea.,,S2
NSC 48/5 provided for a substantially altered
military mission, establishing greater political
restrictions on the new U.N. Commander General Matthew
Ridgway than had been set for MacArthur.

Ridgway's orders

were to
inflict the maximum personnel and materiel losses on
the forces of North Korea and Communist China operating
within the geographic boundaries of Korea and waters
adjacent . . . in order to create conditions favorable
^ o r details on the decision to relieve MacArthur,
see Schnabel and Watson, Joint Chiefs, ch. 10.
slPresident, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1965),
Harry Truman, 1951, 223.
S2James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1972), 393.
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to a settlement of the Korean conflict which would, as
a minimum, a. Terminate hostilities under appropriate
armistice arrangements; b. Establish the authority of
- . . [the Republic of Korea] over all Korea south of a
northern boundary so located as to facilitate, to the
maximum extent possible, both administration and
[military] defense, and in no case south of the 38th
parallel; c. Provide for the withdrawal by appropriate
stages of non-Korean armed forces from Korea; d. Permit
the building of sufficient . . . [Republic of Korea
military] power to deter or repel a renewed North
Korean aggression-53
Less than a year into the war, the conditions had
been set for a subsequent two-year stalemate.

To prevent a

wider war, orders given to Ridgway would remain in force
for subsequent commanders during that period.

Washington's

objectives had shifted from restoration of South Korea's
independence by force, to the reunification of the Korean
peninsula by force, and then to the maintenance of South
Korean independence through negotiations backed by force.
Strategically, mobilization of U.S. combat resources had
become necessary to maintain a war of attrition.

U.S. Mobilization

The North Korean invasion of South Korea in late June
1950 came at a time when the Truman administration was
beginning to reassess its plans for fighting the Soviet
Union.

In light of the Soviet's development of nuclear

capabilities nearly a year earlier, the administration had
“Department of State, Foreign Relations. 1951:
Korea, 489-90.
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recently begun to question its own position that nuclear
weapons were sufficient to compensate for the
demobilization of conventional forces since World War
II.54 In particular, President Truman was still
considering a report (NSC 68) that "without superior
aggregate [allied] military strength, in being and readily
mobilizable, a policy of 'containment' . . .

is no more

than a policy of bluff."55 Without both nuclear and
conventional strength, NSC 68 argued that the United States
would "be confronted more frequently with the dilemma of
reacting totally to a limited [local] extension of Soviet
control or of not reacting at all (except with ineffectual
protests and half measures)."56
Reflecting the administration's nascent concern for
Soviet nuclear capabilities, military planners had begun to
assume a shorter warning period in which to mobilize for
combat than they had assumed at the end of World War II.
Still, at the time of the North Korean invasion, plans and
preparations continued to focus on the primary contingency

5,*In order to curb inflation expected as a result
of military spending, the administration had placed primary
reliance on nuclear weapons as a more economical means of
dealing with Soviet aggression than sustained conventional
mobilization. Etzold and Gaddis, Containment. 383-84.
55Ibid., 402.
S6Ibid., 428.
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of another total war in which mobilization would be
extended over at least two years.57
This focus would quickly call into question
"preparedness for a larger, perhaps global struggle
centered on Europe" once President Truman committed forces
to defend South Korea.58 At that time, the United States
had standing ground forces consisting primarily of 630,000
army personnel, with 108,000 devoted to the continued
occupation and defense of Japan under General MacArthur.59
Having determined by June 30, 1950, that air and naval
forces were inadequate to halt the North Korean offensive,
the president authorized MacArthur to use what forces he
needed to prevent the communists from overrunning the
south.60
Before committing nearly a fourth of America's ground
forces to Korea, Truman had received congressional
authority to obtain draftees through selective service and
to employ reserve forces (discussed more fully below).
57Terrence J. Gough, U.S. Armv Mobilization and
Logistics in the Korean War (Washington, DC: GPO, 1987),
21 - 2 2 .

58Ibid., 28.
MacArthur's forces were understrength and largely
unprepared for combat. This problem was shared by active
and reserve forces stationed in the United States, about
960,000 strategic replacements to support worldwide
commitments. Ibid., 25.
60Schnabel and Watson, Joint Chiefs. 90, 118;
Department of State, Foreign Relations. 1950: Korea. 178183.
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Nonetheless, he expected that restoration of South Korean
control up to the 38th parallel would not require prolonged
combat.61 "Congressional authorization was necessary
since the president had not declared a national
emergency.1,62
On the basis of that authorization, the United States
had deployed enough ground forces (about 155,000 army and
marine personnel) by November 1950 to sustain the offensive
along with South Korean forces (about 82,000) across the
38th parallel.

When the Chinese intervened with nearly

300,000 troops, the president declared a national
emergency.

As part of that emergency, the administration

speeded up efforts to increase the nation's standing forces
for use in other areas (i.e., Europe) while simultaneously
beginning plans to redeploy from Korea.

At the same time,

the president did not move to totally mobilize the nation's
industrial and manpower resources.

He decided that

mobilization would remain partial, with preparations being
made for the possibility of a larger war against the
Soviets and with only sufficient men and materiel being
sent to Korea to contain the Chinese and North Koreans
without triggering such a war.63

61Ibid., 248-53.
62Gough, Mobilization, 29.
63Bevin Alexander, Korea (New York: Hippocrene,
1986), 310; Gough, Mobilization. 37, 45, 55-56.
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The problem of balancing the U.S. commitment to South
Korea against other commitments (e.g., Europe, Japan)
became less urgent with the effective reduction of Chinese
offensive capabilities by June 1951.64 Yet, the problem
became more difficult with the initiation of cease-fire
negotiations the following month (discussed more fully
below).

Although U.S. forces would not be driven from

Korea, their continuing presence was required so long as
negotiations proceeded and South Korean forces remained
unable to defend themselves.
It was not until two years later on July 27, 1953,
that negotiations were brought to a conclusion under the
Eisenhower administration.

The United States had 139,272

combat related casualties, including 24,965 killed in
action and 12,939 missing and presumed dead.

Of South

Korea's 272,975 casualties, 46,812 were killed in action
and 66,436 were missing and presumed dead.
suffered 14,103

U.N. allies

combat casualties, with 2,597 killed and

1,925 missing or dead.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated

that North Korea had 620,264 casualties, with 214,899
killed in action and 101,680 missing or dead.

China had an

estimated 909,607 casualties, with 401,401 killed and
21,211 missing.6S

64Clay Blair, The Forgotten War (New York:
Books, 1987), 897-902.

Times

65Alexander, Korea. 483.
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On the same day that an armistice was signed in
Korea, sixteen U.N. members signed a "Greater Sanctions
Statement" indicating their support for South Korea in the
event of renewed communist aggression.

The members

affirmed
in the interests of world peace, that if there is a
renewal of the armed attack [on South Korea],
challenging again the principles of the United Nations,
we should again be united and prompt to resist. The
consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be
so grave that, in all probability, it would not be
possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of
Korea.66
By the time this statement was signed, the United
States had built up its forces to include over 1,526,921
active army personnel.67 Any doubt that those forces
would not provide the greater part of the sanctions in the
statement was removed by the Eisenhower administration.

On

December 26, 1954, the president announced that he would
begin a gradual withdrawal of most of the 327,000 U.S.
personnel remaining in South Korea (whose forces then
numbered over 450,000).

That announcement was followed

three days later with one by Secretary of State Dulles
that, as part of the administration's new strategy, renewed

“Department of State, American Foreign Policy.
Basic Documents. 1950-55 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1957),
2662.
67Gough, Mobilization, 17.
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communist aggression could result in the bombing of North
Korea and China.68

U.S. Publi c Support

Initially very popular with Congress and the public,
the Korean War became less so following Chinese
intervention.

Given rapidly shifting political and

military objectives (as detailed above), congressional
members and their constituents had little time to develop
an understanding of the peace process initiated by the
president.

Led to expect victory prior to China's entry,

the public expressed a growing, but not overwhelming,
preference for decisive action to end the war.

This was an

indication that the public required greater knowledge of
the war's changing political and military objectives.
On the day that President Truman announced the first
air and naval actions against North Korean forces (June 27,
1950), members of Congress discussed the U.S. intervention.
Although the president had not yet committed ground forces,
the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly (315-4)
on a bill to extend the draft for a period of one year and
to allow the president to begin reserve mobilization.
Senate unanimously approved the measure the next day.69
68Lee, U.S. Forces in Korea. 59.
69A1 exander, Korea, 42.
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After President Truman had implicit support for

the

use of ground forces, he did not ask Congress to declare a
state of war, preferring to let the war be known as a
police action.

"Thus was born" a "presidential precedent

to try to sanitize and minimize American military actions
by avoiding formal congressional" authorization.70
It was not until the president relieved General
MacArthur in the spring of 1951 that congressional members
began to focus on the problem of limited war in Korea.
Explaining that the primary aim of U.S. policy was to
prevent another world war, the president told the nation
that
events have made it evident that General MacArthur did
not agree with that policy. I have therefore
considered it essential to relieve General MacArthur so
that there would be no doubt or confusion as to the
real purpose and aim of our policy.71
In the highly politicized atmosphere surrounding his
relief, MacArthur7s response before a congressional
audience was that the goal of decisive victory in Korea had
been "fully shared by practically every military leader,
including our own Joint Chiefs of Staff."72
In Senate testimony beginning on May 3, 1951,
MacArthur held that the policy of limited war removed the
potential "of destroying the enemy's military power and
7°Ibid.
71President, Public Papers. 1951, 226.
72Kaufman, Korean War. 166.
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bringing the conflict to a decisive close in the minimum of
time and with a minimum loss of life.”73 In contrast with
this position, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Omar Bradley pointed out that
objectives in a war are not entirely military. In
other words, the end results of war are a combination
of military and political considerations, and you use
the military to obtain your political objectives.74
Between the issues of prolonging hostilities and of
subordinating military objectives to political objectives
(i.e., avoiding a U.S.-Soviet strategic confrontation over
Korea), the terms of debate had been set for the American
political system regarding the limits to be observed in
war.
At the time of the Senate's hearings, the American
public was not privileged to the testimony presented by
witnesses.

Nevertheless, there was a general awareness of

the issues at stake in Korea.

In particular, while public

approval decreased over the course of the war, the public
remained committed to American war efforts.

The public's

primary problem was understanding how the war could be
terminated without escalating to a total war.
A Gallup poll conducted in August 1950 showed that 66
percent of those polled approved of America's involvement
in the war, with only 12 percent expressing a desire for

73Gacek, Logic of Force. 65.
74Ibid. , 69.
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withdrawal.

Following Chinese intervention, that approval

had fallen to only 39 percent when the poll was conducted
in December 1950.

Still only eleven percent favored

withdrawal .7S
Consistent with the Gallup poll, a NORC poll
conducted in June 1951 showed that only 37 percent approved
of the initial decision to go to war in Korea; however, 76
percent favored maintaining the U.S. commitment.

When the

war stalemated, public approval remained around 40 percent
for the next 22 months.

Various polls indicated between 12

and 17 percent favoring withdrawal over the same period.76
The constancy of approval during this period was in part
attributable to the Chinese intervention, which had earlier
removed the support of those unsure of unwilling to
maintain a commitment in a prolonged war.77
While there was little variance in public support for
the war following the Chinese intervention, the eventual
stalemate caused the public to increasingly support
escalation of the war against China-

An April 1952 NORC

poll showed 31 percent favoring to remain in Korea and 49
percent favoring war with China.

Through the course of the

7SBenjamin C. Schwarz, Casualties. Public Opinion,
and U.S. Military Intervention (Santa Monica, CA: Rand,
1994), 10.
76Ibid.
77John E. Mueller, War. Presidents, and Public
Opinion (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), 52.
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war, about 77 percent of respondents to a Roper poll
favored retaining a U.S. presence in Korea.

Respondents

favoring escalation rose from 20 percent in June 1950 to 40
percent around the period of Chinese intervention,
remaining between 45 and 49 percent between June 1951 and
the end of the war.

Those favoring escalation outnumbered

respondents favoring withdrawal by a margin of 2 to 1 in
June 1950 and 5 to 1 from July 1951 onward.78
These opinions illustrated "the public's considerable
frustration over what to do next in the war."79 While
later observers and theorists would come to recognize that
frustration as a considerable source of pressure to
escalate limited wars like Korea, they would not provide a
practical means of informing or channeling the public's
desire for escalation.

Military and Nonmilitarv Means

A significant source of public frustration with the
Korean War was the Truman administration's continued
willingness to prolong combat while seeking a political
solution to the war.

The report (NSC 118/2) which

formalized that policy noted that

78Schwarz, Public Opinion. 13.
79Mueller, War. 103.
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it must be expected that, in the event
negotiations fail, U.S. public opinion
adoption of military measures adequate
political and military decision of the
struggle.80

armistice
may demand the
to achieve a
Korean

NSC 118/2 was correct in its expectation that negotiations
would become a primary source of pressure to escalate the
war though it overstated the ultimate impact that public
opinion had in exerting such pressure.81
In a review of NSC 118/2 (NSC 147) undertaken by the
Eisenhower administration in April 1954, it was noted that
American "sentiment for vigorous action to achieve a
settlement [in Korea] is widespread, but there is no strong
demand for any particular course of action."82 With
armistice talks stalled on the issue of prisoner of war
repatriation (the Chinese favoring forcible repatriation),
the administration was considering actions ranging from a
gradual redeployment from Korea to the forcible
reunification of the peninsula.

All options except the

redeployment of forces left open the possible use of
nuclear weapons.83

80Department of State, Foreign Relations. 1951:
Korea. 1388.
81During the Eisenhower administration, the
economic costs of prolonging the war played a substantial
role in considerations to escalate the war. Department of
State, Foreign Relations of the United States. 1952-1954,
vol. 15, Korea, part l (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 847.
82Ibid., 847.
83Ibid. , 840, 845.
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In order to pressure the Chinese into concluding an
armistice, President Eisenhower threatened to escalate the
war to include the use of nuclear weapons against Chinese
targets, thus risking a general war.

While the actual

impact of that threat on the Chinese remained open to
question,84 Eisenhower's willingness to even make it
pointed ”to the tremendous difficulties that inhere in
using force nondecisively against an opponent possessing
great resources and the will to fight.,,8S

Conclusion

The Korean War raised a number of issues which
carried over into and helped define an era of limited war.
The war established containment as a global policy enforced
by the threat or actual use of military force.

The spread

of nuclear weapons complicated that issue, creating a
dilemma for Americans in which the need for military
success and the threat of nuclear escalation appeared as
equally valid concerns.

As Matthew Ridgway notes

Korea taught us that all warfare from this time forth
must be limited. It could no longer be a question of

84For more thorough discussion, see Rosemary Foot,
The Wrong War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1985). Also by the same author, see A Substitute for
Victory (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990).
8SGacek, Logic of Force. 86-87.
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whether to fight a limited war, but of how to avoid
fighting any other kind.86
The difficulty was in determining which groups learned this
particular lesson and how they interpreted it.
One group consisted of the theorists who drew on the
single case of Korea to develop a theory of limited war.
Notwithstanding considerable [public] dissatisfaction
with the conduct and results of the Korean War, it was
widely accepted [by theorists and civilian experts] as
a preferable alternative to the contemporary
alternatives of total war and acquiescence in
aggression.87
Passed on to civilian experts who began to assume
greater responsibilities for military strategy in the late
1950s and early 1960s, the theory of limited war gained
prominence as a means of minimizing the risks of combat
while achieving military success.88 The theory appeared
to offer an acceptable strategic guide to President
Johnson, who was concerned with maintaining U.S.
commitments in Vietnam while attempting to avoid major
combat.

Given an overall lack of empirical content, the

theory offered poor guidance.
With their primary focus on the prevention of total
war, limited war theorists underestimated the need for
public support in the evaluation of conditions favorable to
U.S. security.

This situation was made worse by the

86Ridgway, Korean War, vi.
870'Brien, Just and Limited Warr 257.
88Rosen, "Vietnam and Limited War Theory," 88.
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precedent set in Korea of bypassing congressional debate in
committing forces to combat in limited wars.

For President

Johnson, expert consensus on the need for limited war in
Vietnam would not prove to be an adequate substitute for
popular consensus as to the meaning of such a war.
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CHAPTER 4

THE VIETNAM WAR

In a news conference on July 28, 1965, President
Lyndon Johnson announced the deployment of additional
combat forces to protect South Vietnam against an
insurgency supplied and directed by the north.

He argued

that failure to oppose Asian communism would lead to
further communist aggression, a situation in which no
nation "could ever again have the same confidence in
American promises, or in American protection."1 As part
of his announcement on March 31, 1968, that he would not
stand for reelection, Johnson stressed that the United
States was still committed to South Vietnam but would begin
a unilateral deescalation of its war efforts in order to
achieve a negotiated end to the Vietnam War.2

^The Pentagon Papers f The Senator Gravel Edition,
vol. 4 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971-72), 632; hereafter
cited as Gravel Edition.
President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1970),
Lyndon Johnson, 1968-69, 469-76. Additional deployments
announced in this speech were a "token" indication of the
United States' continued commitment. Gravel Edition, vol.
4, 599.
88
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When President Richard Nixon came into office, he
expanded on Johnson's efforts to negotiate an end to the
war and to decrease American involvement.

President Nixon

implemented a plan meant to provide "a prospect of
honorable disengagement that was not hostage to" communist
"cooperation" and that would not lead to further
aggression.3 By the end of 1973, about 250 U.S. personnel
remained in South Vietnam, over 14,000 less than the number
present before President Johnson assumed his office in late
November 1963.4
Over two decades since the United States disengaged
from the Vietnam War, that experience has continued to
exercise profound influence on the nation's approach to the
problem of limited war.

A number of important and

pertinent questions have remained over how the formation
and implementation of U.S. policy towards Vietnam could
have been so misdirected.

In short, how did things go

wrong?
American involvement in Vietnam did not come about
due to a precise set of circumstances.

Neither was the

nation's conduct of the war based on a fully developed
strategy addressing "the question of 'how' to use military

3Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston:
Little, Brown, 1979), 306.
■•Department of the Army, Defense Information
School, Vietnam. 10 Years Later (Washington, DC: GPO,
1984), 100, 105.
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means to achieve" its political objectives.5 American
commitments and operations evolved over time, drawing
strategic guidance from the abstract framework given by
limited war theory for influencing opponents without waging
a total war to defeat them (as detailed in chapter 2).
Applied to the specific case of Vietnam, that framework
contributed to a situation in which the costs of gradually
expanded war efforts6 eventually weakened the popular
support needed to sustain an effective negotiating stance
with the North Vietnamese and a commitment to South
Vietnam.

Historical Background7

The Vietnam War was largely a continuation of an
earlier war (the first Indochina war) which began in
December 1946 between communist Viet Ninth nationalists led
by Ho Chi Minh and the French, who sought to reassert

DC:

^arry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy (Washington,
GPO, 1983), 3.

6Two early studies isolated casualty levels among
American personnel as the primary variable, explaining
increasing public aversion to the risks of prolonged
conflict in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. See Mueller, War
as well as Jeffrey S. Millstein, Dynamics of the Vietnam
War (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1974).
7The proceeding discussion deals primarily with
internal developments in Vietnam. American involvement in
those developments is discussed more fully in subsequent
sections of this chapter.
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colonial control over Indochina after World War II.

That

war ended in July 1954 with a negotiated settlement, the
Geneva Accords, following the French defeat at Dienbienphu
two months earlier.

The accords provided for a division of

Indochina at the 17th parallel until reunification
elections could be held in 1956-*
Although a truce was achieved, it was one "that
awaited a political settlement, which never happened."9
Instead, one regime was set up in the north, and another
set up in the south.

The former, led by Ho Chi Minh, was

dedicated to reunifying Vietnam under communist control.
The latter, led by Ngo Dinh Diem, sought to build a
separate nation.
In the immediate aftermath of the Geneva Accords,
U.S. military and economic assistance enabled Diem to begin
to consolidate his political position in South Vietnam
after the French began to withdraw from South Vietnam in
February 1955.

In the spring of that year, he suppressed

armed opposition by Buddhist sects.

After proclaiming

himself president of South Vietnam as a result of elections
in October 1955, he refused to negotiate with the North
Vietnamese.

By July 1956, he had refused to hold

reunification elections.

(Neither the U.S. nor the South

'Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of
Vietnam (Washington, DC: Brooking, 1979), 36-61.
9Stanley Karnow, Vietnam (New York:

Viking, 1983),

199.
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Vietnamese representatives at Geneva had signed the 1954
accords) .10
As part of his efforts to consolidate power, Diem had
been waging a successful campaign against the 5,000 to
10,000 Viet Minh who had remained in the south since 1954.
Having been left with orders from the north to engage only
in a political struggle against Diem's regime, the Viet
Minh organized themselves as armed insurgents between 1956
and 1957, after Diem had nearly succeeded in eliminating
them as a revolutionary force.

By the spring of 1959, the

Viet Minh insurgents had become known as Vietcong, being
supplied and directed by Ho's regime in Hanoi.11
Hanoi based its conduct of the war against South
Vietnam on the same strategy of protracted war that had
been used against the French, a strategy developed in turn
from theories which Mao Tse Tung had applied in China.

The

strategy called for a gradual shift from guerrilla
operations, which were defensive in nature, to an all-out
offensive conducted by conventional forces.

The strategic

shift allowed for the continuation of unconventional
operations while those forces were being assembled in the
north.

Unconventional operations were generally localized,

intended to weaken popular support for the South Vietnamese
1QThe Pentagon Papers as Published by The New York
Times (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 14-23; hereafter
cited as Times Pentagon Papers.
“Ibid., 71-81.
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government and disperse its army's capabilities.

Moreover,

guerrilla forces served as a "source of manpower" for the
development of regular forces in the south "whose scope of
activities was more extensive and whose combat
effectiveness and armament were better."12
By 1962, Hanoi had begun to infiltrate forces into
the south to help organize the Vietcong and to replace
their losses.

As of 1964, large units of the regular North

Vietnamese Army (NVA) were being sent to the south, a trend
that only increased with the introduction of American
combat forces a year later.

"The infiltration of NVA men

and units, together with combat and logistic support assets
continued unabated despite heavy" American bombardment.13

U.S. Interests in Vietnam

American interests in Vietnam date back to World War
II.

America found itself caught between two competing and

problematic foreign policy objectives.

On one hand,

Franklin Roosevelt's administration was firmly committed to
anticolonialism.
stated that:

In an internal memorandum, Roosevelt

"France has had the country [Indochina]

thirty million inhabitants, for nearly one hundred years,

12Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (Washington, DC:
U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1980), 10.
13Ibid.
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and the people are worse off than they were at the
beginning. nx*
Roosevelt was unsuccessful in convincing the European
allies to give their colonies independence.

This led to a

competing American foreign policy objective, the need to
satisfy the allied desire to retain colonial holdings in
order to keep the war effort against the Axis powers in
place.

With the death of Roosevelt, the dilemma over anti

colonialism and the need to support the European allies was
far from being resolved.

The situation did not improve

with the administration of President Harry Truman.1S
With the advent of the Cold War and the formulation
and enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, the defense of
Europe was linked to collective security in Asia.
According to William Bundy, who became a senior policy
maker in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, President
Truman compromised on the issue of French colonialism in
Indochina in order to improve chances for "the effective
organization and rearming of" the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.16 By May 1950, the Truman administration

York:

14Michael Maclear, The Ten Thousand Day War (New
St. Martin's, 1981), 6.
lsIbid., 6-7.
16Ibia., 23.
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was providing $75 million in military assistance to support
French efforts against the Viet Minh.17
The president's decision to help the French was
reinforced by subsequent events.

In particular,

the outbreak of the Korean War, and the American
decision to resist North Korean aggression, sharpened
overnight [American] thoughts and actions with respect
to Southeast Asia. The French struggle in Indochina
came far more than before to be seen as an integral
part of the containment of communism in that region of
the world . . . .“
The Korean War would play a major role in the formulation
of American foreign policy toward Indochina for many years
to follow.
While that war was still being waged, events in 1953
would further magnify Indochina's importance to the United
States.

Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected president

following a campaign in which Republicans accused the
Truman administration of being responsible for the loss of
China to communism.

The possibility of an armistice in

Korea only added to speculation that the Chinese would turn
their attention to Indochina.

During the campaign, John

Foster Dulles traveled the United States arguing that
Southeast Asia was a key region in the conflict with
communist imperialism, and that it was important to draw

17Gravel Edition, vol. 1, 370. Indochina received
nominal independence in February 1950, but the French
remained responsible for internal and external security
(41).
“ Ibid., 83.
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the line of containment north of Indochina.

This position

was endorsed by Eisenhower in his first State of the Union
Address, in which he linked communist aggression in Korea
and Malaya with Indochina.19
On April 7, 1954, President Eisenhower held a news
conference in which he echoed this theme.

During the

course of the conference, Eisenhower was asked whether he
would mind commenting on the strategic importance of
Indochina to the free world.

In his response, he

elaborated on what he called the "falling domino"
principle.

He stated that:

You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the
first one, and what will happen to the last one is the
certainty that it will go over very quickly . . . .
[W]hen we come to the possible sequence of events, the
loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the
[Malaysian] Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you
begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the
disadvantages that you would suffer through the loss of
materials, sources of materials, but now you are
talking really about millions and millions and millions
of people.20
As in Korea, failure to combat communist aggression in
Indochina had come to be linked (correctly or not) with the
prevention of future threats at a regional and global
level.

For President Eisenhower and those who would follow
19Ibid., 85.

2°President, Public Pacers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register. National Archives and Records Service, 1960-61),
Dwight Eisenhower, 1954, 383. The domino principle or
theory had been formalized in NSC 64, a report signed by
President Truman in February 1950. Gravel Edition, vol. 1,
83.
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him in office, the question would remain of the means
needed to confront localized aggression on balance with
larger threats.
By 1954, the Eisenhower administration faced the
problem of more firmly establishing its commitment to
Indochina, particularly in light of increasing French
losses to the Chinese and Soviet supplied Viet Minh.

Prior

to the fall of Dienbienphu, the French requested American
intervention.

Apart from the prospects that such

intervention would lead to Chinese intervention, there was
also a considered risk that direct combat on the side of
the French would detract from the ability to defend Europe.
In either case, Eisenhower and his top political and
military advisors did not want to repeat their experience
with a protracted war of attrition as in Korea.21 Even
after Dienbienphu fell, "the Soviet Union and China feared"
the implicit threat represented by the administration's
strategic emphasis on "massive retaliation" and forced the
Viet Minh to accept a truce at Geneva which "was far
better" for the United States "than the military situation"
in Indochina "warranted."22
21Gacek, Logic of Force, ch. 4.
22Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1994), 634. It must be remembered that the Viet
Minh victory at Dienbienphu has helped obscure "the extent
to which the persistence of military stalemate in Indochina
shaped the indecisive peace settlement at Geneva." George
C. Herring, "The Legacy of the First Indochina War," in
Second Indochina War Symposium, ed. John Schlight
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Whatever the role of massive retaliation in achieving
that truce, conditions remained open for a growing American
role in supporting the Diem regime in South Vietnam.
Paralleling that role was an increasing debate over the
adequacy of the Eisenhower administration's nuclear
strategy to deal with unconventional threats like the
Vietcong insurgency.

The same year he retired as Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1959), General Maxwell Taylor
contributed to the debate, writing that
the strategic doctrine which I propose to replace
Massive Retaliation is herein called the Strategy of
Flexible Response. This name suggests the need for a
capability to react across the entire spectrum of
possible challenge, for coping with anything from
general atomic war to infiltrations and aggressions
such as threaten Laos and Berlin in 1959 . . . . [T]he
limited war which we cannot win quickly may result in
our piecemeal attrition or involvement in expanding
conflict which may grow into the general conflict we
all want to avoid.23
President Eisenhower left office advising President-elect
John Kennedy to defend Laos against the North Vietnamese,
who were using the country to infiltrate South Vietnam.24
The strategic content of flexible response would be worked
out along with the development of capabilities to implement
it as a tool to protect American interests.

(Washington, DC:
York:

GPO, 1986), 10.

23Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New
Harper & Row, 1959), 6-7.
24Kissinger, Diplomacy. 641.
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Even before he was elected president, then Senator
Kennedy had accepted both the need to develop flexible
means of protecting American interests and the domino
principle.

Speaking in the Senate on February 29, 1960,

Kennedy stated that
events have demonstrated that our nuclear retaliatory
power is not enough. It cannot deter Communist
aggression which is too limited to justify atomic war.
It cannot protect uncommitted nations against a
Communist takeover using local or guerrilla forces. It
cannot be used in so-called brush-fire peripheral wars.
In short, it cannot prevent the Communists from
gradually nibbling at the fringe of the free world's
territory and strength, until our security has been
steadily eroded in piecemeal fashion— each Red advance
being too small to justify massive retaliation, with
all its risks [of nuclear conflagration].25
By late November 1961, with the insurgency against the Diem
regime worsening, President Kennedy had approved the
commitment of military advisors to stabilize the situation
in South Vietnam.26
President Kennedy fixed on the concepts of
counterinsurgency and nation-building to counter the North
Vietnamese threat, an expression of so-called Wars of
National Liberation or People's War.

At the same time,

developments in South Vietnam continued to worsen.

By

October 1963, Kennedy had sent about 15,000 advisors to
South Vietnam, even as it remained unclear what actual
effects his administration's strategic innovations were

2SGravel Edition, vol. 2, 798.
26Gelb and Betts, Irony of Vietnam. 77.
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having against the Vietcong.

In particular/ it remained an

open question to what extent aid to the South Vietnamese
could enable them to defeat the Vietcong and North
Vietnamese infiltrators.27 On November 14, 1963,
President Kennedy had still not answered the question for
himself when he told reporters that his administration's
objective was "to bring Americans home" and "permit the
South Vietnamese to maintain themselves as a free and
independent country."2*
When President Johnson succeeded Kennedy, he pledged
himself to achieve the goals set by his predecessor.

"That

meant seeing things through in Vietnam as well as coping
with the many other international and domestic problems he
had faced . . . .

Our policy would be 'steady on

course.'"29 The immediate problem that President Johnson
faced was the reliability of information pertaining to
Vietnam.

He realized that intelligence information was

flawed and unreliable.

He later stated his belief that

two things were wrong with the reporting in 1963: an
excess of wishful thinking on the part of some official
observers and too much uncritical reliance on
Vietnamese statistics and information. Many Vietnamese
officials and officers in the field apparently reported
27Hilsman, To Move a nation. 419-46, 517-26.
2*President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1964),
John Kennedy, 1963, 848.
York:

29Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point (New
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971), 41-42.
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as fact what they thought their own government wanted
to hear. Some of our officials in turn accepted many
of those reports at face value.30
Due to President Johnson's suspicions, he ordered
Secretary of Defense McNamara to visit Saigon in early
December 1963 to find out what was really the case in
Vietnam.

McNamara returned to Washington and reportedto

President Johnson that:

"the situation is very disturbing

. . . . Current trends, unless reversed in the next two or
three months, will lead to neutralization at best and more
likely to a Communist-controlled state."31
In his search for options to maintain the American
commitment to South Vietnam without taking on excessive
combat responsibilities, Johnson settled on a strategy of
graduated response offered by an assistant to Secretary
McNamara.

Although a debate had been going on since the

Kennedy administration "over whether to bomb" North
Vietnam, a fundamental issue had remained "how" to doso at
an acceptable cost.

Informed by academic theories of

bargaining, "civilian planners wanted to start out softly
and gradually increase the pressure by precise increments
which could be unmistakenly recognized by Hanoi."32
President Johnson's decision to implement graduated
response was a compromise to support American interests
3°Ibid., 63.
31Ibid.
32Summers, On Strategy. 72.
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given the same dilemma faced by his predecessors, how to
halt the spread of communism in Southeast Asia while
decreasing the risks of a total war against China and the
Soviet Union over South Vietnam-

He wanted to convey the

message that
we [Americans] are there [in South Vietnam] because we
are trying to make the Communists of North Vietnam stop
shooting at their neighbors . . . to demonstrate that
guerrilla warfare, inspired by one nation against
another nation, can never succeed . . . . [and to make]
the Communists in North Vietnam realize the price of
aggression is too high— and either agree to a peaceful
settlement or to stop their fighting . . . .33
Ultimately, Johnson wanted to demonstrate that American
interests were not in defeating the North Vietnamese but in
denying them victory in the south.34
Although strategically appealing, graduated response
had an opposite effect than the one desired on North
Vietnamese determination to continue their offense against
the south.

As Henry Kissinger has recently noted,

theorists had originally conceived of graduated response
as a strategy in nuclear war— incrementally escalating
and thereby avoiding a total holocaust. When applied
to guerrilla warfare, however, it ran the risk of
inviting open-ended escalation. Each limited
commitment involved the danger of being interpreted as
inhibition rather than resolve, thereby encouraging the

33President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register. National Archives and Records Service, 1967),
Lyndon Johnson, 1966, 720.
34Ibid.
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adversary to continue his climb along the ladder of
escalation.35
If incremental bombing did not strengthen North Vietnamese
determination, the strategy at least failed to convince
them to cease their offense and to deny them the means to
continue it.
A major consequence of this failure was an increasing
commitment of ground forces to South Vietnam, contributing
to a reappraisal of the best means to continue to protect
American interests in that nation.

On September 29, 1967,

President Johnson was beginning to lean towards unilateral
concessions in order to achieve a negotiated peace with
Hanoi.

In San Antonio, Texas, he delivered a speech in

which he said
the United States is willing to stop all aerial and
naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead
promptly to productive discussions. We, of course,
assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam
would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or
limitation.36
By the spring of 1968, the commitment of ground forces and
the bombing of North Vietnam had helped to divide the
American public and ruined Johnson's presidency, factors
that Hanoi continued to exploit as part of its propaganda

3SKissinger, Diplomacy. 652.
36President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1968),
Lyndon Johnson, 1967, 879.
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and strategy of "fighting and talking, talking and
fighting."37
When President Nixon entered office in 1969, he
inherited the idea of "peace with honor."

In his first

year as President, he formulated and enunciated a new
approach to American foreign policy, the Nixon Doctrine.
During informal remarks in Guam with newsmen, President
Nixon began to enunciate his approach in Asia and elsewhere
in the world, contrasting it with what he considered to be
the past mistakes of foreign policy:
What will be its [United States] role in Asia and the
Pacific after the end of the war in Vietnam? . . . I
think that one of the weaknesses in American foreign
policy is that too often we react rather precipitately
to events as they occur. We fail to have the
perspective and the long-range view which is essential
for a policy that will be viable . . . . I believe that
the time has come when the United States, in our
relations with all of our Asian friends, be quite
emphatic on two points: One, that we will keep our
treaty commitments, . . . but, two, that as far as the
problems of internal security are concerned, as far as
the problems of military defense, except for the threat
of a major power involving nuclear weapons, that the
United States is going to encourage and has a right to
expect that this problem will be increasingly handled
by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian
nations themselves.38

37George C. Herring, LBJ and Vietnam (Austin, TX:
University of Texas Press, 1994), 176. This strategy was
essentially a means of using negotiations to wear down
American resolve during a prolonged war of attrition.
38President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register. National Archives and Records Service, 1971),
Richard Nixon, 1969, 545-59.
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Nixon argued that from that point onward, the United
States' role in Asia should be to "help them fight the war
but not to fight the war for them-"39
A few weeks later, the president reaffirmed his
doctrine more specifically.
— First, the United States will keep all of its treaty
commitments.
— Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power
threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of
a nation whose survival we consider vital to our
security.
— Third, in cases involving other types of aggression,
we shall furnish military and economic assistance when
requested in accordance with our treatment commitments.
But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to
assume the primary responsibility of providing the
manpower for its defense.*0
In applying the standards of his doctrine to South
Vietnam, the president found it necessary to simultaneously
strengthen the South Vietnamese army, continue bombing
pressures to achieve a negotiated settlement, and assure
the commitment of enough force to attain an orderly
withdrawal.

Ultimately, that withdrawal would be achieved;

however, strategic guidance derived from limited war theory
had helped to undercut the U.S. commitment to South
Vietnam.

It would not be possible to legitimize a

continued commitment of resources to support the south
after withdrawal.

39Ibid., 905.
*°ibid. , 905-06.
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U.S. Objectives in Vietnam

As indicated above, the United States faced a
strategic dilemma in Vietnam, how to prevent the spread of
communism throughout Southeast Asia without provoking a
total war with the Soviet Union and China.

In order to

overcome the fundamental tension between these two goals,
the Kennedy administration established the Military
Assistance Command in South Vietnam.

The command's basic

objective was to assist that nation's government and armed
forces "to defeat externally directed and supported
communist subversion and aggression and attain an
independent South Vietnam functioning in a secure
environment.1,41
Following the assassinations of presidents Diem and
Kennedy in November 1963, President Johnson signed National
Security Action Memorandum 273 (NSAM 273).

NSAM 273

restated the basic goal of assisting "the people and
Government" of South Vietnam "to win their contest against
the externally directed and supported Communist
conspiracy."

Assuming that the South Vietnamese would be

capable of winning "their contest" with current levels of
military and economic assistance, the memorandum estimated
that the withdrawal of advisory forces would begin by

41William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports
(Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1976), 57.
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December 1963 and the Vietcong insurgency would be
suppressed by December 1965.42
These latter estimates were modified during the
spring of 1964 in light of South Vietnam's inability to
suppress the Vietcong and the growing number of northern
troops reinforcing them through Laos.

As approved by

President Johnson in March, a revised memorandum (NSAM 288)
maintained the objective of assisting the South Vietnamese
to defend themselves.

In order to do so, NSAM 288 delayed

the withdrawal of advisors and pointed out that the United
States should "provide all the assistance and advice
required to" defeat the Vietcong "regardless of how long it
takes.1' In addition, the memorandum initiated advance
plans and preparations for a graduated bombing campaign to
pressure the north to discontinue its support of the
insurgents.43
In approving NSAM 288, President Johnson judged that
graduated response would minimize the need for ground
forces to support the south as well as the risks of
confrontation with the Chinese and Soviets.44 In part,
the president based his judgment on the experience of

42Times Pentagon Papers. 238-39.
43Gravel Edition, vol. 3, 503.
44Johnson, Vantage Point. 119; Doris Kearns, Lvndon
Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Harper & Row,
1976), 264.
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Chinese intervention during the Korean War.4S At the same
time, Johnson was relying largely on the advice of civilian
strategists in the Defense Department (e.g., Secretary
McNamara) whose views were shaped by limited war theory.
They assumed that in virtually all cases, ’’the United
States would be free to escalate or deescalate or make
whatever adjustments in policy that the President and his
advisors might think desirable."46
Neither experience nor expert advice could provide
unambiguous guidance in resolving the dilemma of how best
to stem communist aggression while preventing a major
confrontation over South Vietnam.

As of June 22, 1964,

President Johnson could only tell reporters
It may be helpful to outline four basic themes that
govern our policy in Southeast Asia. First, America
keeps her word. Second, the issue is the future of
Southeast Asia as a whole. Third, our purpose is
peace. Fourth, this is not just a jungle war, but a
struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.
On the point that America keeps her word, we are
steadfast in a policy which has been followed for 10
years in three administrations.47
Long-term credibility was at best only a broad standard for
assessing what was to be or was being accomplished in
45In February 1965, Johnson was advised by former
President Eisenhower that the best deterrent to Chinese
intervention was a secretly communicated threat of nuclear
reprisal. Johnson, Vantage Point, 131.
46William Gerberding and Bernard Brodie, The
Political Dimension in National Strategy (Los Angeles, CA:
University of California, Security Studies Project, 1968),
30.
47Gravel Edition, vol. 3, 718.
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Vietnam, one obscuring the means needed to assist the South
Vietnamese to defend themselves.
This left open the possibility of an expanding
commitment lacking a viable strategy to coordinate national
policy objectives and military actions.

On April 7, 1965,

the president did not substantially clarify the situation
when he told a national audience
Our objective is the independence of South VietNam and its freedom from attack. We want . . . only
that the people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to guide
their own country in their own way. We will do
everything necessary to reach that objective, and we
will do only what is absolutely necessary.48
By late April, the emerging strategy to achieve that
objective was "to break the will of" North Vietnam and the
Vietcong "by depriving them of victory," leading
"eventually to a political solution."49
The nation's policy and strategy had not undergone a
significant test when the president announced the
deployment of combat forces to South Vietnam on July 28,
1965.

He stated that "we [Americans] intend to convince

the Communists that we cannot be defeated by force of arms
or by superior power."

When asked if the deployment

implied a change "in the existing policy" of "using
American forces to guard installations and to act as
emergency backup," he announced, "It does not imply any

48Ibid., 730.
49Ibid., 706.
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change in policy whatever.,,so What remained unclear to
the president and all other participants in the political
process was the amount of force that would eventually be
exerted in the attempt both to convince the communists that
they could not win and to secure South Vietnam.
One component of that force was the air campaign
waged against North Vietnam.

Designated Rolling Thunder,

the campaign's primary operation underwent steady
escalation (except for bombing pauses meant to promote
negotiations) from its inception on March 2, 1965, until
late 1967, when President Johnson began the process of
deescalation.

Rolling Thunder's strategic objective was to

coerce Hanoi into abandoning the Vietcong.

Tactically, the

operation was intended to destroy the infrastructure (e.g.,
roads, bridges, industrial facilities) by which the north
supported the insurgents.51
The other component of the force employed was the use
of ground forces in South Vietnam.

According to General

William Westmoreland, head of the Military Assistance
Command in the south, the ground war's strategic objective
was pacification.

Pacification meant the development of

"an economically and politically viable society in which
the [South Vietnamese] people could live without constant

“ Ibid., 477.
slEarl H. Tilford, Jr., Setup (Washington, DC:
GPO, 1991), 105, 153.
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fear of death or other physical harm."52 Tactically, such
development depended on a variety of social, economic, and
military instruments, the latter form being the most direct
way of establishing internal security.
From the beginning of major air and ground operations
in Vietnam, President Johnson and his civilian advisors,
particularly Secretary McNamara, attempted to maintain
restrictions on the military's conduct in accord with the
strategic objectives of the war.53 Nevertheless, it was
not until late 1967 and early 1968 that the gradually
expanding tactical requirements of denying a communist
victory in the south prompted the president to more
actively reevaluate and limit operations.

Faced with an

increasingly public dispute between McNamara and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff over the destruction of the north's
military and industrial base in August 1967, the president
allowed air operations to continue but began assuming a
more conciliatory approach in seeking negotiations with
Hanoi.54 Moreover, although the president had not

“Westmoreland, Soldier Reports. 68.
“Important examples of those restrictions included
the number and variety of targets bombed in the north
(e.g., bridges, oil storage facilities), geographic
restrictions (e.g., the Chinese border), and the number of
ground troops sent to South Vietnam.
54Tilford, Setup. 141-146; Gravel Edition, vol. 4,
138-144. The debate between McNamara and the Joint Chiefs
occupied hearings before the Senate Armed Services
Committee.
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established a limit on the number of forces sent to Vietnam
by late 1967, he had begun to redirect their tactical
emphasis from attrition of the Vietcong towards the
reestablishment of South Vietnam's control over
pacification efforts.ss
By the time President Johnson left office, the
objective of disengaging from Vietnam had significantly
altered what was meant by denying a communist victory.

In

particular, the withdrawal of American forces meant that
any possibility of a negotiated settlement would depend on
a combination of South Vietnamese ground strength
supplemented by the continued use of American airpower.

As

President Nixon observed, if the North Vietnamese feel
that we are going to stay there long enough for the
South Vietnamese to be strong enough to handle their
own defense, then I think they have a real incentive to
negotiate, because if they have to negotiate with a
strong, vigorous South Vietnamese government, the deal
they make with them isn't going to be as good as the
deal they might make now.“
The best deal for the United States had become withdrawal
under the most favorable conditions achieved through
negotiations.
In order to achieve such conditions, the Nixon
administration sought to simultaneously carry on a process

5SThomas W. Scoville, Reorganizing for Pacification
Support (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), ch. 5.
“Richard M. Nixon, A New Road for America (Garden
City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1972), 681.
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of Vietnamization and of negotiation.

The president later

wrote that the nation's policy goals
were to: Reverse the Americanization of the war . . .
and concentrate instead on Vietnamization. Give more
priority to pacification . . . to extend their [South
Vietnamese] control over the countryside. Reduce the
invasion threat by destroying enemy sanctuaries and
supply lines in Cambodia and Laos. Withdraw the half
million American troops from Vietnam in a way that
would not bring about a collapse in the south.
Negotiate a cease fire and a peace treaty. Demonstrate
our willingness and determination to stand by . . .
[South Vietnam] if the peace treaty was violated by
Hanoi, and assure South Vietnam that it would continue
to receive our military aid as Hanoi did from its
allies, the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent,
China.57
Diplomatically, the administration recognized the
possibility of escalating the air war against North Vietnam
without risking Chinese intervention.58
It was in part due to that recognition that President
Nixon escalated the bombing campaign against the north,
reducing restrictions which had been imposed during the
Johnson administration.

(In particular, the president

began by ordering the mining Haiphong harbor and expanded
to targets throughout North Vietnam, Laos, and
Cambodia).S9 The bombing campaign (Linebacker) initiated
by the president on May 9, 1972, had two objectives:
first, to blockade North Vietnam from Soviet and Chinese

57Richard M. Nixon, The Real War (New York:
Warner, 1980), 107.
58Kissinger, Diplomacy, 692.
S9Kissinger, White House Years. 1099-1100.
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supply sources; and, second, to destroy the north's
industrial means of supporting its forces in the south.
"Taken together," these objectives were meant to compel the
north "to negotiate a peace plan acceptable to the United
States."60
Gradual bombing had contributed to the buildup of
U.S. ground forces to assist South Vietnam.

Now sustained

bombing was being used to allow for the withdrawal of those
forces while assisting the south to defend itself.

U.S. Mobilization

The gradual deployment of American combat forces to
Vietnam beginning in 1965 reflected the Johnson
administration's inability to develop a coherent strategy
"to help the South Vietnamese build up their forces so that
they could win the war."61 When peace accords were signed
in January 1973, the Nixon administration had managed to
gradually withdraw combat forces while implementing the
strategy of Vietnamization.

The question remained open to

what extent the South Vietnamese could defeat external
aggression.
In answering this question, President Johnson faced
an ambiguous situation.

With the president's approval,

“Tilford, Setup. 234.
61Nixon, Real War. 106.
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U.S. Marines began deploying to South Vietnam in early
March 1965 to protect air bases needed to sustain the
bombing campaign against the north.62 After the North
Vietnamese refused to negotiate following a six-day bombing
pause he ordered on May 12, 1965,63 the president decided
to proceed with the deployment of over 30,000
reinforcements.
avoiding . . .

Their primary purpose was "holding on and
a spectacular defeat of" South Vietnamese

and American forces already engaged against the
Vietcong.6* By early July, the president had committed
about 75,000 troops to limited offensive operations against
the Vietcong.

President Johnson had accepted a "consensus"

among his advisors "that a settlement in Vietnam would come
as much or more from Communist failure in the South as from
'pain' [produced by bombing] in North Vietnam."65
This consensus was more difficult to maintain after
June 13, 1965, when the American commander in South
Vietnam, General William Westmoreland, requested about
175,000 combat troops to compensate for South Vietnamese

“Jack Shulimson and Charles M. Johnson, U.S.
Marines in Vietnam (Washington, DC: GPO, 1978), ch. 1.
“Johnson, Vantage Point. 578.
6*Alexander S. Cochran, Jr. "Eight Decisions for
War," in Second Indochina War Symposium, ed. John Schlight
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1986), 71.
“Johnson, Vantage Point. 141.
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losses since the previous month.66 In their endorsement
of that request on July 2, the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued
a broad recommendation to deploy "such additional forces at
this time as are required to insure that the" Vietcong and
North Vietnamese "cannot win in" South Vietnam "at their
present level of commitment."67 With South Vietnamese
losses as the clearest indicator of that commitment,
General Westmoreland could not assure anyone in the chain
of command (from the president down) that the number of
requested troops "would persuade the enemy to desist."68
After conferring with General Westmoreland in Saigon,
Secretary McNamara met with the president and other
advisors on July 21 to discuss Westmoreland's request.

In

that meeting, the secretary recommended that the 175,000
troops be deployed and that the president seek
authorization from Congress to call up an additional
235,000 reserves and to increase regular forces by 375,000.
McNamara noted, "It should be recognized that even" if such
mobilization allowed the United States to deny victory to
the communists, "it is not obvious how we will be able to
disengage our forces."69

66Karnow, Vietnam. 421-22; Gravel Edition, vol. 3,
416.
67Ibid.
68Westmore 1and, Soldier Reports , 141.
69Gravel Edition, vol. 4, 621.
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By July 27, President Johnson had met with the
National Security Council and congressional leaders.

At

both meetings, the president obtained a consensus that it
was best not to mobilize reserves or to place the nation on
a wartime footing.

In a meeting held at General

Westmoreland's request, Johnson decided that the use of
existing forces and resources would avoid a hostile signal
to the Soviet Union and China as well as a loss of money
and popular support for his Great Society programs.
Moreover, the president was by now convinced that ground
forces would provide diplomatic leverage against the
Vietcong and the north which had not yet been provided by
bombing.70
Citing the lessons of history regarding past failures
to resist aggression (e.g., Munich), the president
announced on July 28 that he had ordered the immediate
deployment of 50,000 troops to Vietnam with more to "be
sent as requested."71 Placing primary reliance on the
draft and recruitment to meet future needs, Johnson
deferred the decision to mobilize reserves for later
consideration.

Whether or not the decision to make such an

open-ended commitment was derived from the lessons of
history, the president's decision to gradually commit
7°David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New
York: Random House, 1972), 593-600; Johnson, Vantage
Point. 148-151.
71Gravel Edition, vol. 3, 477.
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ground forces to combat at least reflected an
underdeveloped strategy for fighting a limited war and a
concomitant assumption of responsibility from the South
Vietnamese.

As he stated, "we intend to convince the

Communists that we cannot be defeated."72
The indeterminate strategy for assisting the south
manifested itself in the goals set by General Westmoreland
after the decision was made to deploy combat forces.

As an

extension of the concept of graduated response only yet
partially applied in the air campaign,73 the general
divided operations into three phases.

First, his goal was

to "commit those . . . forces necessary to halt the [South
Vietnamese] losing trend by the end of 1965."

Second, by

1966, the general called for the beginning of offensive
operations "to destroy enemy forces and reinstitute
pacification programs."

Third, at some future date, the

general envisioned that "if the enemy persisted, he might
be defeated and his forces and base areas destroyed."74
The lack of more explicit strategic objectives
combined with an open-ended commitment of forces to produce
a war of attrition.

By the time the number of forces

deployed to South Vietnam had reached 385,000 at the end of

72Ibid.
73Summers, On Strategy r 73.
74Westmoreland, Soldier Reports. 142.
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1966,7S General Westmoreland had long since begun
offensive operations to seek out and destroy communist
forces in the south, operations requiring continuous
reinforcements.

The goals of pacification and negotiation,

both intended to provide for a viable political order in
the south, remained elusive as the war remained focused on
the tactical requirements of maintaining enough U.S. troops
"to destroy enemy forces at a rate higher than enemy
input."76
This method of waging war was an adaptation of
limited war theory by the civilian strategists who had come
to dominate the Defense Department since the early 1960s
under McNamara.

In particular, it was felt that

By using the numerical techniques of economics . . .
rationality could be assumed . . . . Therefore, when
Hanoi appeared to be acting irrationally in not
accepting American terms and yet did not appear to be
near defeat, it could only be assumed that they were
bluffing, and a little more pressure would force
rationality upon them.77
In August 1967, that pressure included an announcement by
President Johnson that he had approved a U.S. troop level
in South Vietnam of 525,000, 200,000 less than that
requested by the military.78

7SDepartment of the Army, Vietnam. 101.
7<sCochran, "Eight Decisions," 77.
77Gregory Palmer, The McNamara Strategy and the
Vietnam War (Westpoint, CT: Greenwood, 1978), 139-140.
78Department of the Army, Vietnam. 101.
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As of December 1968, there were over 485,000 U.S.
combat forces in South Vietnam, a number which would prove
necessary to help the South Vietnamese defeat communist
forces during the month-long Tet offensive, which began on
January 30, 1968.79 Tet helped to finally convince the
Johnson administration "that as an interdiction measure
against the infiltration of men and supplies" as well as a
means of "breaking Hanoi's will," "the bombing [campaign]
had been a near total failure."80 The Vietcong were
destroyed as an effective fighting force, leaving a vacuum
of political control in large areas of the south.81
In spite of this tactical success, the Johnson
administration lacked time to fully implement plans to
establish South Vietnamese control over those areas after
President Johnson announced his decision not to seek
reelection.82 In his announcement, he stressed that
The South Vietnamese know that further efforts are
going to be required: to expand their own armed
forces, to move back into the countryside as quickly as
possible, to increase their taxes, to select the very
best men that they have for civilian and military
responsibility, to achieve a new unity within their
constitutional government, and to include in the
national effort all of those groups who wish to

79Ibid., 102.
8°Gravel Edition, vol. 4, 232.
81Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams (New York:
House, 1985), 105.

Arbor

82Scoville, Pacification Support. 82-83.
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preserve South Vietnam's control over its own
destiny.83
In the context of stabilizing the American troop commitment
and deescalating the air war to promote negotiations with
Hanoi, the president had come to a belated understanding of
the limits of American military capabilities to protect
other countries.84
The incoming Nixon administration inherited a troop
commitment which had peaked at 543,400 by the spring of
1969.8S Complicating the task of beginning the gradual
withdrawal of those forces was the absence of clear
strategic guidance for the military.

By June 1969, the

administration had provided the new commander in Vietnam,
General Creighton Abrams, with the tasks of "providing
'maximum assistance' to the South Vietnamese to strengthen
their forces, supporting pacification efforts, and reducing
the flow of supplies to the enemy."86 Since the Tet

83Gravel Edition, vol. 4, 598.
84Four weeks before his resignation was announced by
President Johnson on November 29, 1967, Secretary McNamara
gave the president a memorandum recommending a
stabilization of troop levels and a bombing halt. Johnson,
Vantage Point. 372-73.
8SDepartment of the Army, Vietnam. 103. That number
included 11,000 of the 20,000 reservists which President
Johnson had finally decided to activate after the Tet
offensive. Westmoreland, Soldier Reports. 359.
86Kissinger, White House Years. 276.
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offensive, that enemy consisted primarily of regular North
Vietnamese forces.87
As of December IS71, President Nixon had reduced U.S.
troop levels to about 157,000, a figure which he announced
would be brought to 69,000 by May 1972.88 In support of
that withdrawal, the president had expanded the scope of
air and ground operations to destroy North Vietnamese
sanctuaries and infiltration routes in Cambodia and Laos
beginning in March 1969.89 Although those targets were
not destroyed, Nixon gained time to strengthen South
Vietnamese forces.90
Ironically, it was the withdrawal of American forces
and the defeat of South Vietnamese forces attempting to
sever the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos91 which helped
convince Hanoi to launch a large-scale offensive against

87Having ordered the offensive by the Vietcong, Hanoi
held its regular forces in reserve "in order to exploit
success." Westmoreland, Soldier Reports. 332.
“Department of the Army, Vietnam. 104.
“Actually begun in 1964, air operations in Laos were
steadily intensified after October 1968 in order to aid the
process of Vietnamization. By January 1973, U.S. forces
had dropped "over 3 million tons of bombs on Laos, three
times the tonnage directed at North Vietnam." Tilford,
Setup f 173.
90Nixon, No More Vietnams. 109-138.
91The invasion of Laos occurred in the spring of 1971.
American forces did not participate, having been prohibited
by Congress from doing so in December 1970 following the
joint invasion launched with South Vietnamese forces
against Cambodia. Ibid.
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the south in the spring of 1972.

In response to that

invasion, President Nixon ordered the bombing of North
Vietnam to "destroy [its] war-making capacity" beginning in
May 1972.92 Halted in October to permit negotiations, the
bombing was renewed on December 18, 1972, to force the
North Vietnamese to quit stalling those negotiations.
Eleven days later, President Nixon ordered the bombing of
the north to be halted again to permit the talks which
would lead to the final withdrawal of American combat
forces from South Vietnam.93
"The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace
in Vietnam" was signed between the United States, North
Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the Vietcong on January 27,
1973.94 Among its key provisions, the agreement provided
for an in-place cease-fire, which left up to 160,000 North
Vietnamese troops in control of southern territory seized
since October 1972.

In exchange for the release of

American prisoners of war by Hanoi, the 24,200 American
forces remaining in the south were to be withdrawn within
sixty days.

All four signatories were to refrain from

violating Laotian and Cambodian territory.

Elections were

92Kissinger, White House Years. 1199.
93Details on the events leading to these negotiations
are in Kissinger, White House Years. 1458-59; and Richard
Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York:
Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 741.
94Kissinger, White House Years. 1458-59.
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to be held in South Vietnam under an international
commission's supervision, leading to a set of broader
elections under an overall framework for Vietnamese
reconciliation.

Finally, the United States and North

Vietnam were to be allowed to replace Vietcong and South
Vietnamese equipment on a piece-by-piece basis, a provision
not applying to Soviet and Chinese aid to the north's
regular forces.95
When the terms of this cease-fire went into effect,
U.S. forces had suffered a total of 58,022 deaths.

Of

these, 38,479 were killed in action, and 3,652 were listed
as killed while missing or interned.

By 1985, 745

prisoners of war had been accounted for, with only one
officially recognized as still living under enemy
control.96
Total estimated deaths among the Vietnamese between
1965 and the end of 1973 were 1,379,000.

This figure

included 430,000 civilian deaths in the south and 65,000
killed in bombing campaigns against the north.

About

224,000 South Vietnamese troops were killed, and about

95William E. Le Gro, Vietnam from Cease-Fire to
Capitulation (Washington, DC: GPO, 1981), 2-3; Tilford,
Setup. 249; Department of the Army, Vietnam, 104.
96Department of Defense, U.S. Casualties in Southeast
Asia (Washington, DC: GPO, 1985), 1.
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660,000 North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces died in
combat.97
Casualties among the Vietnamese would rise even
further as the north reorganized its forces and was
resupplied by the Soviet Union and China after the cease
fire.

Renewed communist aggression would soon demonstrate

that South Vietnam, ’’which had no strategy of its own when
the Americans were in the country, also failed to develop a
real strategy after they had left” the country.9® The
Americans themselves had lacked a clear plan, gradually
increasing their commitment in order to wage a limited war
and, subsequently, expanding those limits to gradually
withdraw from the south.

When Saigon fell in 1975, the

difficulty of developing a limited war strategy under
prolonged combat conditions had long since diminished
prospects for U.S. assistance.

U.S. Public Support

The dilemma facing the Johnson and Nixon
administrations was how to maintain the support of Congress
and the American public over the period of time needed to
assure South Vietnam's continued existence.

Under

97James S. Olson, ed., Dictionary of the Vietnam War
(New York: Greenwood, 1988), 67.
9®Stephen T. Hosmer, et al. The Fall of South Vietnam
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1978), 46.
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President Johnson, constraints on the use of force in
Vietnam were intended to avoid Soviet and Chinese
intervention, a risk leading to his acceptance of a
protracted war of attrition.

That risk was reduced by the

diplomacy of the Nixon administration, enabling President
Nixon to pursue a more aggressive war against North
Vietnam.

Even so, Nixon's determination to follow through

with Vietnamization led to a prolonged settlement just as
damaging to support for the war."
Congressional support for President Johnson's actions
in Vietnam was not originally expressed in connection with
a war, but with a series of incidents between August 2 and
5, 1964.

In response to torpedo attacks against U.S. naval

vessels patrolling the Gulf of Tonkin, the president
ordered air strikes against naval and oil storage
facilities in North Vietnam.100
Although the president consulted with the
congressional leadership and announced his decision to the
public prior to the air strikes, he used the incidents to
achieve passage of legislation with much broader policy
implications.

Passing both houses with only two negative

votes in the Senate, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution authorized

"Kissinger, Diplomacy. 692.
xooEdward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The
United States Navv and the Vietnam Conflict, vol. 2, From
Military Assistance to Combat (Washington, DC: GPO, 1986),
414-46.
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Johnson ’’to take all necessary measures to repel any armed
attack against the forces of the United States and to
prevent further aggression.”

Moreover, he was authorized

”to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed
force, to assist any member or protocol state of the
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.”101
President Johnson "hoped this strong congressional
endorsement would help influence North Vietnam to refrain
from accelerating aggression" (italics mine).102 A
combination of a declaration of war and a bargaining
instrument, the president took the resolution as a means of
gradually entering the war in Vietnam.

Because he had

already decided by July 22, 1965, to deploy ground troops
to South Vietnam,103 Johnson met with congressional
leaders on July 27 primarily to establish a consensus that
full national mobilization would create an unacceptable
risk of Soviet and Chinese intervention.10*

101Congress, Congressional Recordr vol. 110, pt. 14.
(4 August 1964 to 12 August 1964), 18441-555.
102Johnson, Vantage Point. 119.
103Melvin Small, Johnson. Nixon, and the Doves (London:
Rutgers University Press, 1988), 57-60.
104Gacek, Logic of Force. 210. Of course, the
president also saw gradual mobilization as a means of
avoiding a political contest endangering his domestic
political agenda. Johnson, Vantage Point. 148-151. That
consensus was established among the congressional leaders
meeting with Johnson.
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In keeping with his desire to signal American resolve
while avoiding total mobilization, the president chose on
July 28 to announce only half of the 100,000 troops
actually scheduled for deployment to South Vietnam as part
of an open-ended commitment (see discussion above ).los
Eventually, the war of attrition resulting from that choice
undermined the consensus needed to exercise influence over
the North Vietnamese.
After the Tet offensive, the ability to achieve
negotiations appeared less likely when the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee opened hearings into the Tonkin Gulf
incidents.

Generally, the issue raised by the hearings was

the need for more meaningful consultation between the
president and Congress prior to the commitment of American
combat forces.106
That issue came to President Nixon's attention early
in his first term.

According to Henry Kissinger, the

president refused to accept advice that he should seek a
congressional mandate for his conduct of the war.

Nixon

had two main reasons for refusing to go before Congress:
losGravel Edition, vol. Ill, 476-77. The president did
not publicly announce his February 1965 decision to begin
the bombing of North Vietnam. Small, Johnson. Nixon, and
the Doves. 60.
10<sCongress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
The Gulf of Tonkin. The 1964 Incidents. 90th Cong., 2nd
sess., 20 February 1968, passim. The specific issue was
the adequacy of President Johnson's consultations after the
fact of a broad Congressional authorization, itself granted
after a single retaliatory action.
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First, he viewed it as an abdication of presidential
responsibility. Second, having served for six years in
the Congress, he was convinced . . . that the Congress
would evade making a clear-cut choice and give him— at
best— some ambiguous endorsement hedged by so many
conditions as to magnify the problem.107
This predisposition came ultimately to defeat the
president's efforts to follow through with the protection
of South Vietnam after four years spent in implementing
Vietnamization and forcing the North Vietnamese to
negotiate an end to the war.
By June 1973, Congress had cut funding for continuing
air operations against Khmer Rouge and North Vietnamese
forces in Cambodia.

Seeking to further disengage from

Southeast Asia, Congress sent the War Powers Resolution to
President Nixon in October 1973.108 Among its key
elements, the resolution required the president
to make every effort to consult with the Congress in
advance of any decision to introduce the armed forces
of the United States into hostilities or into
situations in which hostilities are imminent, unless
there has been a declaration of war or specific
authorization by Congress . . . . to report to Congress
within 48 hours of the time that U.S. armed forces
became involved in combat or of the time that the
President becomes aware that hostilities involving U.S.
forces are imminent . . . . [and] the Congress to
authorize the deployment of U.S. armed forces within
sixty days of the report's submission.100

107Kissinger, Diplomacy. 681.
108Nixon, No More Vietnams. 179-181.
1O0Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The
War Powers Resolution. 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., May 1994,
IV.
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President Nixon vetoed the resolution on October 24,
citing among his reasons that he believed it to be
unconstitutional and a threat to the United States'1 ability
to act decisively in response to international crises.110
On November 7, both the House and Senate voted by two-third
majorities to override the veto, "the objections of the
President notwithstanding.1,111 The president held that
Congress "had laid to rest any fears Hanoi might have had
that another invasion of South Vietnam would provoke an
American response.1,112
Enactment of the War Powers Resolution over the
president's veto was in part a reflection of the long-term
decline in public approval for the war.

In particular, the

war's duration coupled with its lack of clear progress to
convince an increasing number of people that continued
involvement was a mistake.
This trend was evident in responses given to the
Gallup organization's question, "In view of the
developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do
you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight
in Vietnam?"113 In August 1965, 61 percent of respondents
11QNixon, No More Vietnams. 181.
^Congress, War Powers r V.
112Nixon, No More Vietnams. 181.
113Mark Lorell and Charles Kelley, Jr., Casualties.
Public Opinion, and Presidential Policy During the Vietnam
War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1985), 17.
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to this question answered that they felt American
involvement in Vietnam was not a mistake.

President

Johnson had managed to avoid a dramatic entry into the war.
With nearly two-thirds of the country approving his policy,
there was at least an indication that the president was
"launching a war with strong popular backing."114
Nevertheless, by May 1966, it was becoming clear that
the war was not going to be over very quickly.

Those

expressing support for the war had fallen to 49 percent.
Moreover, those asked if they expected a long war increased
from 54 to 72 percent between the end of 1965 and the
middle of 1966.11S
Between September 1966 and December 1967, support for
the war stabilized at just over 48 percent, never falling
below the level of 44 percent in October 1967.

These

levels were hardly a mandate for the original decision to
send troops to Vietnam, much less the steady increase which
had reached nearly a half-million by December 1967.116
Following the Tet Offensive, those who felt that
involvement in Vietnam was not a mistake fell below 50
percent.

"Thereafter, a steady decline set in at roughly a

constant rate until support declined to an all-time low of
28 percent in May 1971, at which time Gallup discontinued
114Ibid., 20.
llsMueller, War. 54, 56.
116Ibid., 54-55; Department of the Army, Vietnam. 102.
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the 'mistake7 question.”117 Without substantial popular
support, the best President Nixon could do to achieve
negotiations with the North Vietnamese was expand the war's
scope in order to shorten its already considerable
duration.

Military and Nonmilitarv Means

The Johnson and Nixon administrations both followed
policies of gradualism in regard to Vietnam, the first
resulting in unilateral concessions to initiate
negotiations and the second in unilateral escalation to
force those negotiations to a conclusion.

Where the

policies diverged in the maintenance of limits, they
converged in the establishment of desired outcomes.

The

problem with both approaches to the limited war in Vietnam
was the inability to maintain a clear understanding that
the North Vietnamese were waging a total war.
Having participated in negotiations under Presidents
Johnson and Nixon, Henry Kissinger noted that "Hanoi
bargained only when it was under severe pressure . . . .
precisely what most inflamed the critics at home."118 The
disadvantages accrued by both administrations were part of
a basic difficulty in waging limited wars under a
117Lorell and Kelley, Casualties. 20.
118Kissinger, Diplomacy. 684.
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democratic system of government.

The ability to make

military decisions restraining the use of force requires
extra attention to popular support.
In addressing this need, neither president could
overcome another basic problem.

The North Vietnamese, even

when compelled to negotiate, did not limit their conduct to
diplomatic moves-

Hanoi did not define its war as

a bargaining process, one in which threats and
proposals, counterproposals and counterthreats, offers
and assurances, concessions and demonstrations, take
the form of actions rather than words, or actions
accompanied by words.119
While Washington sought a rational outcome, the North
Vietnamese were interested in negotiations only as a means
of delaying until they could conquer the south.

Conclusion

Over a period of eight years, U.S. policymakers
attempted to work out a strategy for fighting a limited war
in Vietnam.

Particularly during the Johnson

administration, the strategy of graduated response (derived
from limited war theory) was subjected to a test under
combat conditions.

The problem in applying the strategy

was the ease with which administration officials adopted it
as a means of simultaneously countering aggression in

119Schelling, Arms and Influence. 142.
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Southeast Asia and avoiding war with the Soviet Union and
China.
Improperly applied to the case of Vietnam, graduated
response contributed to a growing commitment of ground
forces lacking a fully coordinated purpose beyond the
tactical goal of attrition.

The lack of purpose had

already weakened the domestic consensus needed to negotiate
with the North Vietnamese when the Nixon administration
took over the war's conduct.

Although the new

administration had a clearer strategic outlook in
conducting the war, the expansion of limits needed to
accomplish that strategy only further weakened remaining
popular support for the South Vietnamese.
The war served to discredit limited war theory as a
source of strategic guidance; nevertheless, the conditions
in which the theory was meant to apply were not the same as
those in which it was actually applied.

As noted above,

graduated response was a strategic concept developed in
theory for nuclear warfare.

Limited war theory retained

relevance because it was not fully tested in Vietnam.
What was added to the concept of limited war after
Vietnam was the political standard under the War Powers
Resolution of maintaining consultations between the
president and Congress over the use of combat forces.

Like

other standards, that one left room for selectivity in its
application.

Perhaps more significantly, the resolution
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provided a time frame within which to judge military
decisions.

In terms of the knowledge used by policymakers

in waging limited wars, the time frame of the War Powers
Resolution would soon become a major empirical standard of
limiting wars even when not applied by the Congress.
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CHAPTER 5

U.S. INTERVENTION IN GRENADA

The U.S. intervention in Grenada on October 25, 1983
was code-named Urgent Fury.

It resulted in what one

participant has described as Ma communist nutmeg" being
"smashed by an enormous American sledgehammer."1 Indeed,
Grenada is the only nation in which the United States has
overthrown a communist government by direct military force.
It is even more important from the perspective of this
study that Urgent Fury set a precedent of using decisive
military force to achieve victories in limited wars.

Historical Background

Urgent Fury was undertaken and later justified as a
response to a crisis situation in Grenada.

Events

occurring there left only forty-eight hours in which to
plan the intervention, according to President Ronald

Nutmeg provides a primary source of export income for
Grenada. Mark Adkin, Urgent Fury (Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books 1989), xv.
136
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Reagan.2 In order to understand the crisis beyond the
scope of immediate events, however, it is necessary to
examine earlier developments in Grenada's history.
Among those developments was the formation of the
People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) of Grenada
following a coup against Prime Minister Eric Gairy in March
1979.

The coup's leaders, including Maurice Bishop,

established themselves along the lines of a Leninist
vanguard party.

Reflecting principles inherent in such a

structure, the PRG centralized power in its own hands (with
both a Political Bureau and a Central Committee).

The PRG

came to rely on mass organizations and popular councils,
neither of which had access to the secrets of included
party members.

Only PRG leaders were privy to the

government's goals.

Popular support came to depend

increasingly on indoctrination, a situation in which
Grenadians grew more and more disaffected with PRG
sloganizing (e.g., against U.S. imperialism) as a
substitute for tangible benefits.

Above all, Grenadians

remained unaware of growing factional problems within the
PRG.3

President, "Remarks at the Reunion," Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents. (3 November 1983),
vol. 19, no. 44, p. 1520.
^ony Thorndike, "People's Power in Theory and
Practice" in A Revolution Aborted, ed. Jorge Heine
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), 38-48.
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Bishop set aside the Grenadian constitution in favor
of edicts issued as People's Laws.

Admittedly, a

commission was eventually appointed in 1982 to draft a
"people's democracy constitution," but ongoing
revolutionary processes forestalled its completion.

The

PRG seized control of all media, suppressing those mediums
that it could not bring under its control.

Arbitrary rule

was further reinforced with aid from the People's
Revolutionary Armed Forces (PRAF) and agents of the
Ministry of the Interior.

By early 1982, these agents were

relaying on large-scale permanent detentions to deal with
public dissatisfaction, dividing the island's population
into groups that reflected the degree of threat they posed
to the revolution.4
By mid-1983, Bishop and his associates came to be
regarded as threats to the revolution because of personal
and ideological differences with a more extreme faction in
the PRG.

Led by Bishop's deputy in the Political Bureau,

Bernard Coard, this faction traced the PRG's increasingly
precarious hold over state power to the party's failures to
follow a stricter Leninist path.s
The remedy sought by committee members was joint
leadership between Bishop and Coard.

Bishop would remain

“Jiri Valenta and Virginia Valenta, "Leninism in
Grenada." Problems of Communism (July-August 1984): 507.
5Gordon K. Lewis, Grenada (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1987), 37-39, 45-46.
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the popular head of the Political Bureau but would give his
chairmanship in the Central Committee to Coard, who was
deemed more competent in matters of organization and
ideology.

Apparently, Bishop lacked the ideological

vocabulary and zeal of his opponents.

On September 25,

Bishop pledged to the Central Committee that he would
exercise greater self-criticism and attempt to overcome
personal petit-bourgeois tendencies that had threatened the
revolution.

Faced with an overwhelming vote by committee

members, Bishop further acceded to a position of joint
leadership with Coard.6
Coard and his faction soon moved to make that
position one of single leadership.

Bishop had called for

the issue of joint leadership to be reconsidered in a
meeting of the Central Committee scheduled for the morning
of October 12.

Prior to the meeting, however, Coard and

his followers made their move to seize total control of the
PRG.

Members of the PRA who were thought to be loyal to

the Central Committee were assembled at 1:00 A.M. on the
twelfth and instructed to accept no more orders from the
disloyal Bishop.

A later meeting at 7:00 A.M. among PRA

members belonging to the party resulted in a call to expel
all those who would not accept "joint leadership."

Once

the meeting had convened, a strong Bishop supporter named
George Louison was removed from the party for telling
6Ibid.
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Grenadian students in Hungary that the issue of joint
leadership remained unsettled.

Another move against Bishop

was the accusation that he, along with his security chief,
had contrived a rumor of an assassination plot against
himself by Coard.

His security chief was arrested, and

Bishop was forced to go on radio to try and quiet the
rumor.

The next day, October 13, Bishop was placed under

house arrest.7
Following Bishop's arrest, his supporters organized a
number of popular protests to stage his release and
reinstatement in power.

Those protests climaxed on October

19 in the Grenadian capital, St. George's.

Thousands of

Grenadians, many from outside the city, freed Gairv and
proceeded to occupy the fort overlooking St. George's, Fort
Rupert.

Armored cars and PRA troops arrived at the fort

and began firing rocket grenades and machine guns at the
fort and the crowd around it.

From inside the fort, Bishop

and several colleagues were forced to surrender.
lined them up and executed them.®

Soldiers

That "Bloody Sunday"

launched the brief military rule of the Revolutionary
Military Council (RMC).

’Hugh O'Shaughnessy, Grenada (London: Hamish
Hamilton, 1984), 122-126; Anthony Payne, Paul Sutton, and
Tony Thorndike, Grenada (New York: St. Martin's, 1984),
128-131.
‘Gregory Sandford and Richard Vigilante, Grenada
(Lanham, MD: Madison Books, 1984), 163-165.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

141

U.S. Interests in Grenada

Having accounted for successive phases of political
turmoil in Grenada's history, it may be asked how that
island nation came to occupy such a prominent position in
U.S. national interests.

Why would a large power like the

United States intervene in an island nation 11just 133
square miles in size, with a mere 110,000 inhabitants,
whose best-known export was nutmeg”?9
An important part of the answer to this question is
Grenada's geopolitical situation as one of numerous small
Caribbean nations emerging from the end of British
colonialism.

Grenada is the southernmost island in a chain

extending 400 miles from just east of Puerto Rico to the
north of Venezuela.

Strategically, this chain controls

passage between the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean
Sea.10
It was not until the Carter and Reagan
administrations, however, that Grenada figured prominently
in considerations of U.S. interests in the Caribbean.
These administrations shared a number of broad goals for
the region:

discouraging the formation of governments with

links to the Soviet Union and its proxies; enhancing
regional security arrangements and capabilities; promoting
9Payne, Sutton, and Thorndike, Grenada, 1.
10Adkin, Urgent Fury, 1.
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democracy and human rights; encouraging social reform; and
promoting economic growth through both private and public
sources -11
Initially, the PRG leadership did not seem to
threaten U.S. goals in the Caribbean.

Once in power,

Bishop and other PRG leaders decided to seek friendly
relations with their foreign neighbors.

Initially

pessimistic about the consequences of Grenada's revolution,
regional governments extended recognition to the PRG once
they had received reassurances of early elections on the
island.

Accepting PRG promises to respect electoral

processes and human rights, the Carter administration
expressed its desire for continued friendly relations with
Grenada.12
Those relations ran into immediate diplomatic
difficulties with the PRG.

Following a Cuban mission to

Grenada on April 7, the U.S. ambassador to the east
Caribbean, Frank Ortiz, met with Bishop and PRG cabinet
members.

Offering $5,000 in aid from his discretionary

funds, Ortiz warned the PRG not to pursue stronger links to
Cuba.

By April 11, Cuba and Grenada decided to exchange

“ One example of the Reagan administration's efforts
to promote the last three goals was the Caribbean Basin
Initiative. Robert Pastor, "U.S. Policy Toward the
Caribbean" in American Intervention in Grenada. ed. Peter
M. Dunn and Bruce W. Watson, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1985), 21.
12Sandford and Vigilante, Grenada. 49-51.
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ambassadors with each other.

By April 13, Bishop announced

on radio that no power would dictate Grenada's foreign
policy, as if the island were in its "backyard.”

On April

14, arms and cement arrived in Grenada following a weeklong journey by ship from Cuba.13
In light of these developments, mid-level State
Department officials expressed doubts that U.S. development
aid by itself was sufficient to curb emerging security
threats in Grenada.

Consideration was given to increased

military training, arms sales, and other measures to
protect Caribbean allies.

These considerations reflected a

growing concern for the spread of revolution in the region;
however, the administration never came to regard the PRG as
a major threat.

Continuing concern over the lack of

elections under the PRG, as well as human rights
violations, remained confined to the State Department.14
The Reagan administration was to raise developments
on the island to the status of a major security threat.
Among the major concerns for administration officials was
the construction of a 10,000-foot runway at Point Salines,
Grenada.

Ostensibly built for the tourist trade, the PRG

construction project received funding from a range of

13Kai P. Schoenhals and Richard A. Melanson,
Revolution and Intervention in Grenada (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1985), 36-37.
14Ibid., 113-116.
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sources (i.e., Cuba, East Germany, the European Economic
Community) in spite of U.S. efforts to block funds.
In two speeches in March 1983, President Reagan
pointed out the geopolitical significance of Grenada.

It

was deemed a vital point along the southern underbelly of
the United States, an area the Soviets would not hesitate
to try to control in order to limit U.S. responses in other
regions of the world.

Moreover, connected in a triangle

with Cuba and Nicaragua, Grenada was seen to threaten U.S.
access to the Caribbean.
the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Its airport could be used by both
According to Reagan, Grenada

was becoming a base for both military and ideological
aggression.15
Besides the Point Salines airport, there was other
evidence to support the President's concern over Grenada as
a possible base of communist aggression.

From documents

seized following the U.S. intervention, it became known
that Cuba and the Soviet Union had entered into secret arms
agreements with the PRG.

Between October 1980 and July

1982, agreements were signed that would have armed the PRG
in increased increments.

Under an agreement to cover the

period between 1982 and 1985, Grenada was to receive a
large shipment consisting of 50 armed personnel carriers,

ispresident, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1984),
Ronald Reagan, 1983, 373, 440.
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60 mortars, 60 heavy guns, 50 portable rocket launches, and
50 light antitank grenade launches-

Not only did Grenadian

military personnel receive Soviet training, but interparty
agreements also provided for Grenadian civilians to be
trained in espionage.16
If the Reagan administration's concerns over
Grenada's military buildup were strong during the period of
PRG rule, they became even more so during the rapid series
of events following the Revolutionary Military Council's
(RMC) takeover on October 19, 1983.

RMC leaders

established an immediate twenty-four hour curfew, giving
orders to shoot violators on sight.

Combined with the

closure of Grenada's airports, an immediate problem for
administration officials was the seizure of American
hostages, as had happened in Iran.17
On October 20, U.S. Marines bound for Lebanon were
ordered to the Caribbean by President Reagan.

On October

22, an urgent request was made by members of the
Organization of East Caribbean States for U.S. assistance
in restoring "order and democracy" in Grenada.

Forty-eight

hours later, President Reagan ordered Urgent Fury to
commence.18
16Valenta and Valenta, Problems of Communism. 11-14.
17H.W. Brands, Jr., "Decisions on American Armed
Intervention: Lebanon, Dominican Republic, and Grenada,"
Political Science Quarterly 102 (Winter 1987/88): 607-24.
lsIbid.
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U.S. Objectives in Grenada

The day that Urgent Fury began on October 25,
President Reagan spoke to reporters.

He stated three

objectives for the intervention:
First, and of overriding importance, to protect
innocent lives, including up to a thousand Americans,
whose personal safety is, of course, paramount concern.
Second, to forestall further chaos. And third, to
assist in the restoration of conditions of law and
order and of governmental institutions to the island of
Grenada.
Restating these objectives, Reagan asserted that Urgent
Fury was intended "to protect our own citizens, to
facilitate the evacuation of those who want to leave, and
to help in the restoration of democratic institutions in
Grenada."19
In order to accomplish these political objectives,
U.S. forces were expected to surprise and overwhelm enemy
forces, seizing control of critical junctures on the island
and paralyzing the enemy's command structure.

Related

objectives included the rescue of U.S. and other foreign
nations, neutralization of enemy troops, and stabilization
of Grenada's internal situation.20
These strategic objectives provided for a number of
related tactical goals.

U.S. Marines were assigned to gain

1STJ.S. President, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer
Session With Reporters," Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents (25 October 1983), vol. 19, no. 43, p. 1487.
2°Adkin, Urgent Fury. 345.
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control of the northern portion of Grenada.

U.S. army

rangers were assigned with the southern portion of the
island.

Special forces and navy SEALs were assigned

certain objectives in the capital, St. George's:
protecting Governor General Sir Paul Scoon, capturing the
government radio station, and freeing political prisoners
from Richmond Hill Prison.

In the final phase of Urgent

Fury, army paratroopers were to relieve southern forces,
carry out mopping-up operations, and provide a law and
order role until Caribbean peacekeepers arrived on the
island.21

U.S. Mobilization

In seeking to fulfill the objectives of Urgent Fury,
military planners faced two primary obstacles:
information.

time and

As the president later admitted, the "Joint

Chiefs worked around the clock to come up with a plan.
They had little intelligence information about conditions
on the island."22
U.S. intelligence sources estimated that Grenadian
forces consisted of 1,200-1,500 PRA members and 2,000-5,000

21Ibid., 141-143.
22U.S. President, "Letter to the Speaker of the House
and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate," Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents (25 October 1983),
vol. 19, no. 43, p. 1501.
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militia members.

It was also estimated that there were 700

Cuban personnel on the island.23 Besides personal arms,
it was believed that Grenadians and Cubans had up to twelve
armored personnel carriers and six antiaircraft guns.24
Not knowing what resistance to expect, U.S. forces
faced a worst case scenario.

The Pearls Airport and

Grenville in the north of the island were assigned to a
Marine Amphibious Unit of about 800 marines (battalion
size).

Point Salines and the medical school to its west

were assigned to about 600 ranger paratroopers (two
battalions, each at half strength).

SEALs, special forces,

and reinforcing army paratroopers (two brigades) brought
the number of U.S. forces in Grenada to approximately 6,000
by October 28, when Urgent Fury had ended.

U.S. forces had

been joined by about 300 troops and police from the five
OECS nations as well as Jamaica and Barbados.25
With the end of Urgent Fury, it became possible to
account for casualties.

It was estimated that 67

Grenadians were killed, at least 17 of which died from the
bombing of a mental hospital and one of which was a boy
killed by a U.S. soldier.

About 350 Grenadians were

23Cuban personnel consisted of approximately 40
military advisors and over 650 construction workers with
reserve training. Adkin, Urgent Fury. 159.
24Ibid., 344.
2SIbid., 143-144; Payne, Sutton, and Thorndike,
Grenada, 159-160.
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wounded.

Cuban casualties included 24 dead as well as 59

wounded and 602 unwounded who were returned to Cuba.

U.S.

casualties included 19 killed.26

U.S. Public Support

Urgent Fury's beginnings were marked by a scarcity of
public information, except that which was either approved
or provided by the Reagan administration-

Direct media

coverage from Grenada was not officially permitted until
October 27.

Yet, by that date, President Reagan had

addressed the nation, raising public support for Urgent
Fury.27
On October 24, before the main forces of Urgent Fury
began combat, President Reagan informed five congressional
leaders about the imminence of hostilities, but he did not
ask their opinions.28 The next morning, the president

2<sAdkin, Urgent Fury. 308-09.
27Marcia Block and Geoff Mungham, "The Military, the
Media and the Invasion of Grenada,” Contemporary Crises 13
(1989): 91-127.
28The five included Speaker of the House Thomas P.
O'Neill (D-Mass.), House Majority Leader Jim Wright (DTex.), House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R-Ill.),
Senate Majority Howard Baker (R-Tenn.), and Senate Minority
Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.). Michael Rubner, "The
Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution, and
the Invasion of Grenada, Political Science Quarterly 100
(Winter 1985-86): 630-31.
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spoke to the entire leadership of Congress, telling them
about the earlier commencement of hostilities.29
On October 26, Representative Clement Zabiocki (DWis.) introduced H.J. Res. 402 in order to mandate that the
sixty-day limit for troop involvement in Grenada had come
in to effect the previous day under the War Powers
Resolution.

The House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 33

to 2 in favor of H.J. Res 402 on October 27.

The measure

was adopted by the whole House of Representatives on
November 1, with

403 in favor of it

Republicans) and

23 against it.30

(256 Democrats and 147

Utilizing language identical to H.J. Res. 402,
Senator Gary Hart (D-Col.) raised the sixty-day time limit
before the Senate as an amendment to another bill.

That

bill, which increased the national debt limit, was approved
on October 28 by a vote of 64 to 20.

The amendment,

however, was defeated and left out of the debt-limiting
bill approved in conference on November 17.

Because

Congress adjourned the next day, no joint legislation was
passed to limit the time for U.S. forces to remain in
Grenada.31
It was perhaps fortunate for those in Congress who
wanted to invoke theWar Powers Act that they were unable
29Ibid.
3°Ibid., 638.
31Ibid. , 638-39.
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to do so before adjournment.

From the outset of Urgent

Fury, before any on site press coverage, the public
expressed its approval of the intervention.

An ABC-

Wash incrton Post poll conducted on October 25 indicated the
58 percent approved of the ninvasion," as against 32
percent who disapproved of it.

A Gallup-Newsweek survey

between October 26 and 27 gave 53 percent approval, to 34
percent disapproval, for U.S. military participation with
Caribbean allies in the "invasion."32
On October 27, President Reagan addressed the nation
regarding the deaths of over 200 marines in Lebanon from a
bomb attack on October 23, as well as discussing overall
events in Grenada.

Following that speech, public approval

for Urgent Fury was given a boost.

A Garth Analysis survey

of registered voters on October 29 showed that 65 percent
favored U.S. intervention, while only 25 percent opposed
it.

A Harris Survey on October 28 found 68 percent who

thought the president was right to invade and take over
Grenada, as opposed to 26 percent who thought it was not a
correct action.33
Following signs that Urgent Fury was a success,
public approval again increased.

On November 3, a third

ABC-Washinaton Post poll showed 71 percent approval, to 22
percent disapproval for Urgent Fury.

A Roper survey in

32Public Opinion Online.
33Ibia.
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early December showed 60 percent strongly to moderately in
favor of the action, while 26 percent were moderately to
strongly opposed to it.34

Military and Nonmilitary Means

Given the rapid and decisive nature of Urgent Fury,
the U.S. public had little time to express major
disapproval of the intervention.35 Moreover, under the
conditions that evolved between the time the RMC assumed
power and the beginning of combat, the Reagan
administration was either unwilling or unable to forestall
military preparations in favor of nonmilitary efforts to
achieve its objectives.
Before resorting to force, Reagan had used
nonmilitary means (e.g., efforts to withhold international
funds) in his efforts to isolate Grenada's leaders even
before the RMC came to power.

Given its emphasis on

security related interests, it was unlikely that the

34Ibid.
35Urgent Fury demonstrates the "halo effect11 of quick,
successful operations very clearly. Public opinion under
such circumstances must be regarded with caution.
Jentleson, "Pretty-prudent Public."
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administration would choose to negotiate with leaders
demonstrably more violent than the preceding PRG.36

Conclusion

Probably the most important consequence of Urgent
Fury was that it set a precedent for subsequent limited war
efforts.

That precedent was reflected in the behavior of

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger.

Initially cautious

about the actual intervention, especially following the
deaths of 200 marines in Beirut, Weinberger lent Urgent
Fury his support only after he had determined that force
was being used as a last resort and that such force was
going to be decisive.37
In order to understand the secretary's insistence on
a decisive use of force, it must be recognized that he and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff were hesitant to intervene in
Grenada based on the experience of Vietnam.38 It was in
order to prevent another such prolonged conflict, that

36It would be difficult to overstate administration
concerns for a potential hostage situation in Grenada. Of
course, some might argue that U.S. citizens were not really
in danger and served primarily as an added justification to
overthrow a communist government. Schoenhals and Melanson,
Revolution and Intervention in Grenada. 130-136.
37Rubner, "The Invasion of Grenada," 635; Brands,
"Decisions on American Armed Intervention," 617-18.
38Gacek, Logic of Force. 260.
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Weinberger enunciated six criteria to guide subsequent
military actions (as detailed in chapter 1 and appendix 1).
Over a year after presenting those criteria, the
secretary wrote
According to theories developed in the 1950s and early
1960s, limited war was essentially a diplomatic
instrument— a total for bargaining with the enemy . . .
. The gradual application of American conventional
power, combined with the threat of incremental
increases in the application of that power would,
according to the theorists, persuade America's
opponents to accept a settlement while they avoided
strategic defeat-39
In their assessment of the length of time needed to achieve
such settlements, the secretary argued that the theorists
neglected "the domestic political realities of American
democracy. "4°
The question remained after Grenada, how can public
support be gained and maintained over the course of a
limited war.

It became vital for the U.S. public to know

what the objectives were to which it lent support.

Even

though conditions in Grenada were not favorable to lengthy
discussion, communicated objectives were a vital political
resource.

The problem for the public was an inadequate

period in which to debate the relative risks associated
with intervention in Grenada.

That was not the problem six

39Caspar Weinberger, U.S. Defense Strategy," Foreign
Affairs 64 (Spring 1986), 684.
4°Ibid., 684-85.
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CHAPTER 6
U.S INTERVENTION IN PANAMA

'Very early on the morning of December 20, 1989, U.S.
forces engaged the regular and irregular forces of Panama
in Operation Just Cause.

About six and one-half hours

later, President George Bush publicly announced the
intervention, his reasons for ordering it, and his
intentions to withdraw U.S. forces from combat as soon as
possible.

President Bush went on to point out that "key

military objectives" had already "been achieved" and that
"most organized resistance" had already "been
eliminated."1 With the surrender of Panama's President,
General Manuel Noriega, on January 3, 1990, Bush announced
the achievement of all U.S. objectives in Panama and the
first withdrawal of combat forces from that nation.2
The relative speed with which what was called
Operation "Just Cause" achieved its objectives in Panama
President, "Address to the Nation Announcing United
States Military Action in Panama," Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents (25 December 1989) vol. 25, no. 51,
pp. 1974-75.
President, "Remarks Announcing the Surrender of
General Manuel Noriega to United States Authorities in
Panama," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (8
January 1990) vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 8-9.
156
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demonstrates a number of important issues with respect to
the evolution of knowledge used in waging limited wars.
First, the concept of limited war in Just Cause was the
same as that in Operation Urgent Fury (i.e., the use of
rapid and overwhelming force in order to prevent a
prolonged conflict). Second, Just Cause reflected an
escalation from unconventional to limited war.

In this

regard, both the Reagan and Bush administrations had
previously attempted to achieve U.S. objectives in Panama
through nonmilitary means (e.g., economic sanctions).
Third, Just Cause demonstrated the familiarity of American
decisionmakers with conditions favoring decisive military
action (e.g., clear objectives, superior combat resources).
Nevertheless, the intervention's outcome demonstrated the
limitations of such knowledge.

Historical Background

Operation Just Cause had antecedents in earlier
efforts to influence Panama's political development.

Those

efforts extended back to the late 1840s before Panama even
existed as a nation (explained more fully below).

Still,

it was not until the late 1960s that the United States had
to deal with a military government in Panama.
In 1968, the Panamanian national guard launched a
1968 coup which removed the country's commercial elite from
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power and led to a regime controlled by General Omar
Torrijos.

Torrijos relied on his charisma and the delivery

of economic benefits to maintain support.3 In this
regard, his regime was vulnerable due to its dependence on
revenues from services (e.g., shipping, banking,
warehousing) whose production was mainly under foreign
control (e.g., the Panama Canal).“
By the late 1970s, poor economic growth, along with
rising foreign debt, threatened Torrijos7 power base and
provided President Jimmy Carter with diplomatic leverage to
resolve the longstanding issue of control over the Panama
Canal (as discussed below).

In 1977, Torrijos and Carter

concluded treaties providing for the gradual transfer of
the canal to Panamanian control.
Torrijos died in 1981, enabling General Manuel
Noriega to become commander in chief by 1983.

Noriega

transformed the national guard into a much larger and
better equipped military/police force, the Panama Defense
Force (PDF).

The PDF rapidly took control of Panama's

transportation network, along with customs and immigration
services.

Although outwardly necessary for the defense and

operation of the canal, these actions enabled the Noriega

3Steve C. Ropp, Panamanian Politics (New York:
Praeger, 1982), chaps. 2-5.
“Andrew Zimbalist and John Weeks, Panama at the
Crossroads (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1991), 17-18.
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regime to extract increasing amounts of legal and illegal
funds from the service economy to privately benefit regime
members and insure regime survival.s
The PDF's expansion and economic hold were paralleled
by Noriega's consolidation of political power.

Following a

1984 election rife with allegations of fraud by the
opposition, the pro-PDF coalition candidate, Nicolas
Barletta, became Panama's president.6 Unresponsive to
civilian authority, Noriega removed Barletta from office
nearly a year later.7
The Reagan administration had given official
recognition to Barletta's regime despite alleged electoral
fraud.8 After limited efforts to prevent his removal,
administration officials continued working with his

^teve C. Ropp, "Explaining the Long-Term Maintenance
of a Military Regime: Panama before the U.S. Invasion,”
World Politics 44 (January 1992): 225-27.
6Evidence of electoral fraud is given by Ricardo Arias
Calderon, "Panama: Disaster or Democracy?," Foreign
Affairs 62(Winter 1987/88), 328-47.
■’Noriega removed Barletta for several reasons:
Barletta's advocacy of economic austerity measures and
Noriega's need for an economic scapegoat, Barletta's lack
of popular support and Noriega's need for a more easily
controlled president, and Noriega's need to prevent public
awareness of crises facing the PDF (i.e., its role in the
brutal 1985 murder of prominent Noriega opponent Hugo
Spadafora and fragmenting leadership). John Dinges, Our
Man in Panama (New York: Random House, 1990), 215-28.
“President Reagan received president-elect Barletta in
the Oval Office in July 1986, and Secretary of State
Schultz attended Barletta's inauguration in October.
Ibid., 194-198.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

160

successor, Eric Delvalle.

In its dealings with both

presidents, the Reagan administration declared that stable
democracy was the best means of securing long-term U.S.
interests under the canal treaties and decided that
Noriega's growing political influence would not prevent
Panama from developing such democracy.9
A key reason why democratization was not actively
pursued by the Reagan administration was that cooperation
with Noriega and the PDF enabled American officials to
combat communism in Central America through covert
means.10 Officials in Washington compromised on
democratization in order to avoid losing PDF security
assistance and possibly creating new political instability
that would disrupt implementation of the canal treaties.11
Events in 1986 called into question the grounds for
cooperating with Noriega and led to a growing consensus for
his removal.

In the spring, Senator Jesse Helms (D.-N.C.)

chaired hearings which sparked further congressional

’Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittees on Human Rights and International
Organizations and on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Human
Rights and Political Developments in Panama. 99th Cong.,
2nd sess., 29 April and 23 July 1986, 4-5, 30, 76.
10Reagan officials sought to reverse the Sandinista
hold on Nicaragua via the Contra insurgency and, thereby,
to counter Nicaraguan support for Salvadoran insurgents.
See Roy Gutman, Banana Diplomacy (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1988); Cynthia J. Arnson, Crossroads (New York:
Pantheon, 1989).
“ Congress, Human Rights. 42-46.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

161

investigations of corruption and repression under
Noriega.12 Subsequent press coverage publicized Noriega's
doubledealings with U.S. security and drug enforcement
officials on one hand, and communists, terrorists, and drug
traffickers, on the other.13 The Iran-Contra scandal in
November could only provide additional publicity to the
administration's dealings with Noriega.14
Relations with Noriega were still favorable enough to
allow President Reagan to certify on March 1, 1987, that
Panama had "fully cooperated" with U.S. drug enforcement
efforts over the past year.

Yet, three events in Jurie 1987

would prompt the Reagan administration to decide to remove
Noriega from power.

When Noriega forced his Chief of

Staff, Colonel Roberto Diaz Harrera, to resign, Harrera
publicly accused Noriega of involvement in assassinations,
electoral frauds, and drug trafficking.

These accusations

served as a rallying point for the Panamanian National
Civil Crusade, a broad coalition of civic, business, and
“Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Situation in
Panama, 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 10 March and 21 April 1986.
“Seymour Hersh, "Panamanian Strongman Said to Trade
in Drugs, Arms, and Illicit Money," New York Times. 12 June
1986, 1 and 6. This article was the first in an
influential series by the author.
“Margaret E. Scranton, The Noriega Years (Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 105. The Iran-Contra scandal
undercut covert support for the Contras as a viable policy,
removed officials stressing the need to cooperate with
Noriega, and placed a premium on the need to refurbish the
Reagan administration's public image.
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religious groups, to launch major demonstrations calling
for a return to democracy.

In response to these

development, the Senate passed S.Res. 239 by a margin of
84-2.

Expressing support for human rights and the

evolution of democracy in Panama, the resolution called for
Noriega to step down until charges against him were
investigated.15
As will be discussed below, S.Res. 329 marked the
beginning of a two-year crisis in which Noriega became an
increasing threat to U.S. interests in Panama.

Viewed as a

period of escalating unconventional war, the crisis
involved efforts by both the Reagan and Bush
administrations to employ various means for removing
Noriega from power and thereby promoting stability and
democracy in Panama.

It was hoped that the Panamanians

themselves (both civilians and PDF members) would join in
achieving the objective.

This combination of means did

isolate Noriega but, in so doing, further increased his
reliance on force to stay in power; in turn, this created a
volatile political situation.

By late December 1989,

President Bush had determined that conventional war against
the PDF was necessary to effect political change in Panama.

15Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Restricting United States Assistance to Panama. 100th
Cong., 1st sess., 15 December 1987, 2-3.
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U.S. Interests in Panama

American efforts to influence Panama's political
development stemmed in large part from that nation's
location.

Panama occupies the narrowest portion of the

isthmus connecting North and South America and separating
the Caribbean Sea from the Pacific Ocean.

Panama's

location has made it a site of military and commercial
transit where the United States has retained treaty
interests since the late 1840s.16
Those interests were clearly demonstrated by
President Theodore Roosevelt.

In August 1903, Colombia

refused to grant U.S. rights to construct a canal across
the isthmus.

Roosevelt provided U.S. naval forces to help

Panama gain independence from Colombia in November 1903,
leading to the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty between the United
States and a newly independent Republic of Panama.

In

return for $10 million outright, and a $250,000 annuity to
begin in 1912, Panama granted the United States the use,
occupation, and control in perpetuity of a zone ten miles
wide through which to construct a canal.

As the guarantor

of Panama's independence, the United States gained the
right to intervene anywhere in Panama to maintain political
1<sThe Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty, signed with Colombia,
gave the United States rights to use military force to
protect transit across the isthmus. David N. Farnsworth
and James W. McKenney, U.S.-Panama Relations. 1903-1978
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1983), 15.
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stability.

Within a year of the beginning of canal

construction, Roosevelt interpreted the Monroe Doctrine to
provide a policing role for the United States among its
southern neighbors.

According to the Roosevelt Corollary,

U.S. intervention was justified when the "chronic
wrongdoing" or inefficiency of governments to the south
threatened to provide a pretext for European
intervention.17
The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty remained the primary
statement of U.S. interests in Panama for nearly threequarters of a century.

In January 1964, Panamanian

frustration with the treaty led to mob violence in which
there was widespread property damage and casualties,
including the loss of four U.S. soldiers.

After his

reelection later that year, President Lyndon Johnson called
for new treaties to replace the 1903 treaty.

Along with

Panama's President Robles, Johnson announced in late 1965
that new treaties would more firmly establish Panamanian
sovereignty over the Canal Zone and fix the time period
during which the United States would continue to defend and
operate the canal.

Treaty drafts produced with the

Panamanians in June 1967 contained two main provisions for
U.S. interests.

First, American control of the canal would

not be given up until 1999.

Second, the United States

17Walter LaFeber, The Panama Canal (New York:
University Press, 1989), 152-193.

Oxford

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

165

would retain military bases in Panama until 2004, beyond
which date base leases were open to renewal.18
These provisions were rejected by the Torrijos regime
in December 1970.

When treaty negotiations resumed in June

1971, the regime was still unable to exact concessions from
the Nixon administration that would significantly alter
control of the" canal and surrounding territory.
Thereafter, the regime moved to internationalize
negotiations.

Working through the United Nations and the

Organization of American States, the regime was able to
gain the support of various nations by portraying U.S.
control of the canal as imperialism, similar to Britain's
former control of the Suez Canal.

In March 1973, the

United States vetoed a resolution by the U.N. Security
Council meeting in Panama City.

The resolution referred to

a new canal treaty guaranteeing Panama control of its
entire territory.

Apart from communist nations, the

Torrijos regime was supported in this and later instances
by non-aligned Third World nations, especially in Latin
America.19
International support for the Panamanian government
on the canal issue served primarily to reinforce earlier
18Ibid., 108-115; Department of State, Department of
State Bulletin 53 (18 October 1965), 625.
19Farnsworth and McKenney, U.S.-Panama Relations, ch.
7; Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, A
Chronology of Events Relating to Panama Canal. 95th Cong.,
1st sess, December 1977, 9.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

166

attempts by President Nixon to establish a realistic
balance between U.S. interests and the costs of supporting
them (explained more fully in the discussion of the Nixon
Doctrine in chapter 4).20 Seeking to decrease the role of
U.S. combat troops in a changing global order, the
President had encouraged the efforts of Third World nations
to secure their own political futures and to assume
responsibility for their own defense.21
In February 1974, the need to open a "new dialogue"
with Latin America, and considering the limits of U.S.
power to direct political events in the Third World, the
Nixon administration agreed to a joint "Statement of
Principles" with the Torrijos regime.

The statement called

for a new canal treaty
with a fixed expiration date . . . , with provision for
phased termination of U.S. jurisdiction in the Canal
Zone, increasing Panama's share of the economic
benefits, and growing participation by Panama in the
operation and defense of the Canal during the life of
the new treaty, after which Panama would assume sole
control .22
Continuing through the Ford administration, concern
about the duration of U.S. control over the canal and
2°The Nixon administration had a major "need for
economic cooperation with Latin America: and confronted "a
growing anti-United States bloc among the southern
nations," according to LaFeber, Panama Canal. 144.
21President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register. National Archives and Records Service, 1972),
Richard Nixon, 1970, 9.
22Congress, Chronology r 10.
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military base leases dominated public debate in the United
States and stalled implementation of the joint statement's
principles.

The terms of the debate were reflected by

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in September 1975.

Even

as he worked to give Panama a greater economic and military
stake in the canal, he remarked that "the United States
must maintain the right, unilaterally, to defend the Panama
Canal for an indefinite future."23
President Jimmy Carter came into office with ten
general foreign policy goals.

One of these goals was to

improve relations with the nations of the Third World and,
thereby, to achieve certain subsidiary objectives:

to

promote economic growth and stability among Third World
nations, to lessen the Soviet Union's ability to influence
those nations, to decrease the anti-American attitudes and
diplomacy of those nations, and to provide them with
tangible incentives to cooperate with the Western
democracies.
President Carter saw new canal treaties as a
particular opportunity to demonstrate America's commitment
to cooperation with Third World nations in resolving their
economic and political problems.

The Panama Canal was a

focal point of the President's efforts to reorient the

23Ibid., 12-23.
of this source.

The Kissinger quote is from page 13
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international order and U.S. interests from Cold War
security concerns, towards human rights.24
With resolution of the canal issue as a top priority,
Panama's internal situation remained a salient factor in
the Carter administration's consideration of American
interests.

Seeking to prevent violence over the canal,

while assuring continued U.S. access, the Carter
administration sought one treaty which would provide an
increasing role for Panama in the canal's operation and
defense until the year 2000.

The administration called for

another treaty to assure the permanent neutrality of the
canal beyond that date.

Under both treaties, the

administration sought to maintain the U.S. right to transit
and defend the canal.25 As the President noted in March
1977, negotiations with the Torrijos regime were intended
"to phase out our [U.S.] military operations in the Panama
Canal Zone, but to guarantee that even after the year 2000"
the United States "would still be able to keep the Panama
Canal open to" U.S. and other ships.26
The Carter administration made a number of
assumptions about U.S. interests in pursuing treaty

24Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York:
Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1983), 52-54; Jimmy Carter,
Keening Faith (New York: Bantam, 1982), 139-186.
2SBrzezinski, Power and Principle. 51; Carter, Keeping
Faith, 157-158.
26Congress, Chronology. 26.
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negotiations with the Torrijos regime.

These assumptions

were based on the Johnson and Nixon administrations'
negotiating experiences.

First, the United States had

interests in assuring the continued neutrality, security,
and operation of the canal, but those interests no longer
required its continued operation and control by American
personnel.

Second, the political costs of controlling the

canal (e.g., Panamanian and Latin American resentment,
communist exploitation of the canal issue, and potential
sabotage by Panamanian nationalists) had increased, while
its strategic value had decreased.

Third, U.S. interests

were better served by granting Panama a growing economic
and military role in the canal's security than by strict
reliance on U.S. military force.27 Fourth, while U.S.
treaty and base rights in Panama ought to reflect similar
arrangements with other nations, the United States could
not abandon the right to take actions considered necessary
to protect its interests in Panama.28 Based on these
assumptions, the 1977 canal treaties left open the
^In July 1976, a joint U.S. and Defense Department
report was released containing a worst-case scenario in
which 100,000 U.S. soldiers would be needed to defend the
canal against a Cuban-backed Panamanian attack. Even
against more probably, less severe threats, the "continuous
operation of the canal could not be ensured," according to
the report. Ibid., 20.
28Department of State, The Panama Canal Treaties— in
the National Interest (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services,
18 October 1977), 1-5; LaFeber, Panama Canalf 158;
Scranton, Noriega Years. 20-21.
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possibility of U.S. intervention, and they led General
Torrijos to promise to reinstate democratic institutions in
Panama.
The Reagan administration accepted similar promises
in its dealings with Noriega until June 1987.

Relations

with his regime fit a general pattern in which the Reagan
White House deemed such authoritarian regimes less
threatening to U.S. interests than the expansive
totalitarianism of communist regimes in the Soviet Union,
Cuba, and Nicaragua.

Demands on authoritarian regimes to

protect human rights through the development of democratic
institutions were thought mainly to create instability
exploitable by communists.29 In this view, communists
used "human rights less as a standard and a goal than as a
political weapon; . . . to expand the scope of their
hegemony."30 The administration would continue only to
declare its support for the efforts of those seeking
democracy under regimes such as Noriega's.
These measures included economic, security, and
diplomatic assistance rather than a direct combat role for

“Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships and Double
Standards," Commentary. November 1979, 35-44. It would be
difficult to overstate the significance of this article on
the Reagan administration's subsequent treatment of human
rights.
3°Department of State, "Double Standards in Human
Rights," Current Policy No. 353 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, December
1981), 2.
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U.S. forces in Latin America.31 This reflected in part
the views of American military leaders who were "opposed to
committing U.S. forces to the region unless" public opinion
supported "it and [military] commanders" were "given a
freer hand in waging war than they had in Vietnam."32
Moreover, the Reagan administration faced an uneasy
compromise between respect for Latin American sovereignty
in resolving regional concerns and a need to be actively
engaged in the region.33
The Reagan Doctrine was issued in part as an answer
to the above concerns.

Essentially a means of waging

unconventional war against communism, the doctrine relied
primarily on indigenous forces "to defy Soviet-supported
aggression and secure [democratic] rights" enjoyed by the
U.S. public.

As long as communism remained the main threat

to global democracy, support even for authoritarian regimes
remained a matter of "self-defense" for the United

31Department of State, "U.S. Interests in Central
America," Current Policy No. 576 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, May 1984),
1-5.
“George C. Wilson, "Top U.S. Brass Wary on Central
America," Washington Post. 24 June 1983, sec. A, p. 20.
“Department of State, "An End to Tyranny in Latin
America," Current Policy No. 777 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, January
1986), 1-4.
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States.34 In this regard, Washington believed that
cooperation with the Noriega regime provided certain
benefits to the Reagan administration's efforts in Latin
America:

protection of the Panama Canal; maintaining

regional military bases and facilities from which to
"covertly” train, fund, and supply anti-communist forces;
and preserving significant intelligence sources.35
These benefits were beginning to be reevaluated in
the spring of 1986.

Public attention was drawn to

questionable activities by Noriega and the Panama Defense
Force (PDF) (i.e., drug trafficking, political repression,
and cooperation with communist regimes) which threatened
U.S. interests.

A statement of these interests by

Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams revealed the
increasing difficulty of working with Noriega, while at the
same time it reaffirmed reasons for doing so.

As Abrams

explained, the United States had to do the following:
continue treaty obligations for the operation and defense
of the Panama Canal and use of military bases, assure long
term commercial and military transit across Panama; insure
legal financial, commercial, and trade access to Panama by
U.S. firms (as opposed to illicit financial and

34President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Service, 1987),
Ronald Reagan, 1985, 1: 135.
35Scranton, Noriega Years. 8-14.
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transhipment activities by drug traffickers); cooperate
with Panama to deny use of that nation by those hostile to
the United States; and to protect U.S. citizens and assets
in Panama.

To insure these interests for the remainder of

the century and beyond, it was necessary to encourage
Panamanians to develop democratic institutions, while
minimizing U.S. interference which would jeopardize that
deve 1opment .36
The Reagan and Bush administrations maintained this
position as part of an unconventional war begun against the
Noriega regime in July 1987.

In an adaptation of the

Reagan Doctrine, both administrations relied predominantly
on Panamanians (whether civilians or PDF members) to end
Noriega's rule and set Panama on a path to stable
democracy.37
Until negotiations broke down in late May 1988, the
Reagan administration used various means (e.g., economic
sanctions and offers to drop federal indictments for drug
trafficking) to try to talk Noriega out of power.
Thereafter, the best scenarios American officials could
project for Noriega's removal involved a prolonged crisis
36Congress, Situation in Panama. 98-109.
37Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, Recent
Developments in Panama. 100th Cong., 1st sess., 18, 24, and
25 June 1987, 17-18; Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Developments Concerning the National Emergency
with Respect to Panama, message from the President, 101st
Cong., 1st sess., 10 April 1989, 1-2.
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in which pressures would continue, effective civilian or
PDF opposition would remain unlikely, and Washington's
military options would remain open.3*
This proved to be an accurate scenario.

In response

to a victory by U.S.-assisted political opponents, Noriega
annulled Panama's May 1989 elections, used paramilitary
forces to repress opposition members violently, and
installed a caretaker president.39 Previously, President
Bush had ranked Noriega's regime along with the Sandinista
regime in Nicaragua as leading threats to Latin America
democracy and had refused to recognize any Panamanian
government elected by fraud.40 In October 1989, Noriega
purged the PDF after its members failed to depose him in a
coup partially aided by U.S. forces.

With little

likelihood remaining that the PDF might be reformed, the
Bush administration stepped up planning efforts to include
conventional operations to destroy the PDF as an effective
fighting force.41

3®Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, The Political
Situation in Panama and Options for U.S. Policy. 100th
Cong., 2nd sess., 20 April, 4 May, and 1 June 1988, 133142.
39Dinges, Our Man. 304.
40President, "Remarks to the Council of the Americas,"
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (8 May 1989)
vol. 25, no. 18, pp. 650-52.
41Scranton, Noriega Years. 185-96.
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President Bush publicly justified his decision to
initiate conventional operations against the PDF with the
point that he had "no higher obligation than to safeguard
the lives of American citizens."42 The President's
concern stemmed from the fact that on December 15, 1989,
the National Assembly of Representatives (a new body
created by Noriega after the October PDF coup) passed a
resolution stating that
Panama is declared to be in a state of war while the
aggression [by the United States] lasts ........ To
confront this aggression, . . . Manuel Antonio Noriega
is designated . . . as Maximum Leader for national
liberation.43
The next day, PDF troops short and killed a U.S.
soldier, wounded a second, beat up a third, and threatened
the third's wife "with sexual abuse."

Although similar

threats had faced U.S. military and canal personnel for the
past two years, the "state of war" convinced President Bush
of "an imminent danger to the 35,000 American citizens in
Panama."44 In effect, it did not matter whether that
danger was intentional or reflected Noriega's lack of
control over the PDF.
Other interests affected President Bush's decision to
intervene against the PDF.

First, Panamanians had been

unable to establish stable democratic institutions with
42President, "Military Action in Panama," 1974.
43Dinges, Our Man. 306.
44President, "Military Action in Panama," 1974.
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earlier U.S. assistance.

Second, Noriega was an indicted

drug trafficker who could not be apprehended like other
such persons and he has an individual with whom Bush had
refused to negotiate since running for president.

Third,

since President Bush withheld recognition from the
government installed by Noriega, treaty provisions calling
for a Panamanian canal administrator by January 1, 1990,
could only be implemented with a recognized government.45
In any case, the Bush administration would not deal with a
"political system other than a functioning democracy" in
Panama.

No other system was deemed able to "provide the

political stability and the economic strength which" was
"indispensable for the Canal's continuing safe and
efficient operation" into the next century.46

U.S. Objectives in Panama

In his national address on December 20, 1989,
President Bush indicated that there were four long-standing
reasons for ordering American intervention.

After a crisis

of "nearly 2 years," Washington's goals remained "to
safeguard the lives of Americans, to defend democracy in
45Ibid., 1974-75; Congress, Political Situation, 14344; Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, Subcommittee on Panama Canal/Outer Continental
Shelf, Strategic Importance of the Panama Canal. 101st
Cong., 1st sess., 2 November 1989, 37.
46Ibid., 54.
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Panama, to combat drug trafficking, and to protect the
integrity of the Panama Canal treaty [sic].1,47 In a
written communication to Speaker of the House Thomas Foley,
the President reiterated these goals and noted that the
intervention was "an exercise of the right of self-defense
recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations charter."48
As the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Colin Powell had to provide strategic content to
the nation's political objectives.

General Powell held

that the intervention's strategic objectives were to
provide
continuing freedom of transit through the Panama Canal,
freedom from PDF abuse and harassment, freedom to
exercise U.S. treaty rights and responsibilities, the
removal of Noriega from power in Panama, the removal of
Noriega's cronies and accomplices from office, the
creation of a PDF responsive to and supportive of an
emergent democratic government in Panama, and a freely
elected GOP [government of Panama] which is allowed to
govern.49
Powell associated certain principles with these
objectives, including the use of maximum surprise, unity of
command, minimization of collateral damage, use of minimum

“’President, "Military Action in Panama," 1974.
48Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Deployment of United States Forces to Panama. communication
from the President, 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 23 January
1990, 1.
49William C. Bennett, "Just Cause and the Principles
of War," Military Review 71 (March 1991): 3.
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necessary force, and plans for post-combat operations to
support Panama's democratic authorities.50
Based on these objectives and principles, General
Powell assigned General Maxwell Thurman (the new commander
in chief of U.S. Southern Command) the mission to
conduct joint offensive operations to neutralize the
PDF and other combatants, as required, so as to protect
U.S. lives, property, and interests in Panama and to
assure the full treaty rights accorded by international
law and the U.S. Panama Canal treaties.51
This mission was to be accomplished in three phases.
In the first phase, operations were to be conducted such
that the PDF would be neutralized and held in place,
Noriega would be captured, government officials elected by
Panamanians in May 1989 would be installed, and U.S.
citizens and facilities would be protected as close to the
onset of combat as possible.

The second phase called for

operations to establish law and order and provide
transitional support for the newly-installed government.
The third phase was to consist of nation-building
activities, which would eventually be turned over to
civilian agencies of the U.S. government.

"These phases

were intended to and in fact did overlap, with no clear
breaks between them."52

Edward M. Flanagan, Jr., Battle for Panama
(Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1993), 40.
51Ibid.
S2Ibid., 41.
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A key objective of the above operations was removing
Noriega from power in Panama and bringing him "to justice
in the United States.,,S3 At the tactical level, Noriega's
apprehension could be accomplished by any U.S. forces but
was assigned specifically to special operations forces.S4
Even without specific attention, planners estimated
that the concentration of forces against the Panama
City-Canal complex would essentially clamp down on the
city. The effort was likened to casting a net over the
city, prohibiting any movement. If any of the initial
raids failed, planners thought the net would capture
Noriega.55
In practice, conventional operations would deny Noriega
freedom of movement and the means of waging war.
An explicit objective of tactical operations was to
move as rapidly as possible toward strategic and then
political conditions in which the "freely elected"
Panamanian government could govern effectively.56 Within
the primary area of operations, the commander ordered that
in all cases, PDF forces which display no hostile
intent will be offered the opportunity to surrender. I
do not want to force PDF units into a fight when they
might otherwise either support U.S. actions or wish to
avoid [sic] engaging U.S. forces.S7
“President, "Military Action in Panama," 1974.
“Flanagan, Battle for Panama. 81.
5SBennett, 11Just Cause," 4.
S6Ibid., 3.
“Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services,
Investigations Subcommittee, The Invasion of Panama: How
Many Innocent Bystanders Perished?. 102nd Cong., 2nd sess.,
7 July 1992, 220-21.
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Outside Panama City, airborne forces were told that
a measured application of force will be used, when
possible, to minimize collateral damage to noncombatants, limit economic hardship to the Panamanian
populace, and facilitate rebuilding the PDF.58
As at the political and strategic levels, command
decisions at the tactical level had to weigh the costs of
offensive action against those of limiting such action.

At

all three levels of authority, it was decided that the
prolongation of hostilities represented the greatest threat
to life and property.

U.S. Mobilization

An important step in American efforts to avoid
prolonged conflict was the push to normalize U.S.Panamanian relations from the outset.

Generally believed

to have won Panama's May 1989 election, presidential
candidate Guillermo Endara and his two vice-presidential
running mates were sworn into office at a U.S. military
base north of Panama City less than an hour before U.S.
forces began offensive operations.

Still under American

protection, President Endara called on PDF members to offer
no resistance to U.S. forces.

In his announcement of the

intervention, President Bush acknowledged the resumption of
diplomatic ties with Panama and steps undertaken with the

5SIbid., 220.
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Endara government to help restore Panama's economy
following prolonged U.S. sanctions.59
The main effort to avoid a prolonged conflict
involved conventional operations against the PDF and
irregular Panamanian forces known as Dignity Battalions.
President Bush "ordered the deployment of approximately
11.000 additional [stateside] U.S. forces to Panama" to
carry out offensive operations simultaneously "with the
13.000 U.S. forces already present" in Panama.60
According to the Director of Operations for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the decision to send 11,000 reinforcements
from the United States to participate in initial operations
reflected the requirements of overwhelming and surprising
opponents.

(Of the 13,000 U.S. forces in Panama, 6,000 did

not have combat as their main function).61
The PDF threat was estimated to include the
following:

3,500 combat personnel at thirteen objective

areas in Panama City and around Panama, twenty paramilitary
Dignity Battalions with between 25 and 250 members each,
and 11,500 police, customs, and administrative personnel
maintaining control of the Panamanian infrastructure.
S9Scranton, Noriega Years. 202-03; President,
"Military Action in Panama," 1974-75.
6°Congress, Deployment of Forces. 1.
61Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and
Select Committee on Intelligence, 1989 Events in Panama.
101st Cong., 1st sess., 6 and 17 October and 22 December
1989, 121-122.
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Apart from the conventional threat posed by the PDF, their
neutralization would deny Noriega the means to carry on an
unconventional resistance from Panama's interior (likely
involving U.S. hostages) or to escape from Panama.62
By the third day of U.S. operations (December 22,
1989), military officials admitted that they had
underestimated PDF resistance and that it would take from
five to ten days to stabilize Panama City.

The extent of

PDF resistance required the deployment of between 2,000 and
3,000 additional forces from the United States.

The result

of this planning failure was an extended period of looting
(with uninsured losses over $400 million) and instability
in Panama City and Colon.

In fact, some Panamanians (those

whose homes burned in the Chorillo neighborhood around PDF
headquarters) were more concerned with economic aid than
casualties.

By January 3, 1990, Noriega was persuaded to

surrender to U.S. authorities outside the Papal Nunciature
in Panama City (where he had taken refuge on Christmas
eve) ."
According to an investigative report by the House
Committee on Armed Services, it was not found
that there was necessarily a conscious effort to
minimize civilian casualties during fighting; rather
62Ibid., 58, 123-125; Flanagan, Battle for Panama. 24,
41; Bennett, "Just Cause," 3.
"Congress, 1989 Events. 118-131; Bennett, "Just
Cause," 4-5; Scranton, Noriega Years, 204-05; Zimbalist and
Weeks, Crossroads. 154; Congress, Invasion of Panama. 8.
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there was a conscious effort to minimize fighting that
might cause any casualties— civilian, PDF, and American
lives and property.64
Because of actions by both U.S. and PDF/Dignity Battalion
forces, between 230 and 330 Panamanian civilians were
killed and about 1,500 wounded over the duration of the
intervention (Dignity Battalion members, looters, and
innocent bystanders).
124 were wounded.
were wounded.

About 70 PDF members were killed and

Twenty-three U.S. troops died and 324

All U.S. citizens taken hostage were

rescued.65

U.S. Public Support

Among its unique features, the U.S. intervention in
Panama was preceded by a prolonged crisis or state of
unconventional war and was concluded fairly rapidly.

In

this regard, members of Congress and the U.S. public had a
lengthy period in which to consider the relative costs of
large-scale military action.

More particularly, the

efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bush to seek options for
Noriega's removal short of conventional force at least
allowed Bush to claim some legitimacy for his decision to
use such force as a last resort.

64Ibid., 10.
65Ibid., 5; Flanagan, Battle for Panama. 229;
Congress, 1989 Events. 119-120.
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President Bush did not carry on prior consultations
with congressional leaders immediately before deciding on
conventional operations in Panama.

As Bush told.the

American public on the morning of the operations, "I
contacted the bipartisan leadership of Congress last night
and informed them of this decision."66 Along with this
announcement, the President reported to Congress
"consistent with the War Powers Resolution."67
Congressional leaders made no significant effort to
challenge the president's decision, nor did other members
of the legislature.

Among the reasons for congressional

inactivity were the overwhelming popularity of the
intervention, the intervention's rapid termination, the
intervention's coincidence with a long congressional
recess, and the President's "working relationship with
Congress on foreign policy issues."68
To this list must be added a period of congressional
activism which contributed to the Reagan administration's
original efforts to remove Noriega from power.69 Upon
assuming office, President Bush inherited a declared
“ President, "Military Action in Panama," 1974.
67Congress, Deployment of Forces. 1-2.
“Eileen Burgin, "Congress, the War Powers Resolution
and the Invasion of Panama," Polity 25 (Winter 1992): 238.
“ Congress, Restricting Assistance. 3. Apart from
investigations conducted by various congressional
subcommittees, examples of congressional activism include
measures enacted by both houses to pressure Noriega.
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national emergency, entailing statutory requirements for
economic sanctions against the Noriega regime and periodic
reports to Congress.70 President Bush's decision to
intervene in Panama was shaped by the failure of prior
means employed to remove Noriega.
The public was hesitant to support an escalation to
overt military intervention against the Noriega regime,
reinforcing the tendency for the Reagan and Bush
administrations to explore alternatives to remove him.
According to an NBC-Wall Street Journal poll in June 1988,
38 percent of those interviewed favored using U.S. troops
to remove Noriega if he continued to refuse the Reagan
administration's calls to leave power, while 46 percent
opposed using U.S. troops.

Similarly, following Noriega's

annulment of the Panamanian elections in May 1989, a
Gallup-Newsweek poll showed 32 percent favoring a U.S.
invasion to overthrow Noriega and 59 percent opposing such
a move.

After the failed coup attempt against Noriega in

October 1989, a Time-CNN poll showed that only 28 percent
thought that military force should be used to remove him,
while 59 percent thought it should not be used.71
Once President Bush had intervened in Panama, the
public rallied to support the action.

Separate polls (USA

70Congress, Developments Concerning National
Emergency. 1.
71Public Opinion Online.
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Today. 20 December 1989; ABC-Washincrton Post. 11 January
1990) showed that just over 80 percent of those interviewed
continued to approve of the intervention, while those
disapproving remained around 15 percent.

In an ABC poll on

December 21, 1989, about 65 percent of respondents rated
the intervention more of a success than a failure and would
support an extended troop commitment.72 Public support
previously denied for military intervention in Panama was
extended for decisive action to end a prolonged state of
unconventional war.

Military and Nonmilitarv Means

The period of unconventional war against the Noriega
regime was prompted by the Senate's passage of S. Res. 239
on June 26, 1987, calling for Noriega to step down as head
of the PDF.

In response, Noriega organized protests that

destroyed U.S. embassy property.

U.S. economic and

military assistance to Panama were frozen in July 1987.

By-

December, Congress moved to cut off all assistance to
Panama.73
Until May 1988, when negotiations broke down, the
Reagan administration tried to talk Noriega into
relinquishing power.

It was questionable whether pressures

72Ibid.
73Congress, Restricting Assistance.
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exerted against Noriega (e.g., drug indictments, economic
sanctions) were sufficient to exact desired results.

As

the administration's negotiator, Michael Kozak, stated,
"pressure alone is not a policy.""*

When President Reagan

froze Panamanian assets in April 1988, as part of a
declared national emergency, he acted to deny funds to the
Noriega regime, while minimizing economic damage that would
hinder Panamanian development.75
With economic sanctions in place, the primary
emphasis in the Reagan and Bush administrations remained on
a Panamanian solution to the Noriega problem.

The

Panamanian elections of May 1989 would provide the next
opportunity to achieve such a solution.

Continuing an

operation reportedly begun under President Reagan,
President Bush authorized "covert" actions to support
Noriega's opponents.

For example, "Bush personally lobbied

congressional committees and gained their support for $10
million for the opposition campaign."76
After Noriega annulled the election, President Bush
made a public statement on May 11, 1989.

The President

pointed out that in order to secure certain objectives

74Congress, Political Situation and Options. 122.
75Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
National Emergency with Respect to Panama. communication
from the President, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 11 April 1988,
1-4.
76Scranton, Noriega Years. 157.
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(such as protecting U.S. citizens and establishing
democracy in Panama) in consultation with congressional
leaders, he was taking a number of steps:
First, the United States . . . will cooperate with
initiatives taken by governments in this hemisphere to
address this crisis through regional diplomacy . . . .
Second, our Ambassador . . . has been recalled, and our
Embassy staff will be reduced to essential personnel
only. Third, U.S. Government employees and their
dependents . . . will be relocated out of Panama or to
secure U.S. housing areas within Panama . . . . Fourth,
the State Department, through its travel advisory, will
encourage U.S. business representatives resident in
Panama to arrange for the extended absences of their
dependents wherever possible. Fifth, economic
sanctions will continue in force. Sixth, the United
States will carry out its obligations and will assert
and enforce its treaty rights in Panama under the
Panama Canal treaties. And finally, we are sending a
brigade-size force [2,000] to Panama to augment our
military forces already assigned there. If required, I
do not rule out further steps in the future.77
While the augmentation forces had an active role to
play in curbing increased harassment of U.S. personnel,78
they also clearly signaled the intent to protect America's
interests in Panama.

A more subtle signal was given to PDF

members when President Bush remarked that "a professional
Panamanian defense force can have an important role to play
in Panama's democratic future.1179

77President, "Remarks and a Question-and-Answer
Session with Reporters on the Crisis in Panama," Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents (15 May 1989) vol.
25, no. 19, pp. 689-90.
78Anthony M. Schilling, "Force Protection," Military
Review 71 (March 1991): 26-27.
79President, "Crisis in Panama," 689.
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Whatever influence this signal had on the PDF
officers who seized Noriega at PDF headquarters on October
3, 1989, they asked for and received U.S. military support
in blocking reinforcement routes into Panama City.80 That
support came in spite of high-level uncertainty as to
whether or not the coup was a ruse by Noriega to embarrass
the United States.81 What became more certain after the
coup failed was that the PDF was unlikely to remove Noriega
and was capable of flexibility in reinforcing PDF
headquarters.
Washington's decision to remove Noriega using
overwhelming force came about largely due to his regime's
public recognition of an existing state of unconventional
war on December 15, 1989.

What Noriega and the PDF failed

to recognize were preparations begun earlier by U.S. forces
in case conventional combat became necessary.82

8°Some evidence suggests that the coup plotters cared
less for democratization than for a chance at self
advancement within a system that continued only formal
democracy.
81Congress, 1989 Events, 9.
82Bennett, "Just Cause," 10.
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Conclusion

Like Operation Urgent Fury six years earlier,
Operation Just Cause was a limited war in which rapid and
overwhelming force was applied to control any unforeseen
consequences arising from a prolonged conflict (i.e., loss
of life among Panamanian civilians and American personnel).
Just Cause met with mixed success in avoiding a
prolongation of hostilities.

The superiority of American

capabilities helped to overcome the inadequacies of plans
initially developed and approved by political and military
decision makers to achieve their objectives.

Nevertheless,

the ability to apply such force with any measure of control
would not have been possible without prior plans and
preparations.
That the public and Congress supported the operation
was due in large part to its relatively rapid
implementation.

Given the two-year period during which the

operation's objectives were developed, the public and their
representatives were given considerable exposure to the
reasons for intervention.

That exposure at least favored

the possibility that popular consensus obtained after the
intervention began was derived from some level of
understanding of its purposes and costs.
Less tentatively, Operation Just Cause reflected the
experience of political and military decisionmakers in the
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Bush administration with conditions favoring the decisive
use of force (e.g., clear objectives, superior combat
resources).

In particular, the Bush administration's

conduct in Panama was based on the strategic influence of
the Weinberger criteria.

Even with that influence, the

intervention had consequences (i.e., a large number of
civilian casualties and property damage) revealing that
experiential knowledge cannot guarantee the success of
strategic outcomes.

This issue would prove no less

difficult in the deserts of Kuwait and Iraq.
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CHAPTER 7

THE PERSIAN GULF WAR

Operation Desert Storm began on January 17, 1991, as
a coalition of American and other national forces, acting
under United Nations authority, launched a massive air
campaign against strategic Iraqi targets.

On February 24,

coalition ground forces began the “final phase" of
operations to liberate Kuwait from occupying Iraqi
forces.1 With the rapid collapse of Iraqi resistance, the
decision was made to end Desert Storm as “a hundred-hour
war."2
Three years after one of the most decisive victories
in American military history, members of the Senate
conducted hearings to inquire into the implementation of
lessons learned from the overall conduct of the Persian
Gulf War.

Among the lessons in question, the point was

made by an Assistant Secretary of Defense that
although we are intent on learning lessons from the
past, we are not simply preparing to refight the last
’•"Chronology," Military Review 71 (September 1991):
72,76.
2H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn't
Take A Hero (New York: Linda Grey, Bantam Books, 1992),
470.
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war. We know that there were certain advantages that
we gained, there were certain circumstances associated
with that war, and technology itself has progressed
since that war was fought, now several years ago.3
The outcome of Operation Desert Storm was based on decades
of experience (lessons derived from previous limited wars)
as well as more immediate plans and preparation.
Given its unique context, what were the consequences
of the Persian Gulf War for America's conduct of limited
wars?

First, although extensive, American objectives and

means in Iraq did not include "unconditional surrender,
military occupation of the entire country, and replacement
of the existing regime with a military government.1,4 In
this regard, the Persian Gulf War demonstrated that the
concept of limited war continued to involve the use of
rapid and overwhelming force to achieve objectives without
becoming involved in prolonged conflict.

Second, the

Persian Gulf War (like intervention in Panama) demonstrated
that efforts to achieve objectives through unconventional
means provided additional time in which to mobilize for
conventional war.

Third, although providing a clear

example of a major military success, the Persian Gulf War

3Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittees on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces
and Military Readiness and Defense, Implementation of
Lessons Learned from the Persian Gulf Conflict. 103d Cong.,
2nd sess., 18 April 1994, 10.
4George, Bridging the Gap. 89.
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demonstrated the importance of not drawing too many lessons
from a single case of limited war.

Historical Background

Saddam Hussein's decision to invade and occupy Kuwait
on August 2, 1990, was the result of a number of historical
factors.

Among these, a long-term factor was the absence

of "an effective system for the peaceful resolution of
conflicts over the borders drawn" by the Britain and France
after World War 1.5 Formed in 1945, the Arab League
depended on the voluntary cooperation of member nations to
reconcile the ideology of Arab unity and the sovereign
rights claimed by those members whose boundaries remained
essentially as the British and French had drawn them.

The

Arab League Charter provided no mechanism, and none was
subsequently developed, to deal with the hegemonic
aspirations of a regional aggressor such as Iraq's
President, Saddam Hussein.6
A more proximate factor contributing to Saddam's
decision to invade and occupy Kuwait was the end of his
regime's eight-year war with Iran in 1988.

The regime

sIbrahim Ibrahim, "Sovereign States and Borders in the
Gulf Region: A Historical Perspective,11 in The Gulf
Crisis. ed. Ibrahim Ibrahim (Washington, DC: Center for
Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1992), 3.
6Ibid.
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emerged from that war with a standing army of about one
million and a foreign debt of $70-$100 million, half of
which was owed to other Arab nations including Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait.

His decision not to demobilize his combat-

tested army only added to Iraq's economic difficulties.
Gradually, those difficulties increased preexisting
tensions between Iraq and Kuwait over the issues of low oil
prices, rights to oil produced from the Rumalia field
straddling the Iraq-Kuwait border, Iraqi access to the
Gulf, and the large Iraqi debt to Kuwait.7
By the summer of 1990, the tensions between Iraq and
Kuwait were such that the Iraqi foreign minister openly
accused the Kuwaitis of stealing oil and conspiring to
decrease his regime's oil revenues by violating OPEC's
production quotas.

Saddam Hussein threatened military

action if Kuwait did not abide by its quotas.

On July 24,

Iraq deployed the first troops to Kuwait's northern border,
after having assured the leaders of Egypt and Saudi Arabia
that his demands could be met through negotiations.

By

August 1, when Iraq's representative walked out on those

7Ibid., 10; Congress, House, Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittees on Arms Control, International
Security and Science, Europe and the Middle East, and on
International Operations, The Persian Gulf Crisis. 101st
Cong., 2nd sess., 8 August, 18 and 25 September, 17
October, 28 November, and 11 December 1990, 45.
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negotiations, about 100,000 troops had been sent to the
Kuwaiti border-*
After invading and occupying Kuwait, Iraqi forces
began deploying along the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border.
President Bush warned Baghdad not to invade Saudi Arabia
and offered forces to defend the Saudis.

On August 8,

1990, the President told the American public that "a line
[of some 50,000 troops] has been drawn in the sand.”9
Over the next five months, the President conducted an
unconventional war in which economic, diplomatic, and
military sanctions were used to try to obtain an
unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

These

sanctions were backed up by the threat of conventional war,
as defensive mobilizations were used to prepare for any
necessary offensive operations.

Throughout this period,

the President sought a national and an international
consensus around certain objectives (as discussed below).
A key difficulty was to establish and maintain agreement on
the forces needed to accomplish those objectives.

As will

be noted, it was necessary for President Bush to explore
alternatives to conventional war, while simultaneously
preparing for its occurrence in order to legitimize what
was essentially a limited victory.
'"Chronology," 65; Caryle Murphy, "Mubarek Says Iraq,
Kuwait Will Begin Talks This Weekend," Washington Post. 26
July 1990, sec. A, p. 34.
9"Chronology," 66.
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U.S. Interests in the Persian Gulf

President Bush's commitment of forces to the Persian
Gulf was only one expression of the region's importance to
the security of the United States.

Generally, security

policies towards the Middle East (of which the Persian Gulf
region is a part) have stressed the requirements
for arranging stable conditions on behalf of all
parties [groups or nations], for strengthening moderate
states in the region, for protecting ties to the West,
for preserving U.S. access to oil, and for assuring the
survival of Israel as a democracy.10
Involving tradeoffs among various interests, these
requirements have evolved, as the United States has assumed
ever greater responsibilities in and around the Gulf,
particularly since World War II.
Reflecting the inability of the British to maintain
their commitments after that war, the United States moved
to contain Soviet aggression.

With communists waging a

civil war in Greece and the Soviet Union threatening
Turkey, President Harry Truman included the Middle East,
with Europe, as primary areas to be protected by the United
States.

According to the Truman Doctrine (1947), aid to

10Melvin A. Friedlander, Conviction and Credence
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 1.
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Greece and Turkey was necessary to prevent the spread of
instability that could be exploited by the Soviet Union.11
President Truman did not view U.S.-Middle East
interests solely in terms of Soviet hegemonic aspirations,
as evidenced by his support for Israel.

Truman made that

support official through several steps:

exerting pressure

to reduce British restrictions on Jewish immigration to
Palestine, working through the United Nations to partition
Palestine and help create Israel in May 1948, and extending
recognition to the newly created nation.12
Besides concern for Israel, expressions of American
interests in the Middle East have been dictated by the
importance of the area's oil reserves.

According to the

State Department, the Middle East was na stupendous source
of strategic power, and one of the greatest material prizes
in world history, probably the richest economic prize . . .
in the field of foreign investment.1,13 President Dwight

“President, Public Papers of the Presidents of the
United States (Washington, DC: Office of the Federal
Register. National Archives and Records Service, 1972),
Harry Truman, 1947, 176-180.
12Harry S. Truman, Memoirs. vol. 2, 132-169. Truman's
motives reflected a mixture of realistic and idealistic
concerns. In particular, he shared his immediate
predecessor's disdain for British colonialism but was also
concerned to prevent the Soviets from filling vacuums
created by the decreasing British presence in the Middle
East.
“Noam Chomsky, "After the Cold War: U.S. Middle East
Policy," in Beyond the Storm. ed. Phyllis Bennis and Michel
Moushabeck (New York: Olive Branch, 1991), 77.
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Eisenhower called the Middle East the most "strategically
important area in the world."14
President Eisenhower took several steps to protect
the area and curb Soviet influence.

One move was covert

action to undercut Soviet intervention and install proWestern leaders (most notably, the Shah of Iran in
1953).15 Such measures were part of larger diplomatic
efforts, as represented by the organization of the Baghdad
Pact in 1955 and the prevention of wider hostilities over
Gamal Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in
1956.16 Eisenhower demonstrated his willingness to back
diplomacy with force in 1958, when he sent forces to
Lebanon to help the Chamoun regime remain in power.17 By
the summer of that year, a military coup deposed the Iraqi
monarchy and led to the loss of Iraq as the Baghdad Pact's
most powerful member.1® After the coup, the Eisenhower
“ Ibid.
lsThe administration stressed covert action as one
means of reducing Soviet influence on a worldwide basis.
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United
States. 1952-54. vol. 2, National Security Affairs. part 1
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 595.
16A British perspective on the Suez Crisis is given by
Anthony Eden, The Suez Crisis of 1956 (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1968). Also see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).
17Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York:
Doubleday, 1965), 264-81.
“Campaign Against Repression and for Democratic
Rights in Iraq, Saddam's Iraq, rev. ed. (London: Zed
Books, 1989), 24-25.
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administration concluded that Israel was "the only strong
pro-Western power left in the Middle East" (italics
mine) .“
This merely restated a commitment, albeit an informal
one, shared by all presidents since Truman.

An indicator

of that commitment was the portion of military aid devoted
by the Nixon administration to the Middle East, where
Israel was the primary recipient.

Prior to 1970, about 75

percent of all such aid was going to Asia.

Thereafter,

reflecting efforts to disengage in Vietnam and to counter
Soviet military aid (especially to Egypt and Syria), the
Middle East's share of U.S. military aid was boosted to
about 60 percent between 1971 and 1975.20
This aid was consistent with the Nixon Doctrine
(detailed in chapter 4), according to which the United
States would maintain its diplomatic commitments by
supplying other nations so they could defend themselves.

A

crucial test of the doctrine came during the Yom Kippur war
in 1973.

American forces conducted what was at the time

the largest airlift in military history to help the

“ Chomsky, "After the Cold War," 81.
2°Sheila Ryan, "Countdown for a Decade," in Beyond the
Storm, ed. Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck (New York:
Olive Branch, 1991), 92.
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Israelis defeat the Soviet-equipped Egyptians and
Syrians.21
Aid to the Israelis was viewed by the Nixon
administration as an extension of diplomacy.

In

particular, Secretary of State Kissinger engaged in
"shuttle diplomacy" to try to stabilize and bring peace to
the Middle East.

Kissinger's attempts continued through

the Ford administration, laying the groundwork for the
diplomacy of the Carter administration.

Under President

Carter, the Camp David accords were concluded by which a
formal peace treaty would be signed between Egypt and
Israel in the spring of 1979.22
The peace treaty marked Egypt's move towards becoming
one of the United States' most important security partners
(eventually ranking second only to Israel as a recipient of
military aid).23 That partnership was itself a
culmination of Egypt's increasingly hostile relationship
with the Soviet Union following the Yom Kippur war.

Even

21Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air
Power Survey: Summary Report (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993),
186. The 1973 airlift was only surpassed by similar
operations during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.
“John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World
War II (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1985), 23739; William B. Quandt, Camp David (Washington, DC:
Brookings, 1986), passim.
23As of fiscal year 1993, Israel and Egypt remained
the top recipients of U.S. military assistance, accounting
for 40.7 percent and 29.4 percent, respectively, of all
requested funds. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Military Net
Assessment. 8-11.
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though the Soviets had helped Egyptian president Anwar
Sadat recover from that war, Sadat recognized the economic,
political, and military advantages of cooperation with the
United States.2*
Two events in 1979 would place a premium on such
cooperation for President Carter.

Coinciding with the

Egyptian-Israeli peace talks, the Iranian revolution led to
a vehemently anti-western regime under the Ayatollah
Khomeini.

Khomeini's regime took American hostages,

supported terrorism, threatened access to oil, and
consolidated all political power under the fundamentalist
Shi'ite sect.

Given the circumstances, it was difficult to

justify Carter's emphasis on human rights as an important
aspect of U.S. interests.25 The Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan in December 1979 cast even further doubt on the
president's stress on the importance of human rights.
Having moved to attain greater geographic proximity to the
Persian Gulf, it was unclear how willing the Soviet Union
was to carry out aggressions beyond Afghanistan.25

2*Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Red Star on the Nile
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 288-91.
25Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, 1981), 180-332.
26Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, U.S. Interests
in. and Policies Toward, the Persian Gulf. 1980f 96th
Cong., 2nd sess., 24 March, 2 April, 5 May, 1 and 28 July,
and 3 September 1980, 3.
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In order to counter the Soviet threat, President
Carter stated that
an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the
Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on
the vital interests of the United States of America,
and such an assault will be repelled by any means
necessary, including military force.27
To support what came to be known as the Carter
Doctrine, the administration undertook several steps:
developing a Rapid Deployment force, repositioning
materiel, and undertaking regional base negotiations.28
Although they met with mixed success, these steps were
important to the subsequent organizational development of
U.S. forces capable of defending the Gulf.
The Reagan administration built on President Carter's
experiences, most notably by increasing the U.S. defense
budget and aid to Middle Eastern nations.

Among those

nations, Egypt assumed prominence as a moderate ally
against the Soviets.29 Given the Iranians support for
terrorism, President Reagan also found common cause with
Iraq against Iran, providing Saddam Hussein's regime
with substantial economic assistance and large amounts
of indirect military aid to prevent Iran from achieving
a hegemonic position in the Gulf and spreading its
radical islamic fundamentalism.30
^Ibid., 4.
28Ibid., 64-65.
29Dankwart A. Rustow, "Realignments in the Middle
East," Foreign Affairs 63 (1985): 598-601.
3°George, Bridging the Gap. 33.
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In effect, the "Great Satan" was helping a lesser devil to
fight Iran.
Besides Iraq's role as a counterweight to Iran,
assistance to Saddam Hussein reflected the attempts of the
administration and its allies to reform his regime as a
cooperative, non-aggressive member of the Gulf region.31
An additional motive for aiding Baghdad was the Reagan
administration's growing estimation during the late 1980s
of the Soviet Union's declining strategic threat to the
Persian Gulf in relation to the overt threat still posed by
Iran.32
Whatever its capacity or intentions to carry out
overt aggression against the Gulf, the Soviet Union was
still viewed as having diplomatic means for establishing a
physical presence in the Gulf.33 A clear indication of
Soviet intentions was Mikhail Gorbachev's positive response
to a Kuwaiti request for help in protecting oil tankers
from Iraqi attacks.

The Reagan administration reacted to

that response, moving rapidly to extend protection to
Kuwaiti tankers under the U.S. flag.

By committing forces

31Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf
Conflict: 1990-1991 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1993), 23-25.
32Department of State, U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, July 1987),
1-5.
33Ibid., 1-6. In particular, the Soviets might have
obtained base rights.
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to protect the tankers, in effect the Reagan administration
involved them in open warfare against the Iranians, denied
the Soviet's diplomatic access to the Gulf, and
demonstrated that the United States would maintain open
passage through the Gulf.

A significant result was the

demonstration of the U.S. commitment to protect its
regional allies.3*
With the end of the Iran-Iraq War and Iranian threats
to Gulf shipping, the Reagan administration retained ties
with Saddam's regime as a regional balancer and in order to
try to moderate his behavior.

The incoming Bush

administration followed this pattern.

In October 1989,

President Bush signed a National Security Directive (NSD26) stating that
normal relations between the U.S. and Iraq would serve
our longer-term interests in both the Gulf and the
Middle East. The U.S. government should propose
economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate
its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq.
As a means of developing access to and influence
with the Iraqi defense establishment, the U.S. should
consider sales of non-lethal forms of military
assistance, eg training courses and medical exchanges,
on a case-by-case basis.35
The directive assumed that Iraq would be reformed by
positive inducements and that there would be sufficient

3*William J. Crowe, Jr., with David Chanoff, The Line
of Fire (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 174-181, 202.
The most serious combat with the Iranians came in April
1988 when U.S. forces attacked and destroyed about fifty
percent of Iran's naval vessels.
3SFreedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict. 26.
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time to gain influence with his war-weary army.36 These
assumptions were based on tentative evidence that Saddam
was moderating his behavior (e.g., discussing a new
constitution to protect human rights, and participating in
disarmament conferences).
Yet, by April 1990, the administration was openly
acknowledging a deterioration of relations with Iraq.
Saddam had criticized the U.S. naval presence in the Gulf
and called for its removal as well as threatened Israel
with missiles from western Iraq.

Iraqi efforts to smuggle

nuclear components into the country had been detected; and,
human rights abuses remained common in Iraq.

While the

administration opposed efforts by the Congress to impose
sanctions on Iraq at this time, there was continuous review
of "the entire range of options available" to protect U.S.
interests.37
In mid-July 1990, the first Iraqi troops began to
deploy towards Kuwait, and Saddam threatened military
action.

On August 1, Iraq broke off talks supposedly meant

to settle economic and territorial controversies with
Kuwait.

During this period, the Bush administration, along

with Arab leaders, continued to hold out the possibility of
negotiations, but they promised military action to protect
36Ibid., 26-27.
37Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, United StatesIraai Relations. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 26 April 1990, 16.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

207

U.S. interests.38 After the Iraqi invasion on August 2,
the question would remain of the degree to which military
force could have prevented aggression against Kuwait
without further provoking Saddam.
President Bush soon responded to and moved to control
events in the Gulf region.

On the morning of the invasion,

Bush told reporters that "there is no place for this sort
of naked aggression in today's world."39 Beyond the
immediate context of liberating Kuwait, Bush came to link
Iraqi aggression to a number of threats.
Among these, it was recognized that Baghdad's actions
were a threat to security and stability, both regional and
global.

As Bush told congressional members during a

briefing on August 28, 1990,
Iraq threatened Kuwait, lied about its intentions, and
finally invaded. In 3 days, Iraq had 120,000 troops
and 850 tanks in Kuwait, moving south toward the Saudi
border. And it was this clear and rapidly escalating
threat that led King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to ask for
our [previously offered] assistance. We knew that an
Iraq that had the most powerful military machine in the
Gulf and controlled 20 percent of the world's proven
38For more detailed information on the inability to
prevent the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, see Ambassador April
Glaspie's testimony in Congress, House, Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle
East, United States-Iraai Relations. 102nd Cong., 1st
sess., 21 March 1991. Also see Janice Gross Stein,
"Deterrence and Compellance in the Gulf, 1990-1991: A
Failed or Impossible Task?," International Security 17
(Fall 1992).
39President, "Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters
on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents (6 August 1990) vol. 26, no. 31, p.
1184.
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reserves of oil would pose a threat to the Persian
Gulf, to the Middle East, and to the entire world.40
In further elaborating the Iraqi threat, Bush told
the nation on January 5, 1991, that
Saddam already poses a strategic threat to the
capital cities of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel,
and Syria, as well as our own men and women in the Gulf
region. In fact Saddam has used chemical weapons of
mass destruction against innocent villagers, his own
people. Each day that passes brings Saddam Hussein
further on the path to developing biological and
nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. If
Saddam corners the world energy market, he can then
finance further aggression, terror, and blackmail.
Each day that passes increases Saddam's worldwide
threat to democracy.
The struggling newborn democracies of Eastern
Europe and Latin America already face a staggering
challenge in making the transition to a free market.
But the added weight of higher oil prices is a crushing
burden they cannot afford. And our own economy is
suffering, suffering the effects of higher oil prices
and lower growth stemming from Saddam's aggression.41
This assessment of the Iraqi threat contained obvious
references meant to mobilize opinion for the possible onset
of conventional war.

That fact did not detract from the

validity of the threats identified by President Bush nor
from public consideration of evidence of Saddam's
aggressive potential.

For example, having seized American

citizens and other nationals in Iraq and Kuwait, Saddam's
regime announced on August 20, 1990, that they were being
4°President, "Remarks at a White House Briefing for
Members of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis," Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents (3 September 1990)
vol. 26, no. 35, p. 1300.
41President, "Radio Address to the Nation on the
Persian Gulf Crisis," Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents (14 January 1991) vol. 27, no. 2, p. 15.
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moved to key installations to serve as human shields
against any outside attack-42 President Bush stated his
deep concern
about the American and other foreign nationals held
hostage by Iraq. As I've said before, when it comes to
the safety and well-being of American citizens held
against their will, I will hold Baghdad responsible.43
(It was not until December 14, 1990, that the last group of
American hostages were allowed to leave Iraq.)44
More generally, Bush portrayed Iraqi aggression as a
threat to the "new world order" emerging in the wake of a
declining Soviet threat.45 Consistently, the President
stressed that Iraq's conflict was not just with the United
States.

On August 22, 1990, nearly a month before he

mentioned a new world order, Bush said
as the deployment of the forces of the many nations
shows and as the votes in the United Nations show, this
is not a matter between Iraq and the United States of
America; it is between Iraq and the entire world
community, Arab and non-Arab alike. All the nations of
the world lined up to oppose aggression.46
On January 5, 1991, Bush stated

42,1Chronology," 67.
43President, "Remarks at a Briefing," 1301.
““"Chronology," 70.
45President, "Address Before a Joint Session of the
Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget
Deficit," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (17
September 1990) vol. 26, no. 37, p. 1359.
46President, "The President's News Conference on the
Persian Gulf Crisis," Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents (27 August 1990) vol. 26, no. 34, p. 1281.
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Eleven days from today, Saddam Hussein will either
have met the United Nations deadline [January 15] for a
full and unconditional withdrawal, or he will have once
again defied the civilized world. This is a deadline
for Saddam Hussein to comply with the United Nations
resolution, not a deadline for our own Armed Forces.47
The credibility of the United States was approaching a
deadline to test its leadership in influencing
international events.
As Bush told Congress on September 11, 1990, Iraqi
aggression
is the first assault on the new world that we seek, the
first test of our mettle. Had we not responded to this
first provocation with clarity of purpose, if we do not
continue to demonstrate our determination, it would be
a signal to actual and potential despots around the
world.48
In the United Nations coalition assembled against Iraq, the
President held
that there is no substitute for American leadership.
In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American
credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our
staying power. We will stand by our friends.49

U.S. Objectives in the Persian Gulf

Like the nation's interests, its political and
military objectives were linked to the United Nations and
the establishment of a new world order.

As they were

47President, "Radio Address," 15.
48President, "Address Before Congress," 1359-60.
49Ibid., 1360.
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originally stated, those objectives were sufficiently openended to require an expanding commitment of forces and a
gradual shift from defensive to offensive operations.

In

this regard, the conduct of the Persian Gulf War involved
the expansion and elaboration of objectives in relation to
"the specific diplomatic and military actions necessary to
achieve them" at any given point in time.50 Ultimately,
however, objectives were not expanded so as to prolong the
war.
A fundamental objective of the war was spelled out in
Resolution 660, adopted by the U.N. Security Council on
August 2, 1990.

The resolution demanded "that Iraq

withdraw immediately and unconditionally ail its forces to
the positions in which they were located" on August 1.

The

possibility of future Security Council meetings was left
open "as necessary to consider further steps to ensure
compliance with the present resolution."51
President Bush announced the first deployments of
U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia on August 8, 1990.

He said

Four simple principles guide our policy. First,
we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete
Thomas R. Dubois, "The Weinberger Doctrine and the
Liberation of Kuwait," Parameters 21 (Winter 1991-92): 30.
The author's assertion that political and military
objectives were expanded "beyond the liberation of Kuwait
to the destruction of Iraqi warfighting capability and the
political castration of Saddam" is an overstatement.
51Sherrill Brown Wells, ed., American Foreign Policy.
Current Documents. 1990 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department
of State, 1991), 455.
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withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second,
Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored to
replace the puppet regime [installed on August 4]. And
third, my administration, as has been the case with
every President from President Roosevelt to President
Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of
the Persian Gulf. And fourth, I am determined to
protect the lives of American citizens abroad.“
The President went on to point out that nthe mission of our
troops is wholly defensive."“
Addressing Congress a month later, Bush reiterated
the four reasons for initial deployments and added a fifth,
creation of a "new world order."

Apart from that order's

ideal content (e.g., international harmony and justice),
its immediate purpose had to do with the maintenance of a
U.S. led coalition against Iraq.
At the same time, elaboration of this fifth objective
was accompanied by a more subtle expansion of the U.S.
military role.

According to the President,

long after all our troops come home— and we all hope
its's [sic] soon, very soon— there will be a lasting
role for the United States in assisting the nations of
the Persian Gulf. Our role then: to deter future
aggression . . . to help our friends in their own self
defense . . . to curb the proliferation of chemical,
biological, ballistic missile and, above all, nuclear
technologies .s*

“President, "Address to the Nation Announcing the
Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia,"
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (13 August
1990) vol. 26, no. 32, pp. 1216-17.
“ Ibid., 1218.
“President, "Address Before Congress," 1359, 1361.
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Although mentioned in the context of a post-war
environment, this American role would figure prominently in
the development and execution of massive offensive
operations against Iraq.
Until early November 1990, the United States'
strategic objectives remained primarily defensive.

As

Secretary of Defense Cheney had told the Senate Armed
Services Committee on September 11, 1990, the President
ordered the deployment of forces
to deter further aggression by Iraq against other
nations in the region; second, to defend Saudi Arabia
and others should deterrence fail; and third, to use
military forces we have deployed to enforce the
sanctions voted by the United Nations and basically, to
enforce the interception or embargo or quarantine, if
you will, on economic activities with Iraq [detailed
more fully below in section on military and nonmilitary
means ].ss
Deployments were continuing “specifically to make certain
that" there would be “sufficient forces in the region to be
able to deal with any contingency."56
On November 8, President Bush announced that "our
forces, in conjunction with other coalition forces now have
the capability to defend successfully against any further

55Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services,
Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and
Implications. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 11 and 13 September,
27, 28, 29, and 30 November, and 3 December 1990, 13.
S6Ibid.
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Iraqi aggression.1,57 He went on to say that he had
directed an increase in the "size of U.S. forces committed
to Desert Shield to ensure that the coalition has an
adequate offensive military option should that be necessary
to achieve our common goals."58
By November 29, American influence on the U.N.
Security Council had resulted in the passage of Resolution
678.

The resolution demanded Iraq's unconditional

withdrawal from Kuwait by January 15, 1991, and authorized
coalition members to "use all necessary means" to achieve
that withdrawal and "to restore international peace and
security in the area" after that date.S9
Although planning for offensive operations had been
going on since August 25, 1990, the deployment of
additional forces and establishment of a "deadline" for
Iraqi withdrawal intensified planning and preparation
efforts.

By the latter half of December 1990, the

President had been briefed on and approved plans for a
combined air and ground campaign against Iraq forces.

When

the plans were approved,
it was decided that if Saddam Hussein refused to
withdraw from Kuwait and it became necessary to use
force, the offensive would begin with the air campaign.
S7President, "The President's News Conference on the
Persian Gulf Crisis," Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents (12 November 1990) vol. 26, no. 45, 1790.
S8Ibid.
S9Brown Wells, American Foreign Policy. 544.
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While the ground campaign was approved, its start would
be a separate and subsequent decision also requiring
Presidential approval.60
While the air and ground campaigns could only be
initiated with presidential approval, their conduct was
under the direct command of General Norman Schwarzkopf,
commander of U.S. Central Command.

Within the Persian Gulf

theater, Schwarzkopf promulgated a number of key military
objectives:

attacking Iraq's political-military leadership

and command and control; gaining and maintaining air
superiority; severing Iraqi supply lines; destroying known
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) production,
storage, and delivery capabilities; destroying Republican
Guard forces in and around Kuwait; and, liberating Kuwait
City.61
In fulfillment of these objectives, Schwarzkopf
assigned several missions to his air and ground forces.
Operating throughout the entire offensive campaign, air
forces were to destroy the Iraqi command and control
structure,62 NBC capabilities, and forces opposing any
subsequent ground campaign.

Given sufficient attrition of

6°Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf
War: Final Report to Congress (Washington, DC: GPO,
1992), 70.
61Ibid., 74.
“Although Hussein and his top commanders were primary
targets, "it was sufficient to silence" them if they could
not be killed. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take a Hero. 31819.
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Iraqi forces, coalition ground forces were to conduct two
attacks:

a primary one to envelop forces around Kuwait

from the west and a supporting one to occupy forces in
Kuwait and to capture its capital.63 Having approved
execution of the ground campaign, President Bush told the
nation on February 23, 1991, that he had "complete
confidence in the ability of the coalition forces swiftly
and decisively to accomplish their mission."64

U.S. Mobilization

The president's professed confidence stemmed in large
part from evidence of the comparative advantages enjoyed by
coalition ground forces after the month-long air campaign.
Having lost over half of their armor and artillery, most of
the 450,000 Iraqi troops thought to remain in and around
Kuwait "were in poor condition with heavy desertions, low
morale, and a severely degraded capability to coordinate an
effective defense."65 Against this force, President Bush

“ Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War. 75-76.
“President, "Address to the Nation Announcing Allied
Military Ground Action in the Persian Gulf Conflict,"
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (4 March 1991)
vol. 27, no. 9, p. 207.
“ Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War. 142. On
the accuracy of these figures, see Keaney and Cohen, Air
Power Survey. 9-10, 105-107.
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authorized the attack by a better equipped, highly mobile
force of about 620,000 members (one-third non-American).66
The massing of this force (especially after November
1990) was an important indication of the administration's
determination to avoid a prolonged war.

As General Colin

Powell told Senators on December 3, 1990,
General Schwarzkopf, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
I believe strongly that if the Armed Forces of the
United States are asked to go into combat to achieve a
decisive, political objective [victory], we must
implement a decisive military strategy that seizes the
initiative, one that is designed to win . . . . We do
not over-estimate or under-estimate the capability of
the Iraqi armed forces. We have studied them very
closely. We understand their strength; we understand
their vulnerabilities . . . .
Based on our analysis of the mission, the enemy,
other factors, we recommended and the President
approved a force buildup capable of accomplishing the
mission which seizes the initiative and which forces
the Iraqis to consider the consequences of a combined,
overwhelming campaign against them.67
Asked about the possibility of a prolonged war two
weeks later, President Bush told reporters that he thought
"some believe this will be another Vietnam.
of Vietnam is still with us.
war."

And the agony

People remember a protracted

He added, "one of the reasons that I moved this

additional force, or had it moved, was because . . . if
there had to be some" military confrontation, "I would want

66Department of Defense, Persian Gulf Warr 387.
67Congress, Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region. 663.
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to be able to assure . . . there is enough force there to
minimize the risk" to coalition troops.68
The success of the allied ground campaign was
sufficient to force Iraq to accept the terms of a cease
fire, which went into effect February 28, 1991, one hundred
hours after the beginning of the campaign.

Estimates of

Iraqi military casualties ranged from 10,000 to 115,000
killed during the war.69 Over 85,000 enemy troops
captured or surrendered.

Iraq lost between 50 and 65

percent of its armor and 65 to 90 percent of its artillery.
Of the coalition's casualties (about 1,000), 613 were
American.

Of these, 146 were killed in action (35 by

friendly fire).70
The war against Iraq achieved its military
objectives.
restored.

Kuwait was liberated and its government
Although the Republican Guard was not destroyed,

the Iraqi army was severely damaged.

In a related vein,

Saddam's capacity to rebuild and maintain an offensive

68President, "The President's News Conference with
Regional R e p o r t e r s Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents (24 December 1990) vol. 26, no. 51, p. 2050. An
important incentive to avoid a prolonged war was the strain
of maintaining the troop commitment, which by February 11,
1991 included the second largest call up of reserves since
the Korean War. "Chronology," 78.
69Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict. 408; Douglas
Waller and John Barry, "The Day We Stopped the War,"
Newsweek. 20 January 1992, 18.
7°Ibid., Department of Defense, Persian Gulf War. 313,
577-78, 589; Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict. 408-09.
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force was significantly degraded.71 Given the intensity
and duration of the air campaign as well as the magnitude
of the ground campaign, these achievements came about
rapidly and with comparatively low coalition losses.
In a communication to House Speaker Thomas Foley on
March 19, 1991, President Bush summarized the post-war
situation.

He stated

On February 27, I ordered a suspension of
offensive combat operations. On March 2, the Security
Council adopted Resolution 686, which demanded
compliance by Iraq with the 12 resolutions previously
adopted by the Security Council. Diplomatic efforts
continue to achieve such compliance . . . .U.S. forces
have already begun to withdraw from the region, . . .
However, we will continue efforts to ensure peace and
stability in the region as contemplated by Security
Council Resolution 678.72
Working through the UN Security Council, the Bush
administration obtained passage of a series of resolutions
to force conditions on Iraq, satisfying resolution 6787s
requirement for the restoration of "peace and security" in
the Gulf.
687.

Among these resolutions, the Council adopted

Along with subsequent resolutions, 687 was unique for

"the extent to which the Council imposed obligations and
duties that directly infringed on Iraq's internal affairs."
Saddam's regime was held accountable for settling
outstanding issues with Kuwait (repatriation, boundaries,

71George, Bridging the Gap. 91.
72Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Report on Kuwait, communication from the President, 102nd
Cong., 1st sess., 20 March 1991, 1.
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reparations).

In addition, the regime was obliged to allow

for the inspection and destruction of its unconventional
weapons capabilities as well as for the delivery of
humanitarian aid to the Shi'ites and Kurds.

Economic

sanctions imposed after the August 1990 invasion of Kuwait
were left in place but were moderated to allow for a
limited export of Iraqi oil.

"These resolutions were

considered significant . . .

as possible precedents for

U.N. efforts in any future peace and security
situations."73
The resolutions compromised between the costs of more
aggressive intervention (risking additional loss of life,
fragmentation of the allied coalition, and creation of a
regional power vacuum) and the need to curb new threats by
Saddam's regime to the peace and security of the Gulf.

As

President Bush told Congress on March 6, 1991,
we've learned the hard lessons of history. The victory
over Iraq was not waged as "a war to end all wars."
Even the new world order cannot guarantee an era of
perpetual peace. But enduring peace must be our
mission.74

73Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, U.N. Security
Council Resolutions on Iraq: Compliance and
Implementation. 102nd Cong., 2nd sess., March 1992, vii.
74President, "Address Before a Joint Session of
Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf Conflict,"
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (11 March
1991) vol. 27, no. 10, 259-60.
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In pursuit of this "mission,n what guidelines did the
Persian Gulf War provide for Americans to use in evaluating
possible involvement in and conduct of other limited wars?

U.S. Public Support

Among these guidelines, the war provided an important
demonstration of the need for presidents to build and
maintain a domestic consensus in support of military
actions.

In particular, President Bush had to mobilize

Congress and the public to support large-scale offensive
operations against Iraq.

Without having faced that task,

the president could not have legitimately claimed that such
operations were undertaken only after diplomatic and
economic sanctions (discussed more fully below) had proven
ineffective in gaining Iraqi compliance with UN Security
Council resolutions.

Neither could he have maintained

legitimacy for the buildup of forces needed to carry out
those operations decisively and swiftly.
Congressional responses to that buildup reflected a
growing concern for the application of the War Powers
Resolution.

Having previously reported to Congress on his

declaration of a national emergency with respect to Iraq,
Bush sent a letter to Speaker Foley on August 9, 1990,
regarding the initial deployment of forces to Saudi Arabia.
The president stated, "I am providing this report on the
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deployment and mission of our Armed Forces in accordance
with my desire that Congress be fully informed and
consistent [not in compliance] with the War Powers
Resolution."

The further point was made that it was "not

possible to predict the precise scope and duration of this
deployment."75 All along, the president refused to
recognize the constitutionality of the resolution.
It was not until the next month, when Congress
reconvened, that members began to focus greater attention
on the resolution.

By that time, it was becoming clear

that the deployment "would not fall within the"
resolution's "sixty-day period, and that support for the
initiative and the President's popularity, at least
temporarily, had declined."76 On October 1, 1990, the
House passed H.J. Res. 658 "to support actions the
President has taken with respect to Iraqi aggression
against Kuwait and to demonstrate United States resolve."
As to compliance with the War Powers Resolution, the
resolution found that "the President has consulted with the
Congress and has kept the Congress informed with regard to
the deployment" of forces to the Gulf region.77
75Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and
Science, The Persian Gulf Crisis: Relevant Documents,
Correspondence. Reports. 102nd Cong., 1st sess., June 1991,
13.
7<sBurgin, "Congress," 242.
77Congress, Gulf Crisis:

Documents. Ill, 14, 23.
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On November 16, 1990, President Bush sent another
letter to Speaker Foley noting that
on November 8, after consultations with our Allies and
coalition partners, I announced the continued
deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf
region . . . .
I want to emphasize that this deployment is in
line with the steady buildup of U.s. Armed Forces in
the region over the last 3 months and is a continuation
of the deployment described in my letter of August
9.78
Rather than an action undertaken solely on presidential
authority, the deployment was undertaken as part of
consultations with congressional leaders "throughout the
past 3 months."79 Still, the president did not seek
Congress' permission for the deployment.
After November 1990, congressional attention focused
increasingly on the possibility of offensive operations and
the effects of diplomatic and economic sanctions.

The

ensuing discussion and debate culminated with the passage
of H.J. Res. 77 on January 12, 1991, three days before the
deadline set by U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 for
Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Authorizing the use of force

against Iraq, H.J. Res. 77 passed the House by a vote of
250 to 183 and the Senate by a vote of 52 to 47.

The joint

resolution required the president to certify that
78President, "Letter to the Speaker of the House and
the President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the Deployment
of Additional United States Armed Forces to the Persian
Gulf," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (19
November 1990) vol. 25, no. 46, p. 1834.
79Ibid., 1835.
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diplomatic and economic sanctions would not be effective
before beginning offensive operations against Iraq.
Thereafter, the president was required to report on the
status of those operations every sixty days in compliance
with the War Powers Resolution.80 The Gulf War would only
last forty-two days.
Like Congress, the public had reservations about the
necessity of war against Iraq but was still willing to
support the president's actions.

An ABC-Washinoton Post

poll repeated between August 20 and January 9, 1990, showed
an average of over 67 percent approval for Bush's handling
of Mthe situation caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait."
The highest level of approval was 78 percent on September
8.

By November 15, one week after the president announced

the deployment of additional forces to the Gulf, approval
reached its lowest level of 59 percent.81
These results were consistent with those of a Wall
Street Journal poll which found approval of the president's
overall conduct falling from 82 percent on August 20 to 51
percent on November 13.

When asked specifically about the

decision to send more troops to the Gulf region, only 51
percent approved.82
8°Congress, Congressional Record, vol. 137, no. 8,
daily ed. (12 January 1991), H443, H485, S403.
81Jentleson, "Prudent Public," 65; Public Opinion
Online.
82Dubois, "The Weinberger Doctrine," 32.
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Between the passage of Security Council Resolution
678 on November 29, 1990, and the January 15, 1991,
deadline it established for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait,
the public remained committed to war as a last resort.
After talks broke down between Secretary of State Baker and
the Iraqi foreign minister on January 9, 1990, President's
Bush's approval rating rose to 69 percent, "the highest it
had been since back in September."83 At the same time, an
ABC-Washinoton.Post poll showed that the public was nearly
evenly split between those favoring offensive operations
immediately after the deadline (49 percent) and those
favoring a longer wait for diplomatic sanctions to prompt
an Iraqi withdrawal (47 percent).

In the same poll, 62

percent favored going to war at an unspecified date after
January 15, while only 32 percent favored not going to war
at all.84 Though the public was still willing to pursue
other options, it was unwilling to give up the option of
war against Iraq.
When that option was finally carried out, the public
rallied to support it.

A Gallup poll conducted during the

first two weeks of the air campaign (January 17 to January
31, 1991) showed an average of 81 percent in favor of the
operations.85 That support remained high throughout the
83Jentleson, "Prudent Public," 66.
84Ibid.
85Schwarz, Public Opinion. 18.
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remainder of the war, including the decisive defeat dealt
to Iraqi troops uurin^ ciie uunuLeu~uOujir ground oxxensive.
In the immediate aftermath of the war, Kurds and
Shi'ites rebelled against Saddam, only to be suppressed by
Iraqi forces-

Where a Gallup-Newsweek poll (April 4-5,

1991) showed a clear majority of 78 percent favoring the
provision of humanitarian aid to the rebels, another
majority (63 percent) opposed using U.S. ground troops to
intervene on the rebels' behalf.86 Having been cautious
about the buildup of forces and the onset of major war
against Iraq, the public remained cautious of involvement
in Iraq's internal conflicts.

Military and Nonmilitarv Means

Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2,
1991, the Bush administration undertook several immediate
steps to deal with the aggression.

Working through the UN

Security Council, Ambassador Thomas Pickering obtained
emergency passage of Resolution 660 condemning Iraqi
actions and demanding an immediate and unconditional
withdrawal from Kuwait.

Acting under authority of the

International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the president
froze Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States and
prohibited transactions with Iraq.

The State Department

86Jentleson, "Prudent Public," 70.
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began diplomatic efforts to form an international coalition
against Iraq.87
From that date until November 8, 1990, the
administration achieved a number of diplomatic successes.
Secretary of State James Baker was able to convince
"thirty-three countries to contribute financially or
militarily to the anti-Iraq coalition."88

In maintaining

the coalition, the administration countered Saddam's
efforts to link the occupation of Kuwait with Israel's
occupation of Palestinian territories.89 By the end of
October, U.S. influence on the Security Council had
contributed to the passage of ten more resolutions
expanding on Resolution 660.

Among these, Resolution 661

established an international trade embargo on Iraq, and
Resolution 665 approved the use of naval force to support
that embargo.90
With these sanctions proving ineffective and over
200,000 troops committed to the defense of Saudi Arabia,

87President, "Remarks and an Exchange with Reporters,"
1184.
88Jo-Anne Hart, "American Objectives in the Crisis,"
in Iraq, the Gulf Conflict and the World Community, ed.
James Gow (London: Brassey's, 1993), 39.
89Freedman and Karsh, The Gulf Conflict, ch. 11. The
ability to counter Hussein on this issue stemmed in large
part from the president's willingness to bring the IsraeliPalestinian issue before the United Nations after Iraq
withdrew from Kuwait.
9°Brown Wells, American Foreign Policy. 466-67, 487.
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the president announced additional deployment to the Gulf
on November 8, 1990.

Although the president wanted to

assure adequate means of carrying out any necessary
offensive operations, he also wanted to increase pressure
on Iraq to comply peacefully with all Security Council
resolutions.

As he told reporters,

I think it [fielding an offensive force] sends a very
strong signal— another strong signal— to Saddam Hussein
that we are very, very serious about seeing the United
Nations resolutions complied to in their entirety,
without any kind of watering down.91
Given the substantial dangers of allowing Saddam Hussein to
profit by his aggression (e.g., encouraging further
aggression), President Bush's decision reflected a need to
avoid a prolonged crisis while still exploring alternatives
to conventional war.
The passage of Security Council Resolution 678
established a time frame for Iraqi compliance, one which
the president could not associate with specific
operations.92 As Secretary Baker told the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee,
economic sanctions and military preparations are not
alternatives, but we are really reinforcing and
escalating steps of the same strategy. Notwithstanding
our desire for peace, from the outset we have proceeded
with the full realization that if these objectives
"President, "President's News Conference," 1792.
"Setting an exact time frame for the commencement of
hostilities would have weakened domestic and international
support for war as a last resort. Moreover, Hussein might
have initiated offensive actions or reinforced his
defensive position if he had such foreknowledge.
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cannot be achieved peacefully, then we really must be
prepared to use force, given the vital interests that
we have at stake.*3
War was possible, but not inevitable.
On January 5, 1991, the president informed the nation
that
This week, we've taken one more step [to force Iraqi
compliance short of conventional war]. I have offered
to have Secretary of State James Baker meet with Iraqi
Foreign Minister Tariq, 'Aziz in Switzerland,
yesterday, we received word that Iraq has accepted our
offer to meet in Geneva. This will not be secret
diplomacy at work. Secretary Baker will restate, in
person, a message for Saddam Hussein: Withdraw from
Kuwait unconditionally and immediately, or face the
terrible consequences.94
Those consequences remained up to Saddam's choice.
When Baker met with 'Aziz on January 9, he gave him a
letter from Bush to Saddam.

The letter stated

You may be tempted to find solace in the diversity of
opinion that is American democracy. You should resist
any such temptation. Diversity ought not to be
confused with division. Nor should you underestimate,
as others have before you, America's will.9S
Whether or not Saddam would have been impressed with this
part of the letter, 'Aziz refused to deliver it.

93Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf. 101st Cong., 2nd sess., 4
and 5 December 1990, 106.
"President, "Radio Address," 15.
9SMichael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The
General's War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1995), 494.
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Conclusion

Among the wars discussed in previous chapters, the
Persian Gulf War was unique for the scale of its execution
and the extensive policy objectives it imposed on Saddam's
regime.

The war provided a further demonstration that

Americans have come to expect limited war to involve the
application of rapid and overwhelming force to avoid
prolonged conflict.

An important part of that expectation

is that such force will be preceded by the application of
unconventional or nonmilitary means (e.g., naval blockades,
economic sanctions), especially since such means provide an
extended opportunity for conventional mobilization.

The

war also demonstrated the importance of caution in its
outcome and to expect similar outcomes in future limited
wars.
The Gulf War's outcome was affected by four decades
of American exposure to the problem of limited war.

Based

on that exposure, experiences have accumulated and been
rearticulated through political processes.

Reflected in

the public statements of political leaders and in security
policies, general empirical knowledge has been gained of
those factors (i.e., interests, objectives, mobilization,
public support, nonmilitary means) influencing the outcomes
of previous limited wars (even if most Americans have not
necessarily acquired such knowledge for themselves).
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For example, shortly before leaving office in 1993,
President Bush commented oil the uses of military force.

He

said,
Using military force makes sense as a policy where the
stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective,
where no other policies are likely to prove effective,
where its application can be limited in scope and time,
and where the potential benefits justify the potential
costs and sacrifice . . . ,96
Without public debate, lessons derived from the use of
force in one war may be misapplied by policymakers in the
next.

Even with such debate, knowledge will remain

partial.

Debate can only facilitate the accumulation of

knowledge needed to pursue successful strategic outcomes.

96,,Bush/s Talk to Cadets: When 'Force Makes Sense,'"
New York Times. 6 January 1993, sec. A, p. 6; quoted in
Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1994), 292.
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CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

Over forty years since the Korean War, Americans
continue to face limited war as a fundamental challenge to
their security.

In order to help to more effectively deal

with the problem, this study has sought to develop a
pragmatic understanding of limited war (i.e., one in which
it is possible to judge in retrospect the cumulative
results of previous limited wars).

In fulfillment of that

task, this study has pursued two simultaneous goals:
first, to model and critically evaluate two types of
knowledge of relevance to policymakers in waging limited
wars; and, second, to detail the development of that
knowledge from its antecedents in the Korean War.

Reassessing the Two Models

In chapter 1, two models of knowledge were identified
as having relevance to policymakers' conduct of limited
wars.

The first model, the deductive theory of limited

war, addressed four questions.

First, what basic framework

did the theory provide for designing an effective strategy?
232
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Second, what critical variables were identified to which
policymakers had to give strategic content?

Third, what

general logic was associated with a successful limited war
strategy?

Fourth, what strategic use did policymakers make

of theory?
These questions were answered in chapter 2 and
elaborated in chapter 4.

Based on those chapters, a number

of tentative conclusions can be drawn regarding the
deductive model's policymaking impact.
In terms of the basic framework provided for an
effective limited war strategy, the Eisenhower
administration's emphasis on massive retaliation led to two
theoretical positions which would have major consequences
for United States' involvement in Vietnam.1 First,
conventional and unconventional military capabilities were
needed to compensate for overemphasis on nuclear
armaments.2 Second, the United States economy was robust
enough to support a conventional war of attrition.3
President Kennedy's decision to expand conventional and
unconventional forces as well as President Johnson's
acceptance of a strategy of attrition helped involve the

Galperin, Limited War. 2-3.
^rodie, "Unlimited Weapons," 16-21; Brodie, Missile
Age Strategy.
3Kissinger, "Military Policy," 416-28.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

234

United States in a massive ground war without a clear
withdrawal strategy.
This situation was compounded by strategic choices
made in the Johnson administration in relation to a key
variable identified by limited war theory.

Based on the

single case of the Korean War, it was argued that the U.S.
public was prone to support only total wars.4 Civilian
advisors to President Johnson seized onto that idea.
Determined to keep the war in South Vietnam from escalating
into a total war, Johnson misinformed the American public
about troop deployments in order to decrease the potential
for popular mobilization.
The generally accepted logic of the deductive model
was that the primary use of force was to achieve bargains
rather than to defeat the enemy.5 Among the advisors to
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, this logic suggested an
additional means (e.g., graduated response) of preventing
total war with the Soviet Union or China while resisting
communist aggression in Southeast Asia.
As noted in chapter 2 and detailed in chapter 4 of
this study, the effort to adapt limited war theory to the
Vietnam War served to call into question the logical
grounds upon which the theory was based.

In particular,

the deductive model of limited war was misapplied in trying
40sgood, Limited Warr Kissinger, Necessity for Choice.
Osgood, Limited War. 9-11.
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to achieve a negotiated settlement with the North
Vietnamese.

It must be remembered that there are two main

limitations on
the usefulness of such models for policymaking . . . .
First, the abstract model is not itself a strategy but
merely the starting point for constructing a strategy.
The usefulness of an abstract model of policymaking is
limited to providing the basic framework for
understanding the general requirements for designing
and implementing a strategy . . . .[T]he policymaker
has to tailor the abstract model into a specific
strategy for the particular situation at hand and for
the behavioral characteristics of [a] particular
adversary.6
The inability of policymakers to develop an adequate
strategy with respect to North Vietnam was more an
indication of their lack of understanding than of the
deductive model's lack of validity.
The second model in chapter 1 was derived from a
speech by then Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (see
Appendix).

The use of the criteria contained in that

speech as comparative standards has demonstrated that they
contain generic knowledge, knowledge based on the "study of
past experience that identifies the uses and limitations”
of strategies "and the conditions on which" their
"effective employment depends."7 In addition, the
criteria have presented an opportunity to make certain
generalizations about limited war that apply under specific
conditions.
6George, Bridging the Gao. 118.
7ibid., xvii.
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The first question derived from the Weinberger
criteria was, what were the interests used to justify the
commitment of troops to combat?

In all the cases examined

in this study, there were doctrines which played a role in
the commitment of troops to combat (e.g., containment, the
Carter doctrine).8 At the same time, there are strong
reasons to avoid allowing doctrine to become the
predominate guide in the decision to commit troops to
limited wars.9
As will be recalled from chapter 1, short of total
war, the primary standard for judging the success or
failure of a policy decision is its consistency with the
rules governing democratic discourse and participation.10
In the cases of Korea and Vietnam, the doctrinal bases for
commitment (i.e., containment, the domino principle) were
insufficient to maintain public support over the course of
American involvement.

The problem should be resolved by

building a consensus prior to the commitment of troops (as
far as possible given emergencies).

In any event, "there

8The Nixon Doctrine was enunciated within the context
of withdrawing combat forces.
9The communication of interests to the public alows
for their translation from abstract, nonoperational goals
into concrete, operational objectives whose costs can be
assessed (i.e., troop levels).
10Nincic, Democracy. 166-168.
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is a need to avoid overarching doctrines and to seek more
particular, more adaptive, and more conditional ones.”11
The second question derived from the Weinberger
criteria was, what were the political and military
objectives to be accomplished?

The evidence was clear in

the cases of Korea and Vietnam, that objectives were not
sufficiently worked out prior to the commitment of forces.
Admittedly, in Korea, President Truman was responding to an
emergency when he ordered the deployment of troops to halt
the communist advance.

Nevertheless, the decision to

reunify Korea by force stemmed from a lack of prior
consideration that the war's original objectives had
already been achieved.
The lack of clear objectives in Vietnam was most
apparent in the failure to move ahead with the process of
pacification (see chapter 4), a strategic objective, rather
than devoting primary attention to attrition, a tactical
objective.

A principle cause for the confusion of

objectives, apart from the civilian management of military
strategy, was the effort to develop strategies from theory
meant primarily to deal with nuclear war.
As indicated by the case of Grenada, although not
primarily a conventional operation, the decision to commit
enough forces to overwhelm the opposition can prove
decisive enough to compensate for a lack of time to
^ e l b and Betts, Irony of Vietnam. 367.
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establish clear objectives.

Yet, when there was a

prolonged period in which to plan for operations in Panama,
it remained necessary to reinforce from the United States
in order to make up for planning inadequacies.
The Persian Gulf War served as a primary example of
the difficulty of translating political objectives into
military objectives.

As evidenced by the decision to halt

ground operations prior to the destruction of Iraqi armored
units, there are limits beyond which even decisive military
force cannot achieve larger political concerns (i.e.,
maintaining a regional balance in the Middle East).
The third question derived from the Weinberger
criteria was, what were the main decisions regarding and
consequences of mobilization for combat?

A primary basis

for comparison between the three larger cases (Korea,
Vietnam, and Persian Gulf) in this study was the ability to
refrain from committing troops to combat until an optimum
number had been massed to affect combat.

In Korea,

President Truman committed ground forces to combat in an
emergency and at a time when the U.S. reserves were
insufficient to maintain other commitments (i.e., Europe,
the Middle East). Moreover, he accepted a prolonged
stalemate while building reserves and maintaining
negotiations, which President Eisenhower concluded with a
nuclear threat against China.
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President Johnson's decision to commit ground forces
reflected a similar concern for the situation in South
Vietnam.

It was not until the commitment of American

forces had begun to strain the ability to maintain other
commitments that he mobilized a small reserve force.
Johnson also accepted a prolonged stalemate to maintain
negotiations.

It was not until President Nixon expanded

the air and ground war against the North Vietnamese that
negotiations were achieved which allowed for the final
redeployment of ground forces from the South.
Although President Bush faced an emergency when he
deployed forces to protect Saudi Arabia, he waited until
sufficient force was massed to decisively defeat Iraqi
ground forces before ordering the commencement of offensive
operations.

The president was still willing to place

forces in a situation of imminent hostilities.

The

advantages of massing troops were to retain the initiative
for withdrawal and to impose sanctions on Iraq, an
advantage compounded by the ability to avoid attrition.
The fourth question derived from the Weinberger
criteria was, what were the levels and timing of public
support relative to combat?

In terms of congressional

support, the pattern established by President Truman of
circumventing that body's war making authority was not
greatly altered by the passage of the War Powers
Resolution.

Presidents have consistently refused to
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compromise on their position as commander-in-chief.

What

has changed is the former tendency for presidents to
involve troops in situations subject to prolonged
commitments.

The practical limit in war has become time, a

problem President Bush overcome in Iraq without
compromising on the War Powers Resolution.
Time has a similarly problematic aspect in relation
to popular support over the course of limited wars.
Between the five cases presented, a number of situations
developed which have potential applications as scenarios in
future limited wars.

At the extreme, a president might

find himself in a situation like President Nixon who, after
a prolonged attempt to negotiate a cease fire, was unable
to maintain U.S. commitments because of a climate of
retrenchment among the public.

Similarly, President Nixon

had long faced the problem of public pressure to withdraw
from South Vietnam, a situation which finally occurred
after considerable damage to national policy objectives.
In Korea, President Eisenhower escalated the war to include
nuclear threats against the Chinese in order to stem the
possibility of a prolonged negotiation process.

In the

Persian Gulf War, President Bush faced the politically
difficult decision of halting the ground war before it had
achieved all its objectives.

President Bush also delayed

supported to rebel groups in Iraq at a time when the public
was unwilling to intervene on their behalf.
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Such public concern is closely related to the fifth
question derived from the Weinberger criteria; what
combination of military and nonmilitary means were used to
achieve political objectives?

The most obvious contrast

between the five cases in regards to this question is that
the first two involved negotiations during combat, and the
last three involved the imposition of political conditions.
A fundamental issue raised by this distinction is the shift
that occurred in U.S. defense policy.
In the use of combat force as an instrument of
negotiations, those who waged the Korean War, particularly
President Truman, were exploring new territory in seeking
to negotiate an end to the war.

Those who did so in

Vietnam had come to share a view held primarily by
theorists and civilian defense strategists that war could
be waged rationally, without mobilizing public opinion.12
After Vietnam, the shift occurred in U.S. defense
policy towards the use of decisive force.13 As part of
that shift, greater emphasis was placed on domestic
consensus.

The experts who had proceeded to build up a

body of work on the theory of limited war before the
Vietnam War had forgotten to include the public in their
inquiries.

“For a fuller discussion, see Gacek, Logic of
Force.
“ Ibid.
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On Pragmatism

Pragmatism seeks the meanings of concepts in their
empirical consequences and truth in empirical consensus
achieved under conditions of continuous inquiry.

How do

these definitional criteria relate concepts to the
consequences of policy decisions?
Drawing on Dewey, several assumptions are made in
answering this question.

First, those who carry on

scientific inquiries are experts to the extent that the
knowledge they produce has technical applications with
consequences affecting and accessible to various
contextually defined publics.

Second, those

generalizations whose applications are incorporated into
policy by decision makers serve as working hypotheses
rather than absolute programs of action.

Third, in

assessing the interests served in testing hypotheses, it is
necessary to give the widest possible publicity to results.
Fourth, any consensus achieved in publicity will include
expert inquirers as well as publics with common interests
in controlling the consequences of particular inquiries.14
The concerns behind these assumptions are warranted
by the number of experts who seek or are sought to provide
knowledge to decision makers in all areas of government.
Growth in the number of ministries and agencies performing
14Dewey, Public and its Problems, ch. 6.
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new tasks indicates the increased importance of regulation
as a function of bureaucracy.

Moreover, public issues and

problems are becoming more technical.

Governmental needs

for expertise draw on an increasing range of
disciplines.15
For pragmatism, the issue becomes one of the degree
to which experts remain responsive to the interests of
various publics making up society.

In any divisible

measure of authority between technical and political
experts, lack of responsiveness is a basic political
problem.

Broadly speaking, this problem entails decision

making that is deficient to cope with the other problems
(i.e., social, economic, and legal) by which interests are
subject to aggregation.

Among the sources of deficiency, a

partial list includes lack of information, poor problem
comprehension, unequal power among participants, and too
much or not enough centralization of decision-making
authority.16 What is needful is "the improvement of the
methods and conditions of debate, discussion and
persuasion," an improvement that "depends essentially upon

15Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic
Communities and International Policy Coordination,"
International Organization 46 (May 1992): 8.
16Paul Diesing, How Does Social Science Work?.
(Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991), 79-80.
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freeing and perfecting the processes of inquiry and of
dissemination of their conclusions."17
This assertion of the primacy of political problems
is not to be confused with an assertion of the primacy of
politics.

Rather, the assertion is only of the need for

expertise to be informed by public interests through direct
social contact.

It would not be pragmatic to aim for

political forms in which inquiry could not guide public
interactions and moderate conflicts of interest between
associations.

It is accepted that knowledge "is created by

experts in a social context, thus it is not necessarily
true or complete; it often is political."18 Politics
informs inquiry and vice versa.

Pragmatism entertains the

possibility that over time the meaning of intersubjectivity
can be expanded beyond scientific inquirers to include
those who commonly experience the consequences of
inquiries.

Even when communication between the two groups

is optimized, however, there is only relative certainty as
to the meaning of truth.
Another way of expressing this proposition is with
reference to the concept of intelligence, "the observation
of consequences as consequences, that is, in connection
17Dewey, Public and its Problems. 208.
“Peter R. Lavoy, "Learning and the Evolution of
Cooperation in U.S. and Soviet Nuclear Nonproliferation
Activities," on Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy,
ed. George W. Breslauer and Phillip E. Tetlock (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1991), 743.
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with the acts from which they proceed."19 Over time, the
goal of practical action is increasingly intelligent
political decisions, a political order capable of framing,
articulating, and answering increasingly complex problems.
Science, particularly that designated as social, is
involved in politics in that it provides information,
diagnoses, and techniques to decision makers.

Such

involvement makes for intelligent politics to the extent
that it helps improve society's ability to cope with its
own problems, to regulate public consequences itself.
Democracy obtains in this process to the extent that all
persons and organizations affected by problems participate
in their solution.20 Fixed solutions arrest the
development of intelligence.
How does this methodological position differ from
others, particularly those grounded in logical empiricism?
It is helpful to remember that pragmatism argues for the
use of intelligence in promoting consensus.

Truth is

regarded as consensus achieved in the practical application
and improvement of theoretical knowledge.

Concentration is

on knowledge within historical contexts and on its
fallibility.

In seeking to reduce appeals to relativism

and arbitrariness, objectivity is translated into a

19Dewey, Public and its Problems. 12.
diesing, Social Science. 80.
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retrospective judgment rendered of theoretical knowledge
after accumulating some level of practical results.21
It is through this translation that pragmatism seeks
also to judge the progress and continuity of science.
Without accepting inevitability or precluding access to
sources of knowledge, it is possible to speak of new
knowledge in terms of theory's technological
manifestations.

The products of applied scientific

knowledge can be sufficient for judging its effectiveness.
In a sense,
despite any semantic or ideational incommensurability
between a scientific theory and its latter-day
replacements, there remains the crucial pragmatic
commensurability of a constellation of problem-solving
tasks that can (by and large) be formulated in the
ordinary everyday language that antedates scientific
sophistication. The fundamentally pragmatic aspect of
its applications in problem solving and control at the
level of everyday life manifests those continuities of
the scientific enterprise with reference to which the
idea of progress can be invoked.22
Science is not inevitably progressive, but the artifacts of
its physical activities are deemed in some measure to
indicate its progress.
More broadly, the possibility of progress presupposes
a scientific process capable of successful operation and
improvement without need of transcendent reason.

Provided

that the process is ongoing, inquiry develops criteria by
which to judge future inquiry.

Methodological assertions

21Prado, Limits of Pragmatism. 158-159.
22Rescher, Methodological Pragmatism. 188.
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with varying histories of success inform subsequent
assertions.

In other words, the logical principles that

guide inquiry are presumed to emerge from methods already
employed in science.

Improvement of those methods is to

proceed as a matter of history rather than a reflection of
knowledge derived outside science.23
A fundamental aspect of this position is in its
redirection of inquiry as a process.

Truth or falsity

would only block attempts at new directions reflecting
discrepancies between data and expected results.
Pragmatically, it stands irrelevant to debate the relative
importance assigned to "confirmation, disconfirmation,
corroboration, and verisimilitude" by philosophers.
Essentially, pragmatism reverses the logical-empiricist
"assertion that the logic of science deals solely with
testing and that discovery is a creative act following no
rules.1,24
The main pragmatic grounds for confronting logical
empiricism is its mistaken search for universal laws of
causality and a unitary scientific method.

Pragmatism

accepts a plurality of methods and treats generalizations
as relative matters subject to context.

Of identifiable

methods, those involving case studies and formal (non-

CT:

23John E. Smith, Purpose and Thought (New Haven,
Yale University Press, 1978), 99.
24Diesing, Social Science. 87.
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empirical) theorization are furthest from acceptance by
logical empiricism.

Quantitative methods, if disregarding

universality, are closest to logical empiricism.
Pragmatism, as a methodology, can utilize all three
methods.2S To the extent that the methods interfere with
or constrain the methodology of pragmatism, they can be
regarded as potentially improvable.

A Step

Just as methods are improvable, so is the knowledge
of those who employ them.

Having referred to American

pragmatism as little more than improvisation, Henry
Kissinger wrote that doctrine "is the mode of survival of a
society," enabling it to reserve "creative thought for
unusual or unexpected situations.1126
Thirty-seven years later, Kissinger wrote
First, before the United States commits itself to
combat, it should have a clear understanding of the
nature of the threat it will be confronting and of the
objectives it can realistically reach. It must have a
clear military strategy and an unambiguous definition
of what constitutes a successful political outcome.
Second, when America commits itself to military
action, there can be no alternative to victory, as
General Douglas MacArthur advised. Qualms cannot be
stilled by hesitant execution; prolonged stalemate will
sap the endurance and hence the will of the American
public. .This requires a careful elaboration of
2Sibid., 91.
26Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), 403-04.
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political goals and the military strategy to achieve
them before the decision is made to go to war.
Third, a democracy cannot conduct a serious
foreign policy if the contending factions within it do
not exercise a minimum of restraint toward each
other.27
This was hardly a rousing endorsement for participatory
democracy, but it was a gradual step in that direction.

27Kissinger, Diplomacy. 700.
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APPENDIX
TEXT OF REMARKS BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB
- November 28, 1984 -

"The Uses of Military Power11

Thank you for inviting me to be here today with the
members of the National Press Club, a group most important
to our national security.

I say that because a major point

I intend to make in my remarks today is that the singlemost critical element of a successful democracy is a strong
consensus of support and agreement for our basic purposes.
Policies formed without a clear understanding of what we
hope to achieve will never work.

And you help to build

that understanding among our citizens.
Of all the many policies our citizens deserve— and
need— to understand, none is so important as those related
to our topic today— the uses of military power.

Deterrence

will work only if the Soviets understand our firm
commitment to keeping the peace . . . and only from a well-
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informed public can we expect to have that national will
and commitment.
So today, I want to discuss with you perhaps the most
important question concerning keeping the peace.

Under

what circumstances, and by what means, does a great
democracy such as ours reach the painful decision that the
use of military force is necessary to protect our interests
or to carry out our national policy?
National power has many components, some tangible—
like economic wealth, technical preeminence.

Other

components are intangible— such as moral force, or strong
national will.

Military forces, when they are strong and

ready and modern, are a credible— and tangible— addition to
a nation's power.

When both the intangible national will

and those forces are forged into one instrument, national
power becomes effective.
In today's world, the line between peace and war is
less clearly drawn than at any time in our history.

When

George Washington, in his farewell address, warned us, as a
new democracy, to avoid foreign entanglements, Europe then
lay 2-3 months by sea over the horizon.
was protected by the width of the oceans.

The United States
Now in this

nuclear age, we measure time in minutes rather than months.
Aware of the consequences of any misstep, yet
convinced of the precious worth of the freedom we enjoy, we
seek to avoid conflict, while maintaining strong defenses.
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Our policy has always been to work hard for peace, but to
be prepared if war comes.

Yet, so blurred have the lines

become between open conflict and half-hidden hostile acts
that we cannot confidently predict where, or when, or how,
or from what direction aggression may arrive.

We must be

prepared, at any moment, to meet threats ranging in
intensity from isolated terrorist acts, to guerrilla
action, to full-scale military confrontation.
Alexander Hamilton, writing in the Federalist Papers.
said that "it is impossible to foresee or define the extent
and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent
extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to
satisfy them."

If it was true then, how much more true it

is today, when we must remain ready to consider the means
to meet such serious indirect challenges to the peace as
proxy wars and individual terrorist action.

And how much

more important is it now, considering the consequences of
failing to deter conflict at the lowest level possible.
While the use of military force to defend territory has
never been questioned when a democracy has been attacked
and its very survival threatened, most democracies have
rejected the unilateral aggressive use of force to invade,
conquer or subjugate other nations.

The extent to which

the use of force is acceptable remains unresolved for the
host of other situations which fall between these extremes
of defensive and aggressive use of force.
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We find ourself, then, face to face with a modern
paradox:

The most likely challenge to the peace— the gray

area conflicts— are precisely the most difficult challenges
to which a democracy must respond.

Yet, while the source

and nature of today's challenges are uncertain, our
response must be clear and understandable.

Unless we are

certain that force is essential, we run the risk of
inadequate national will to apply the resources needed.
Because we face a spectrum of threats— from covert
aggression, terrorism, and subversion, to overt
intimidation, to use of brute force— choosing the
appropriate level of our response is difficult.

Flexible

response does not mean just any response is appropriate.
But once a decision to employ some degree of force has been
made, and the purpose clarified, our government must have
the clear mandate to carry out, and continue to carry out,
that decision until the purpose has been achieved.

That,

too, has been difficult to accomplish.
The issue of which branch of government has authority
to define that mandate and make decisions on using force is
now being strongly contended.

Beginning in the 1970s

Congress demanded, and assumed, a far more active role in
the making of foreign policy and in the decision-making
process for the employment of military forces abroad than
had been thought appropriate and practical before.

As a

result, the centrality of decision-making authority in the

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f the copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout p erm ission.

275

executive branch has been compromised by the legislative
branch to an extent that actively interferes with that
process.

At the same time, there has not been a

corresponding acceptance of responsibility by Congress for
the outcome of decisions concerning the employment of
military forces.
Yet the outcome of decisions on whether— and when—
and to what degree— to use combat forces abroad has never
been more important than it is today.

While we do not seek

to deter or settle all the world's conflicts, we must
recognize that, as a major power, our responsibilities and
interests are now of such scope that there are few troubled
areas we can afford to ignore.

So we must be prepared to

deal with a range of possibilities, a spectrum of crises,
from local insurgency to global conflict.

We prefer, of

course, to limit any conflict in its early stages, to
contain and control it— but to do that our military forces
must be deployed in a timely manner, and be fully supported
and prepared before they are engaged, because many of those
difficult decisions must be made extremely quickly.
Some on the national scene think they can always
avoid making tough decisions.

Some reject entirely the

question of whether any force can ever be used abroad.
They want to avoid grappling with a complex issue because,
despite clever rhetoric disguising their purpose, these
people are in fact advocating a return to post-World War I
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isolationism.

While they may maintain in principle that

military force has a role in foreign policy, they are never
willing to name the circumstance or the place where it
would apply.
On the other side, some theorists argue that military
force an be brought to bear in any crisis.

Some of these

proponents of force are eager to advocate its use even in
limited amounts simply because they believe that if there
are American forces of any size present they will somehow
solve the problem.
Neither of these two extremes offers us any lasting
or satisfactory solutions.

The first— undue reserve— would

lead us ultimately to withdraw from international events
that require free nations to defend their interests from
the aggressive use of force.

We would be abdicating our

responsibilities as the leader of the free world—
responsibilities more or less thrust upon us in the
aftermath of World War II— a war incidentally that
isolationism did nothing to deter.

These are

responsibilities we must fulfill unless we desire the
Soviet Union to keep expanding its influence unchecked
throughout the world. In an international system based on
mutual interdependence among nations, and alliances between
friends, stark isolationism quickly would lead to a far
more dangerous situation for the United States:

We would
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be without allies and faced by many hostile or indifferent
nations.
The second alternative— employing our forces almost
indiscriminately and as a regular and customary part of our
diplomatic efforts— would surely plunge us headlong into
the sort of domestic turmoil we experienced during the
Vietnam War, without accomplishing the goal for which we
committed our forces.

Such policies might very well tear

at the fabric of our society, endangering the single-most
critical element of a successful democracy:

a strong

consensus of support and agreement for our basic purposes.
Policies formed without a clear understanding of what
we hope to achieve would also earn us the scorn of our
troops, who would have an understandable opposition to
being used— in every sense of the word— casually and
without intent to support them fully.

Ultimately this

course would reduce their morale and their effectiveness
for engagements we must win.

And if the military were to

distrust its civilian leadership, recruitment would fall
off and I fear an end to the all-volunteer system would be
upon us, requiring a return to a draft, sowing the seeds of
riot and discontent that so wracked the country in the
'60s.
We have not restored high morale and pride in the
uniform throughout the services.

The all-volunteer system
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is working spectacularly well.

Are we willing to forfeit

what we have fought so hard to regain?
In maintaining our progress in strengthening
America's military deterrent, we face difficult challenges.
For we have entered an era where the dividing lines between
peace and war are less clearly drawn, the identity of the
foe is much less clear. In World Wars I and II, we not only
knew who our enemies were, but we shared a clear sense of
why the principles espoused by our enemies were unworthy.
Since these two wars threatened our very survival as
a free nation and the survival of our allies, they were
total wars, involving every aspect of our society.

All our

means of production, all our resources were devoted to
winning.

Our policies had the unqualified support of the

great majority of our people.

Indeed, World Wars I and II

ended with the unconditional surrender of our enemies . . .
the only acceptable ending when the alternative was the
loss of our freedom.
But in the aftermath of the Second World War, we
encountered a more subtle form of warfare— warfare in
which, more often than not, the face of the enemy was
masked.

Territorial expansionism could be carried out

indirectly by proxy powers, using surrogate forces aided
and advised from afar.

Some conflicts occurred under the

name of "national liberation," but far more frequently
ideology or religion provided the spark to the tinder.
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Our adversaries can also take advantage of our open
society, and our freedom of speech and opinion to use
alarming rhetoric and disinformation to divide and disrupt
our unity of purpose.

While they would never dare to allow

such freedoms to their own people, they are quick to
exploit ours by conducting simultaneous military and
propaganda campaigns to achieve their ends.
They realize that if they can divide our national
will at home, it will not be necessary to defeat our forces
abroad.

So by presenting issues in bellicose terms, they

aim to intimidate Western leaders and citizens, encouraging
us to adopt conciliatory positions to their advantage.
Meanwhile they remain sheltered from the force of public
opinion in their countries, because public opinion there is
simply prohibited and does not exist.
Our freedom presents both a challenge and an
opportunity.

It is true that until democratic nations have

the support of the people, they are inevitably at a
disadvantage in a conflict.

But when they do have that

support they cannot be defeated.

For democracies have the

power to send a compelling message to friend and foe alike
by the vote of their citizens.

And the American people

have sent such a signal by re-electing a strong chief
executive.

They know that President Reagan is willing to

accept the responsibility for his actions and is able to
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lead us through these complex times by insisting that we
regain both our military and our economic strength.
In today's world where minutes count, such decisive
leadership is more important than ever before.

Regardless

of whether conflicts are limited, or threats are illdefined, we must be capable of quickly determining that the
threats and conflicts either do or do not affect the vital
interests of the United States and our allies . . . and
then responding appropriately.
Those threats may not entail an immediate, direct
attack on our territory, and our response may not
necessarily require the immediate or direct defense of our
homeland.

But when our vital national interests and those

of our allies are at stake, we cannot ignore our safety, or
forsake our allies.
At the same time, recent history has proven that we
cannot assume unilaterally the role of the world's
defender.

We have learned that there are limits to how

much of our spirit and blood and treasure we can afford to
forfeit in meeting our responsibility to keep peace and
freedom.

So while we may and should offer substantial

amounts of economic and military assistance to our allies
in their time of need, and help them maintain forces to
deter attacks against them— usually we cannot substitute
our troops or our will for theirs.
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We should only engage our troops if we must do so as
a matter of our own vital national interest.

We cannot

assume for other sovereign nations the responsibility to
defend their territory— without their strong invitation—
when our own freedom is not threatened.
On the other hand, there have been recent cases where
the United States has seen the need to join forces with
other nations to try to preserve the peace by helping with
negotiations, and by separating warring parties, and thus
enabling those warring nations to withdraw from hostilities
safely.

In the Middle East, which has been torn by

conflict for millennia, we have sent our troops in recent
years both to the Sinai and to Lebanon, for just such a
peacekeeping mission.

But we did not configure or equip

those forces for combat— they were armed only for their
self-defense.

Their mission required them to be— and to be

recognized as— peacekeepers.

We knew that if conditions

deteriorated so they were in danger, or if because of the
actions of the warring nations, their peace keeping mission
could not be realized, then it would be necessary either to
add sufficiently to the number and arms of our troops— in
short to equip them for combat . . . or to withdraw them.
And so in Lebanon, when we faced just such a choice,
because the warring nations did not enter into withdrawal
or peace agreements, the President properly withdrew forces
equipped only for peacekeeping.
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In those cases where our national interests require
us to commit combat forces, we must never let there be
doubt of our resolution.

When it is necessary for our

troops to be committed to combat, we must support them, as
effectively and resolutely as our strength- permits.

When

we commit our troops to combat we must do so with the sole
object of winning.
Once it is clear our troops are required, because our
vital interests are at stake, then we must have the firm
national resolve to commit every ounce of strength
necessary to win the fight to achieve our objectives.

In

Grenada we did just that.
Just as clearly, there are other situations where
United States combat forces should not be used.

I believe

the postwar period has taught us several lessons, and from
them I have developed six major tests to be applied when we
are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad.

Let me

now share them with you:
1. First, the United States should not commit forces
to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or
occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that
of our allies.

That emphatically does not mean that we

should declare beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950,
that a particular area is outside our strategic perimeter.
2. Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat
troops into a given situation, we should do so
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wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning.
If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources
necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit
them at all.

Of course if the particular situation

requires only limited force to win our objectives, then we
should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly.
When Hitler broker treaties and remilitarized the
Rhineland, small combat forces then could perhaps have
prevented the holocaust of World War II.
3.

Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat

overseas, we should have clearly defined political and
military objectives.

And we should know precisely how our

forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives.
And we should have and send the forces needed to do just
that.

As Clausewitz wrote, "No one starts a war— or

rather, no one in his senses ought to do so— without first
being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that
war, and how he intended to conduct it."
War may be different today than in Clausewitz's time,
but the need for well-defined objectives and a consistent
strategy is still essential.

If we determine that a combat

mission has become necessary for our vital national
interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job—
and not assign a combat mission to a force configured for
peacekeeping.
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4. Fourth. the relationship between our objectives
and the forces we have committed— their size, composition
and disposition— must be continually reassessed and
adjusted if necessary.

Conditions and objectives

invariably change during the course of a conflict.

When

they do change, then so must our combat requirements.

We

must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the
basic questions:
interest?”

"Is this conflict in our national

Does our national interest require us to fight,

to use force of arms?"
must win.

If the answers are "yes," then we

If the answers are "no," then we should not be

in combat.
5. Fifth. before the U.S. commits combat forces
abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance we will
have the support of the American people and their elected
representatives in Congress.

This support cannot be

achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats
we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing
and close consultation.

We cannot fight a battle with the

Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war
overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking
our troops not to win, but just to be there.
6. Finally. the commitment of U.S. forces to combat
should be a last resort.
I believe that these tests can be helpful in deciding
whether or not we should commit our troops to combat in the
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months and years ahead.

The point we must all keep

uppermost in our minds is that if we ever decide to commit
forces to combat, we must support those forces to the
fullest extent of our national will for as long as it takes
to win.

So we must have in mind objectives that are

clearly defined and understood and supported by the widest
possible number of our citizens.

And those objectives must

be vital to our survival as a free nation and to the
fulfillment of our responsibilities as a world power.

We

must also be farsighted enough to see when immediate and
strong reactions to apparently small events can prevent
lion-like responses that may be required later.

We must

never forget those isolationists in Europe who shrugged
that "Danzig is not worth a war," and "why should we fight
to keep the Rhineland demilitarized?"
These tests I have just mentioned have been phrased
negatively for a purpose— they are intended to sound a note
of caution— caution that we must observe prior to
committing forces to combat overseas.

When we ask our

military forces to risk their very lives in such
situations, a note of caution is not only prudent, it is
morally required.
In many situations we may apply these tests and
conclude that a combatant role is not appropriate.

Yet no

one should interpret what I am saying here today as an
abdication of America's responsibilities— either to its own
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citizens or to its allies.

Nor should these remarks be

misread as a signal that this country, or this
Administration, is unwilling to commit forces to combat
overseas.
We have demonstrated in the past that, when our vital
interests or those of our allies are threatened, we are
ready to use force, and use it decisively, to protect those
interests.

Let no one entertain any illusions— if our

vital interests are involved, we are prepared to fight.
And we are resolved that if we must fight, we must win.
So, while these tests are drawn from lessons we have
learned from the past, they also can— and should— be
applied to the future.

For example, the problems

confronting us in Central America today are difficult.

The

possibility of more extensive Soviet and Soviet-proxy
penetration into this hemisphere in months ahead is
something we should recognize.

If this happens we will

clearly need more economic and military assistance and
training to help those who want democracy.
The President will not allow our military forces to
creep— or be drawn gradually— into a combat role in Central
America or any other place in the world.

And indeed our

policy is designed to prevent the need for direct American
involvement.

This means we will need sustained

congressional support to back and give confidence to our
friends in the region.
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I believe that the tests I have enunciated here today
can, if applied carefully, avoid the danger of this
gradualist incremental approach which almost always means
the use of insufficient force.

These tests can help us to

avoid being drawn inexorably into an endless morass, where
it is not vital to our national interest to fight.
But politics and principles such as these require
decisive leadership in both the executive and legislative
branches of government— and they also require strong and
sustained public support.

Most of all, these policies

require national unity of purpose.

I believe the United

States now possesses the policies and leadership to gain
that public support and unity.

And I believe that the

future will show we have the strength of character to
protect peace with freedom.
In summary, we should all remember these are the
policies— indeed the only policies— that can preserve for
ourselves, our friends, and our posterity, peace with
freedom.
I believe we can continue to deter the Soviet Union
and other potential adversaries from pursuing their designs
around the world.

We can enable our friends in Central

America to defeat aggression and gain the breathing room to
nurture democratic reforms.

We can meet the challenge

posed by the unfolding complexity of the 1980s.
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We will then be posed to begin the last decade of
this century amid a peace tempered by realism, and secured
by firmness and strength.

And it will be a peace that will

enable all of us— ourselves at home, and our friends
abroad— to achieve a quality of life, both spiritually and
materially, far higher than man has even dared to dream.
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